Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction December 1993 OTA-BP-ISC-115 NTIS order #PB94-126984 GPO stock #052-003-01361-4 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993). Foreword ontrolling the spread of weapons of mass destruction depends on how hard it is to manufacture them and on how easy such weapon programs are to detect. This background paper, a companion volume to OTA’s report Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,cl reviews the technical requirements for countries to develop and build nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, along with the systems most capable of delivering these weapons to distant or defended targets: ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, and cruise missiles. It identities evidence that might indicate the production of weapons of mass destruction, and technical hurdles that might provide opportunities to control their spread. Of the weapons considered here, nuclear weapons are the most difficult and expensive to develop-primarily due to the difficulty of producing the required nuclear materials. These materials, and the equipment needed to produce them, have quite limited civilian applications and are tightly controlled. States have produced nuclear weapon materials indigenously by evading international controls, but at great cost and with substantial opportunity for detection. For chemical and biological weapon materials, in contrast, most of the equipment needed also has civilian applications and has become widely available, making the capability to produce such weapons much more difficult to monitor and control. The level of technology required to produce weapons of mass destruction is relatively modest: ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons date back to World War II, and basic chemical and biological weapons predate even that. Since export controls ultimately cannot block the spread of general technological capability, an effective nonproliferation regime must supplement them with other nonproliferation policy measures. Nevertheless, export controls can prevent states from pursuing the easiest or most direct routes to weapons of mass destruction, and they will remain an important component of nonproliferation policy. ‘ U.S. Congess, Office of ‘lkchnology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruch’on.” Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993). Roger C. Herdman, Director . III Advisory Panel James E. Goodbyl John M. Googin Gary Milhollin Chairman through 3/22/93 Senior Staff Consultant Director Distinguished Service Professor Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Carnegie-Mellon University Robert G. Gough James F. Leonard2 Senior Member, Technical Staff Marvin M. Miller Chairman since 6/1/93 Sandia National Laboratories Senior Research Scientist 3 Department of Nuclear Engineering Executive Director Elisa D. Harris Washington Council on Massachusetts Institute of Technology Non-Proliferation Senior Research Analyst The Brookings Institution Janne E. Nolan George Anzelon Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Associate Division Leader Geoffrey Kemp The Brookings Institution Senior Associate Lawrence Livermore National William C. Potter Laboratory Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Director Will D. Carpenter 4 Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies Joshua Lederberg Chemical Industry Consultant Monterey Institute of International Rockefeller University Studies Lewis A. Dunn Assistant Vice President John W. Lewis Barbara Hatch Rosenberg Science Applications Center for International Division of Natural Sciences International Corp. Security and Arms Control State University of Stanford University New York at Purchase Randall Forsberg Lee W. Mercer s Executive Director Lawrence Scheinman Institute for Defense and Corporate Export Manager Associate Director Disarmament Studies Digital Equipment Corp. Peace Studies program Cornell University Thomas R. Fox Matthew S. Meselson Leonard S. Spector Director Department of Biochemistry Office of National Security and Molecular Biology Senior Associate Technology Harvard University Carnegie Endowment for Pacific Northwest Laboratories International Peace Stephen M. Meyer Sergio C. Trindade Alan R. Goldhammer Center for International Studies Director of Technical Affairs Massachusetts Institute of President Industrial Biotechnology Technology SE2T International, Ltd. Association 21 Resimexi to become Chief U.S. Ne~otiator for Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weawns. Panei member until June 1, 1993; I%nel chair atler June 1, 1993. 3 Resigned Jan. 29, 1993 to join National Seeurity Council staff. 