United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons West Point ETD Spring 6-18-2018 Danger Close: Military Politicization and Elite Credibility Michael Robinson United States Military Academy, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/faculty_etd Part of the American Politics Commons, Design of Experiments and Sample Surveys Commons, International Relations Commons, Longitudinal Data Analysis and Time Series Commons, and the Statistical Methodology Commons Recommended Citation Robinson, Michael, "Danger Close: Military Politicization and Elite Credibility" (2018). West Point ETD. 19. https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/faculty_etd/19 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by USMA Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Point ETD by an authorized administrator of USMA Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DANGER CLOSE: MILITARY POLITICIZATION AND ELITE CREDIBILITY A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Michael A. Robinson June 2018 © 2018 by Michael Arthur Robinson. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/xf819jg4312 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Michael Tomz, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Scott Sagan I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Kenneth Schultz Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost for Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii Abstract This dissertation analyzes the relationship between the American public and the military institution as a source of political information. As much of the study of international re- lations and domestic institutions suggests, leaders considering policy options are sensitive to public opinion regarding those policies; as such, it is of considerable import to under- stand how the public forms those attitudes. Though traditional study has focused on the influence of partisan leaders and media elites in shaping the public's base of information, comparatively little has been devoted to understanding the role of military elites in this process. As the value and veracity of political information is subject to increased public skepticism based on its source, the military is by contrast a highly trusted institution whose representative figures { both active and retired { continue to play a public role in politics. In this project, I examine not only the potential influence that such figures can have on public political attitudes, but how the credibility of the military and its elites as a source of information operates in an environment of partisan polarization, selective media exposure, rising acceptance of illiberal norms, and falling confidence in government and traditional expert communities. The dissertation that follows comprises three papers that incorporate original survey experimentation, observational time-series and social media data, text-as- data, and qualitative case studies in order to contribute to our general understanding of how politicization of the military affects { and is affected by { the credibility of military elites in the political information space. The first paper measures the potential political influence of military elites on public attitudes towards proposed military interventions. Using original survey experimentation, iv Abstract I build on previous knowledge of elite cuing and public attitudes for war by placing the political preferences of the military and the president in opposition, providing the military source a variety of mechanisms by which to challenge the stated preferences of the executive. Not only do I find that the military voice is a potentially influential one, but that this effect is tied considerably to impressions of the military elite as a credible source of information. Military elites { both active and retired { possess not just an independently powerful voice, but one that remains significant even when conditioning on the partisan identities of the president and the individual. The second paper envisions this concept of elite credibility not as a moderator, but as a dependent variable in its own right, seizing on the empirical puzzle presented by the parti- san \gap" in expressed confidence for the military. Using time-series data and text-as-data on media reporting I find that partisans are likely to be exposed to widely different media environments when acquiring information on military institutional quality. Furthermore, using original survey experimentation, I find that even conditional on being presented with negative information on the military, partisans exhibit different pathologies in using it to update their impressions in a rational (Democrats, Independents) or biased (Republicans) fashion. The third paper takes this concept one step further, measuring not only the nature of elite credibility, but its limits. This chapter captures how partisan activism by military elites affects the perceived credibility of these figures and their parent institution. Using the results of original survey experimentation, I find that the public, contrary to much of the established literature on civil-military norms, is not normatively opposed to political activism by retired military elites. Instead, partisans asymmetrically { and significantly { reduce their estimations of credibility for military elites only on the other side of the political aisle. Using analysis of social media data for several prominent military elites, I further reveal an environment of weakened civil-military norms that is ripe for continued politicization into the future. v Acknowledgements The opportunity to pursue a doctorate through the Stanford program has been an immense honor. I am deeply indebted to a host of individuals whose support was indispensible and without which I could not have succeeded. I offer my deepest thanks to my committee, who gave so much of their time, understanding, and wisdom in my efforts to bring this project to fruition. Mike Tomz offered a seemingly limitless source of expertise, patience, and support as my advisor, even from the humblest beginnings of the ideas that became this project. Ken Schultz was always there to provide a fresh sanity check, to offer context where one was lacking, and shed light on new and interesting ways to think of the story I was telling. Scott Sagan not only allowed me the opportunity to teach as a part of his team, but constant and good-natured encouragement to an insecure graduate student far out of his element. The sharp insight of these individuals throughout this process was matched only by their generosity in allowing me to work with them; in addition to being giants in their own fields, they are first-rate mentors and teachers. To this I add my heartfelt gratitude to the two mentors who rounded out my defense committee, whom I similarly could not have done without. I am deeply indebted to Amy Zegart, who in addition to sharing her incredible sense of dedication and drive, allowed me the humbling opportunity to teach and research as part of her team and who was consis- tently encouraging and supportive as I pursued my own project. I am similarly grateful for the support and encouragement of Kori Schake, who in addition to providing expert insight into the civil-military dimensions of my work, has brought her patience, love of country, and infectious optimism to every interaction I have had with her since my days as a cadet. I am humbled by the generosity of these two incredible professionals for the time they sacrificed vi Acknowledgements in helping me complete this project. The department of political science offered me the opportnity of a lifetime in coming to Stanford and has been indispensible during this entire process. This begins with the support and dedication of the hard-working individuals in the front office who keep the operation running so well and who helped me at every administrative turn, especially Jennifer Radley, Stephanie Burbank, and Jackie Sargent. My fellow cohort-mates have been an invaluable source of expertise, comaraderie, and support, from the first days of Math Camp through my defense; I am deeply indebted to all ten of you and am proud to call you my friends. I also owe quite a bit to the senior students in the department who were so supportive to my own efforts and patient in their consideration, including Nandita Balakrishnan, Jordan Bernhardt, Marc Grinberg, Lindsay Hundley, Nathan Lee, and Iris Malone. I am exceedingly grateful to all of the fantastic professors