KAREL MOM (Amsterdam) Philosophy, linguistic analysis, and linguistics I Introduction In his essay about Chomsky’s generative grammar Flach assesses the philo- sophically relevant doctrines of Chomsky’s linguistic theory. Generally, Flach considers those doctrines as philosophically relevant that are amena- ble or at least directly connective to a philosophic discipline. 1 On the basis of his assessment, Flach declares the development of this theory a second linguistic turn in philosophy (LT2), stretching from the late 1950s through the 1960s. 2 This verdict Chomsky owes to his discussion of the reciprocal epistemological relation between linguistics and philosophy. 3 Flach observes that LT1, in its varieties of ideal language philosophy (ILP), ordinary language philosophy (OLP) and the ontologic-hermeneutical doctrine of communication has scarcely produced an account of the prob- lem of language, i.e. of the structure of language along with its systematic classification. 4 By contrast, LT2, with the generative grammar as its main as- set, reveals this problemtheoretical deficit of LT1 in its quest for a philoso- phical theory of language which could serve as the philosophical foundation 1 Flach, W. 1974: Die generative linguistische Theorie und die Prinzipienlehre des Denkens . In: Simon, J. (ed.), Aspekte und Probleme der Sprachphilosophie. Freiburg, 69-110, 92. Flach considers publications of Chomsky’s from Chomsky, N. 1957: Syntactic Structures . The Hague , up till 1970 (Ibid., 78 fn. 21.) For a recent development of Chomsky’s theory see below. 2 Die generative … , 73. 3 Ibid., 24 fn. 12. Notice that Flach uses the word ‘Wechselbeziehung’, which cap- tures, though not states explicitly, the asymmetry of this relation, linguistics being principiated by the principles that epistemology purports to establish. 4 Ibid., 70f., Bergmann, G. 1964: Logic and reality . Madison. Bergmann does not dis- tinguish Flach’s third variety, which, incidentally, equally is met with Flach’s criticism, specifically for its abstract-theoretically oriented neotranscendentalism ( Die generative …, 99 fn. 44.). For a similar scepticism as regards the transcendental po- tential of linguistic pragmatism see, Aschenberg, R. 1982, Sprachanalyse und Transzen- dentalphilosophie , Stuttgart, 1982, 29. 244 Karel Mom for linguistics. 5 However, for all its merits, Chomsky’s theory, in particular its mentalistic conception of linguistic competence, is vulnerable to Flach’s criticism. 6 In this paper I will argue that Flach’s observations show some interesting parallels with Strawson’s position concerning LT1,2. This might seem sur- prising, given the apparent incommensurability of the approaches of both philosophers as is suggested by the differences in the vocabularies they em- ploy, despite their obvious Kantianism. However, if Flach mentions Straw- son, next to Quine 7, as an example of methodological criticism of generative linguistics Strawson’s substantive philosophical position with respect to it is equally noteworthy. 8 For it is here that interesting parallels come to the fore. After this introductory section this paper is organised as follows. In sec- tion II I will give an account of the relation between linguistics and philosophy as Flach sees it, albeit imperfectly, exemplified in Chomsky’s lin- guistic theory. This account links up with Flach’s model of the historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] of philosophy and the problematicity [Problemcharakter] of its topic [Gegenstand]. 9 In section III I will trace the historical antece- dents of LT1,2, viewed from a perpective of the philosophy of linguistic sciences and confront the model, outlined in section II, with this perspec- tive. Section IV proposes a comparative analysis of Strawson’s position concerning linguistic analysis as advocated in LT1,2 with reference to Flach’s exposition of the concept of linguistic competence. In a concluding section I will state some generalisations derived form the comparative analy- sis ( section V ). 5 Die generative , 72f. 6 Ibid., 102. 7 Quine signals e.g. an equivocity in Chomsky’s interpretation of ‘rule of grammar’, having the connotations both of guiding and of fitting linguistic behaviour, the for- mer as a matter of cause and effect, the latter as a matter of true description. (see Quine, W. V. 1970: Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory . Synthese, 21, 386–98, 386. It is questionable whether Chomsky’s notion of grammar as an in- ternalised system of rules (cf. Die generative … , 83) eludes Quine’s dichotomy. 8 Die generative ... 92 fn. 38. 