4 Ex-officio; Member of ‘kchnology Assessment klviso~ Council. 5 Resigned Aug. 13, 1993 to become Counselor for Nonproliferation in the U.S. Department of Energy. NOTE: O’E4 appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel does nof however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the amuacy of its contents, iv Preject Staff Peter Blair Gerald L. Epstein ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF Assistant Director Project Director Jacqueline Robinson Boykin Industry, Commerce, and International Office Administrator Security Division Thomas H. Karas Louise Staley Alan Shaw Jonathan B. Tucker Administrative Secretary Program Manager International Security and CONTRACTORS Commerce Program CONTRIBUTORS Dan Fenstermacher Kenneth E. Freeman Eugene Gholz Jacques Hyman William W. Keller Todd M. La Porte Additional Reviewers Kenneth E. Apt John R. Harvey Thomas S. O’Beirne Los Alamos National Laboratory Center for International Security Science Applications International Los Alamos, NM and Arms Control Corp. Stanford University McLean, VA Gordon M. Burck Stanford, CA EAI COrp. Kyle B. Olson Alexandria, VA David L. Huxsoll Chemical and Biological Arms School of Veterinary Medicine Control Institute Zachary S. Davis Louisiana State University Alexandria, VA Congressional Research Service Baton Rouge, LA Library of Congress William C. Patrick Ill Washington, DC Kenneth W. Jewett Biological Warfare Consultant Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force Frederick, MD William C. Dee Grand Forks Air Force Base Chemical-Biological Defense Command Grand Forks, ND Michael Rosenthal Us. Army U.S. Arms Control and Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD Gregory W. Jordan Disarmament Agency Northrop Corp. Washington, DC James de Montmollin Los Angeles, CA Albuquerque, NM Oswald F. Schuette David A. Kay Department of Physics and Astronomy Alexander DeVolpi Science Applications International University of South Carolina Arms Control and Corp. Columbia, SC Nonproliferation Program McLean, VA Argonne National Laboratory Nelson F. Sievering, Jr. Argonne, IL Robert E. Kelley Atlantic Council of the United States Action Team Washington DC C. Robert Dietz International Atomic Energy Sunnyvale, CA Agency Jessica Stern Vienna, Austria Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Warren H. Donnelly Livermore, CA Congressional Research Service Ronald A. Kerst Library of Congress Lawrence Livermore National George Sutton Washington, DC Laboratory Danville, CA David W. Dorn Livermore, CA Leo Zeftel United Nations Special Commission George Lo Chemical Industry Consultant for Iraq Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. Wilmington, DE New York, NY Palo Alto, CA Alan P. Zelicoff Michael S. Elleman Benoit F. Morel Sandia National Laboratory Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. Department of Engineering and Albuquerque, NM Palo Alto, CA Public Policy Raymond A. Zilinskas Harold A. Feiveson Carnegie-Mellon University University of Maryland Center for Energy and Pittsburgh, PA Biotechnology Institute Environmental Studies Thomas Morgan Catonsville, MD Princeton University Alexandria, VA Princeton, NJ Peter D. Zimmerman Stephen S. Morse Center for Strategic and Thomas W. Graham The Rockefeller University International Studies International Security Program New York, NY Washington, DC The Rockefeller Foundation New York, NY NOTE: OT4 appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers do not. however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full resp6-hsib@ for the-report and the accuracy of its contents: vi ——.——. c ontents 1 Introduction and Summary 1 Nuclear Weapons 3 Chemical Weapons, 6 Biological Weapons 8 Delivery Systems 11 2 Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 15 Summary 16 Acquiring a CW Capability 18 Agents and Production Processes 21 Indicators of CW Proliferation Activities 36 Alternative Proliferation Pathways 53 Append ix 2-A: Techniques for the Detection and Analysis of Chemical Signatures 59 3 Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation 71 summary 73 Biological and Toxin Agents 76 Acquiring a BTW Capability 82 Indicators of BTW Agent Production 99 Military Implications of Genetic Engineering 113 vii 4 Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 119 Overview and Findings 120 Acquiring Nuclear Weapon Capability 127 Sources of Nuclear Materials 129 From Nuclear Materials to Nuclear Weapons 149 Signatures of Nuclear Proliferation Activities 161 Appendix 4-A: Components, Design, and Effects of Nuclear Weapons 173 Appendix 4-B: Enrichment Technologies 176 Appendix 4-C: Safeguards and the Civilian Nuclear