Obtained by Inside Defense National Air and Space Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio Table of Contents Page Number Key Findings 3 Air Dominance 4 Network Centric Warfare 5 Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and 6 Reconnaissance Mult-Role Fighter 10 Fourth Generaton Fighter 12 Fifh Generaton Fighter 18 Sixth Generaton Fighter 24 Air-to-Air Missiles 25 Global and Regional Strike 27 Cruise Missiles and 29 Hypersonics Air Combat Tactcs 30 Scientifc and Technical Analysis of Aerodynamic Systems Aircraf and weapons will remain a doctrinal part of foreign military strategy. As advanced technologies incrementally improve aerodynamic threat capabilites, it is imperatve that scientfc and technical analysis contnues to evaluate the capabilites and limitatons of emerging systems. Scientfc and technical intelligence is geared toward preventng technological surprise, ensuring technical superiority for US weapons systems for their entre life cycle, and maintaining an air combat advantage for US air forces. As foreign systems capabilites approach near parity with US systems, a more detailed understanding of their capabilites is required to maintain US air dominance. Obtained by Inside Defense 2 Key Findings Foreign militaries have learned from US and Coaliton air combat operatons during recent conficts, and seek to resolve air combat defciencies using US airpower as the yardstck. China and Russia are currently the only near- peer threat countries that are equipped with the aerodynamic systems and air forces to challenge US and Coaliton forces. Russian T-50 Key Findings • China and Russia are working toward a network warfare strategy that creates a kill chain matrix to fnd, fx, target, track, and engage potental targets. • Russia remains a key original equipment supplier of aircraf and aerodynamic weapons to rogue natons. • The global aerospace industry uses common aerodynamic system designs to allow customizaton of technology. • China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey are each developing ffh-generaton fghter aircraf. The most prominent are the Chinese J-20 and the Russian T-50 (PAK-FA). • China and Russia both contnue to revitalize, research, and develope new strategic bombers to create a global-reach capability using cruise missiles and ant-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). • Land-atack cruise missiles (LACMs) present a major threat to both military operatons and potentally the United States. Over 10 foreign countries currently produce and export LACMs, and over 30 countries own and employ them. • Almost any mult-role fghter or bomber can be confgured to carry a weapon of mass destructon. Obtained by Inside DefenseChinese J-20 3 Air Dominance The United States and its Coaliton partners have maintained air dominance because of technical and tactcal air systems superiority. The ability to protect US forces from airborne atack provides a safe operatng environment for persistent air surveillance, plus the freedom to maneuver for military and civil air, ground, and maritme assets. Air dominance has become a military instrument of power that provides the United States with an asymmetric advantage over nearly any country in the world. That advantage is being eroded by foreign weapons systems being designed and felded today. The relatve ease for achieving air dominance during recent conficts has created a grossly inaccurate percepton that foreign military weapons systems will remain technologically inferior to US equipment. The technology being incorporate into foreign weapons systems since the turn of the century is the most signifcant threat to US air combat observed in decades. The advantages once held by US legacy combat aircraf are quickly eroding with select adversaries. Near-Peer Air Threat: Potental adversaries that have advanced aerodynamic systems, operatonal inventories, and integrated air defenses to directly challenge sustained US air dominance. This includes potental adversaries that have an aerodynamic power projecton capability. China and Russia are considered the only near-peer threats. Chinese J-16 Asymmetric Air Threat: Potental adversaries operate aerodynamic systems, but cannot compete directly with US airpower because of limited technology, small inventories, or a limited integrated air defense. Asymmetric air threats ofen include leading technology that could disrupt or delay US air dominance, and temporarily deny US access to a partcular country or region. Russian Su-35S Obtained by Inside Defense 4 Network-Centric Warfare Individual physical airborne threats remain a concern, but they can no longer be viewed as single threat platorms. Transformaton toward informaton warfare drives integrated informaton sharing among threat platorms enabling faster, more precise, more efectve employment. Emerging network-centric warfare will ultmately require the combined analysis of foreign air, space, ground, and sea capabilites together to fully comprehend a potental adversary capability. Signifcant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) developments are occurring in China and Russia, where network warfare strategies are evolving to establish a mult-layered sensor and communicaton architecture for regional actvity monitoring. Advanced sensor computer processing and communicatons data links allow networks to passively track and rapidly combine data for surveillance, target de-conficton, and weapons delivery against fxed or even mobile targets within minutes. Passive tracking capabilites provide US aircraf or ships litle to no threat warning. Obtained by Inside Defense 5 Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Fixed-Wing Airborne ISR Over 1,300 foreign fxed-wing ISR aircraf and 2,000 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs) are in operaton in 40 countries. These systems utlize radar, electro-optcal (EO) cameras, and/or infrared (IR) sensors to monitor, detect, and identfy threats in the air, sea, or on the ground. These ISR assets can also direct intercepts of these threats. ISR aircraf support persistent surveillance networks designed for the protecton of natonal interests, including patrol of shipping lanes, preventng drug trafcking, environmental monitoring, and stemming illegal immigraton. These same foreign ISR assets have been used to collect data on US military force locatons, command structures, operatng methods, and training paterns. This data can be used to create electronic databases of US military equipment and defne US capabilites. Chinese Airborne ISR Systems that Ofer a Layered Sensor Network Obtained by Inside Defense 6 Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Airborne Early Warning and Control Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraf are force multpliers in that they amplify the capabilites of a natonal military to detect, track, and target threats. AEW&C extend the range of a country’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network. In partcular, these systems are beter suited to detect low-alttude targets at greater standof distances. Untl recently, only the United States, Russia, and NATO were capable of efectvely operatng such aircraf. Since 2000, Russia, China, Israel, and Sweden have marketed new AEW&C aircraf that incorporate state-of-the-art Russian A-50 radar technology, such as actve electronically scanned arrays (AESA). The reduced size of solid-state electronics and advances in radar technology allow smaller aircraf to be converted to AEW&C. The end result is an increase in proliferaton to smaller cash-strapped natons that desire this ISR capability. Pakistan’s procurement of the Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C aircraf is an excellent example of how smaller foreign militaries are integratng AEW&C. Chinese KJ-2000 AWACS Obtained by Inside Defense 7 Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Swedish Saab 340 Chinese KJ-200 Obtained by Inside Defense 8 Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Actve Electronically Scanned Array Today’s AEW&C aircraf are fted with AESA radars that ofer instantaneous target updates; electronic beam steering; advanced radar modes; vastly improved signal and data processing; very large search volumes; the ability to stare at a target or electronically steer the radar beam; and track thousands of targets simultaneously. These features combine to provide faster target acquisiton tme, more accurate target positon data, and increased ability to detect low-observable targets. AESAs ofer increases fexibility, allowing for specialized modes designed to fnd specifc targets, such as cruise missiles and ground targets. Simultaneous Functons of AESA Radars Obtained by Inside Defense 9 Multi-Role Fighter Fighter aircraf designs were historically focused on aerodynamics and engines geared toward speed and maneuverability to win traditonal dogfght scenarios. Today’s integrated air defense and network warfare strategies demand fghter aircraf that fuse data from multple sensors across the informaton spectrum to enhance pilot situatonal awareness; use high-bandwidth communicatons and data links to share data among air defense partcipants in near-real tme; and employ sophistcated, precise, long-range weapons. Russian Su-30SM Chinese J-11B Obtained by Inside Defense 10 Multi-Role Fighter The signifcant technical advantage held by US fghter aircraf has subtly eroded, as the cost and complexity of weapons system development has increased. This forced the global aerospace industry to consolidate and engage in joint development programs for survival. Mergers blurred the lines between diferent indigenous