9 Flach, W. 1963: Die Geschichtlichkeit der Philosophie und der Problemcharakter des phi- losophischen Gegenstandes . Kant-Studien 54, 17–28. Philosophy, linguistic analysis, and linguistics 245 II Linguistics and philosophy At the outset of his essay Flach states, referring to Plato and Aristotle, that the theme of language always also has been considered a philosophical theme. 10 The mere reference to Plato and Aristotle, though, underdeter- mines the way in which Flach conceives the epistemological relation bet- ween language and philosophy, let alone how this relation is exemplified in the connection of Chomsky’s linguistic theory with the philosophical doc- trine of the principles of thought. 11 The expression 'always also' [immer auch] in the abovecited statement implies nonetheless a distributive divison of language as a theme between philosophy and linguistics. This division implies a distinction between philosophical doctrine and linguistic theory, each with its own, to use Katz’s phrase, proto-theory of language. 12 This distinction can be projected on the model Flach construes to describe the topic-systematic connections between the conception of phi- losophy, of its history [Geschichte] and the theory [Historie] about this history. According to Flach, whereas philosophy shares with science that it generates knowledge from principles of (the things in) the world, it differs from science in that it is moreover knowledge of the principles of thought themselves and their principiating function. Consequently, the topic of phi- losophy is knowledge in the entire scope of its structural particularity [Bestimmtheit]. From this it follows that philosophy, as the steady and uni- versal reflection on available knowledge is sceptical towards science as well as itself and its history. Therefore, answers to questions about the constitu- tion of knowledge always have a provisional character and the topic of philosophy is intrinsically problematic. Accordingly, for philosophy, the ref- lection on its own history, i.e. Historie as mentioned above, is the explication of the development of self-consciousness of philosophy itself. The historical course of philosophy, therefore, is a steady interplay between systematicity 10 Die generative ..., 69. 11 I render Flach’s ‘Denken’ here as ‘thought’. Notice that Dummett, in his under- standing of the object of philosophy declares that “the goal of philosophy is the structure of thought [...] that the study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking ; and [...] that the only proper me- thod of analysing thought consists in the analysis of language [...]” (Dummett, M.A.E. 1978: Can analytical philosophy be systematic and ought it to be? in id. Truth and other Enigmas, London, 437–458, 458 (orig. emph.) 12 Katz, J.J. 1990. The Metaphysics of Meaning , Cambridge (Mass.), passim. 246 Karel Mom and the explication of this self-consciousness, in short, between system- thinking [Systemdenken] and problem-thinking [Problemdenken]. This in- terplay consists in the continuous systematization of philosophical know- ledge in the totality of its insights, i.e. the necessary and encompassing implications of all factive and possible philosophical problems generated by the universal principle of reflection. 13 These insights are, of course, also operative in Flach’s essay, provided that it has an exclusive systematic approach. 14 Here Flach’s focus is on the classification of Chomsky’s justification of his linguistic theory within the overall problematic of the justification of knowledge. 15 Flach’s discussion of the exemplification of the epistemological relation between linguistics and philosophy seizes upon Chomsky’s conception of a grammar of a language. Being the linguistic objectivation [Objektion] of that language, i.e. its object- disclosing determination, Chomsky conceives grammar as a theory about the formation of the expressions of that language, i.e. of its structure, from the aspect of observation (through the aspect of description) to the aspect of explanation. As such, Flach considers the generative linguistic theory, which claims the adequacy of the grammar it establishes on the aspects of observation, description and explanation of linguistic facts 16 as a threefold justification of its linguistic objectivation. As such, it is a philosophical theory of language [Sprachtheorie] because its language-theoretical question involves a preliminary theory that warrants the coherent, i.e. scientific, es- tablishment of the linguistic facts. 17 For Flach, the philosophical relevance of this theory is unquestionable when it is taken into account that philoso- phy is itself a doctrine of justification of knowledge. 18 III Linguistics, a perspective from the philosophy of linguistic sciences Now from this model to the historical antecedents of LT1,2. In his account of the history of the analysis of natural language,