ABSTRACT “THE JAWS OF MARS ARE TRADITIONALLY WIDE … AND HIS APPETITE IS INSATIABLE”: TRUMAN, THE BUDGET, AND NATIONAL SECURITY by Edward Trowbridge Strong Harry Truman based his efforts to create and run the Department of Defense on his interpretation that the best way to sustain effective national security was through balanced budgets. Once Defense budgets fell, Truman could offset the security imbalance through programs such as Universal Military Training and aid programs to Europe for mutual defense. Desperate to cut military expenditures after World War II, Truman failed to provide adequate leadership during the unification debates and allowed James Forrestal to much control over the shape of the Department. Forrestal, whose national security ideology favored coordination of efforts, struggled to effectively execute either national security vision. The dysfunction of the Department of Defense in its first five years emerged from this ideological clash. Consequently, when given a chance to amend the original National Security Act and replace Forrestal, Truman selected a Secretary who did not possess a unique security ideology and would execute Truman’s directions. While initially successful in reducing defense budgets, the rising tensions of the Cold War ultimately revealed the dangerous shortcomings of Truman’s policies. Truman’s hope to create and sustain cost-effective security fell apart with the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased anxiety of the Soviet threat. “THE JAWS OF MARS ARE TRADITIONALLY WIDE … AND HIS APPETITE IS INSATIABLE”: TRUMAN, THE BUDGET, AND NATIONAL SECURITY A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts by Edward Trowbridge Strong Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2019 Advisor: Dr. Amanda McVety Reader: Sheldon Anderson Reader: Lindsay Schakenbach Regele ©2019 Edward Trowbridge Strong This Thesis titled “THE JAWS OF MARS ARE TRADITIONALLY WIDE … AND HIS APPETITE IS INSATIABLE”: TRUMAN, THE BUDGET, AND NATIONAL SECURITY by Edward Trowbridge Strong has been approved for publication by The College of Arts and Science and Department of History ____________________________________________________ Dr. Amanda McVety ______________________________________________________ Dr. Sheldon Anderson _______________________________________________________ Dr. Lindsay Schakenbach Regele Table of Contents Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………………iv I. Introduction …………………………………………………………………...1 II. Chapter 1 ……………………………………………………………………...8 III. Chapter 2 …………………………………………………………………….34 IV. Chapter 3 …………………………………………………………………….56 V. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………...…...79 VI. Bibliography ……………………………...…………………………………82 iii Acknowledgment I would like to thank Miami University for giving me this opportunity, my advisor Amanda McVety for her endless work to help and support me, and the History Department Faculty for challenging and encouraging me throughout my time. Finally, I want to thank my fellow Graduate Students, in my cohort and those before and after us. Your support and commiseration at times was valuable beyond words. I will miss our days in the office together. iv “The Jaws of Mars are Traditionally Wide … and His Appetite is Insatiable”: Truman, the Budget, and National Security In his memoir Counsel to the President, Clark Clifford wrote of the Department of Defense, “Today’s national security structure was not the product of divinely inspired concept, rather, it was the result of compromises President Truman made as he fought a bitter struggle with Congress and many of his own civilian and military subordinates.”1 This observation, from a man whom himself served as Secretary of Defense for Lyndon Johnson, denotes the unavoidable chaos that came from attempting to give structure to an amorphous concept. In the hands of policymakers, how one interpreted national security varied greatly and could have significant implications for policy. When Truman and his contemporaries agreed to compromise on their varied security interpretations, they created a confused and compromised structure: The Department of Defense. They enshrined the ambiguity of the concept into the department’s structure by failing to definitively establish a definition for national security. Historian Melvyn Leffler wrote that: “To be sure, national security … is an ambiguous symbol. Security is used to encompass so many goals that there is no uniform agreement on what it encompasses and hence no universal understanding of the concept.”2 National security thought dominated the post-1945 world, but the term lacked a unanimous understanding. Multiple interpretations vied for dominance and created confusion. Despite the commonality of the term, the historiography does not provide enough consideration of how the individual national security interpretations of central figures shaped national security policy debates. The National Security Act of 1947 was meant to be the foundation of the new American security structure, the same one which Clifford evoked. The problem, however, was the foundation was unstable. Years of infighting amongst the military branches, Congressional gridlock, and inconsistent Presidential leadership created a flawed foundation. Despite men like Harry Truman and James Forrestal knowing that the foundation was not solid, they still began to build the security structure on it. Truman and Forrestal had alternative views of how that structure should look, what apparatus would best ensure American security. Forrestal attempted to build a dual structure to fulfill both his own and Truman’s concept of security once the 1 Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), 147. 2 Melvyn Leffler, “National Security,” The Journal of American History Vol 77, No. 1 (June, 1990): 143. 1 foundational legislation passed. Within the Department of Defense, Forrestal advanced by his own and Truman’s security interpretations simultaneously, adding to the confusion and creating an organization with too many goals and not enough power to achieve them. This proved disastrous. The result was the “bitter struggle” that Clifford described. Once Forrestal was gone, Truman turned to someone he could trust to pursue only his vision. Ultimately, however, Truman’s structure proved untenable in the landscape of the early Cold War. Harry Truman’s structural concepts rested on his interpretation that the best way to sustain effective national security was through balanced budgets and economic freedom. Once Defense budgets were reduced, Truman intended to offset the security imbalance through programs such as Universal Military Training (UMT) and aid programs to Europe for mutual defense. To Truman, bloated military spending could be as dangerous to security as any foreign power. For Truman’s first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, inadequate coordination between government institutions might be the difference between American survival and destruction. Desperate to cut military expenses after World War II, Truman failed to provide adequate leadership during the unification debates. This failure of leadership gave James Forrestal too much control over the shape of the Department. Forrestal, however, attempted to implement both his and Truman’s security interpretations. The dysfunction of the Department of Defense in its first five years emerged directly from Forrestal’s failure to pursue a coherent policy within the Department of Defense. Consequently, when given a chance to amend the original National Security Act and replace Forrestal, Truman selected a Secretary of Defense who would not pursue his security interpretation and would execute Truman’s directions. While initially successful in reducing defense budgets, the rising tensions of the Cold War ultimately revealed the dangerous shortcomings of Truman’s policies. Truman’s hope to create and sustain cost-effective security fell apart with the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased anxiety of the Soviet threat. How these two men interpreted national security and envisioned the most effective policy requires more discussion than the historiography currently provides. The conflagration of the end of World War II, the beginning of the Cold War, and the shifting emphasis to permanent war readiness within the United States government meant that national security had no clear definition. As a result, Truman and Forrestal’s philosophies received extensive consideration because there was no clear precedent to follow. 2 Historians have written extensively about national security since the end of World War II. The effects of national security interpretations on policy fundamentally altered how the United States Government approached its defense and role within the world community. Understanding how those security interpretations evolved and adapted has been a central question for historians. These historians, however, did not give enough attention to how personal security interpretations altered policy. The historiography, such as Douglas Stuart’s emphasis on Pearl Harbor, too often focuses on how world events shaped security policy. It is essential, however, to understand how those responsible for giving security structure thought. Regardless of world events, the main catalyst for security policy innovation was the personal interpretation of those tasked with giving structure to ambiguous rhetoric. Harry Truman’s interpretation was different from James Forrestal’s. The compromise that created