Introduction: the Communist Party Economist

Introduction: the Communist Party Economist

Notes Introduction: The Communist Party Economist 1. Neither Dobb’s letter nor Robertson’s response has survived, but see Amartya Sen, “Autobiography,” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/ laureates/1998/sen-autobio.html. 2. Michael Ellman, “Review of The Development of Socialist Economic Thought: Selected Essays by Maurice Dobb,” De Economist 157.1 (2009), 123. 3. For a critique of biography as it is conventionally practiced, see Stefan Collini, Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 283–98. For defenses of the genre (though not of examples of the kind Collini draws attention to), see David Nasaw, “Historians and Biography: Introduction,” American Historical Review 114.3 (June 2009), 573–8; Jochen Hellbeck, “Galaxy of Black Stars: The Power of Soviet Biography,” American Historical Review 114.3 (June 2009), 615–24; and Alice Kessler-Harris, “Why Biography?,” American Historical Review 114.3 (June 2009), 625–30. On biography and the history of economic thought, see E. Roy Weintraub and Evelyn Forget, eds, Economists’ Lives: Biography and Autobiography in the History of Economics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 4. This is, of course, easier said than done. For contrasting views on the per- ils and promises of synoptic and contextualist analyses, see Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), esp. 23–71; and Martin Jay, “Two Cheers for Paraphrase: The Confessions of a Synoptic Intellectual Historian,” Stanford Literature Review 3.1 (Spring 1986), 47–60 and “Historical Explanation and the Event: Reflections on the Limits of Contextualization,” New Literary History 42.4 (Autumn 2011), 557–71. On intellectual history more generally, see Anthony Grafton, “The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950–2000 and Beyond,” Journal of the History of Ideas 67.1 (January 2006), 1–32. 5. Maurice Dobb, Political Economy and Capitalism: Some Essays in Economic Tradition (London: Routledge, 1937), 338. As will be discussed below, this was not the first time Dobb reached for a Christian vocabulary when dis- cussing his political goals. 6. Michael Ellman, “Review,” 123. 7. The classic example of this narrative is Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996); The Age of Capital, 1848–1875 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996); and The Age of Empire, 1875–1914 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 8. Timothy Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe, 1648–1815 (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 125–41; Jan Luiten van Zanden, The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution: The European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000–1800 (Brill: Leiden, 2008); and Jan de Vries, “Economic Growth Before and After the Industrial Revolution: A Modest 225 226 Notes to pp. 3–4 Proposal,” in Early Modern Capitalism: Economic and Social Change in Europe, 1400–1800, ed. Maarten Prak (London: Routledge, 2011), 175–92. 9. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) is one of the canoni- cal indictments of Eurocentrism. Christopher Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparison (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004) attempts to write a truly global account of modernity’s ori- gins; for an even more sweeping effort, see André Gunder Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Jennifer Pitts examines the joined histories of liberalism and empire in A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), while David Harvey considers Paris as modernity’s avatar in Paris: Capital of Modernity (London: Routledge, 2006). 10. Which does not imply that these three candidates exhaust the available options. For only one of the many prominent interpretations excluded from this discussion, see Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 11. Stephen Kotkin has called this a history of “the welfare state”: Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 19. Readers of Michel Foucault will recognize Kotkin’s rebranding of governmentality, on which see Michel Foucault Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) and Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 12. David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2011), 90. 13. For examples of the social sciences in action, see James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development,’ Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power, in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Daniel Immerwahr, “Quest for Community: The United States, Community Development, and the World, 1935–1965,” University of California, Berkeley (PhD Dissertation, 2011). For broader reflec- tions on this history, see Theodore Porter, “Speaking Precision to Power: The Modern Political Role of Social Science,” Social Research 73.4 (Winter 2006), 1273–94; James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); and Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 14. On the prehistory of the nineteenth-century statistical explosion, see Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), but also William Deringer, “Calculated Values: A Political History of Economic Numbers in Britain, 1688–1738,” Princeton University (PhD Dissertation, Notes to p. 4 227 2012). On the nineteenth century and after, see Donald Mackenzie, Statistics in Britain, 1865–1930: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1981); Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) and Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Stephen Stigler, The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty Before 1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German State: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 15. For economists’ influence over governance, see A.W. Coats, ed., Economists in Government: An International Comparative Study (Durham: Duke University Press, 1981); Mary Furner and Barry Supple, eds, The State and Economic Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Michael Lacey and Mary Furner, eds, The State and Social Investigation in Britain and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Michael Bernstein, A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Bradley Bateman, “Keynes and Keynesianism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Keynes, eds Roger Backhouse and Bradley Bateman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 271–90; Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); and Keith Tribe, “Liberalism and Neoliberalism in Britain, 1930–1980,” in The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, eds Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 68–97. 16. Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of its Economic and Financial Organisation,” Contemporary European History 14.4 (November 2005), 465– 92; and, more generally, Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 17. Jeffry Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), 173–228. 18. On economists in wartime, see Craufurd Goodwin, ed., Economics and National Security: A History of their Interaction (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); Roger Middleton, Charlatans or Saviours? Economists and the British Economy from Marshall to Meade (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), 85–92; Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Adam Tooze, The Wages

View Full Text

Details

  • File Type
    pdf
  • Upload Time
    -
  • Content Languages
    English
  • Upload User
    Anonymous/Not logged-in
  • File Pages
    89 Page
  • File Size
    -

Download

Channel Download Status
Express Download Enable

Copyright

We respect the copyrights and intellectual property rights of all users. All uploaded documents are either original works of the uploader or authorized works of the rightful owners.

  • Not to be reproduced or distributed without explicit permission.
  • Not used for commercial purposes outside of approved use cases.
  • Not used to infringe on the rights of the original creators.
  • If you believe any content infringes your copyright, please contact us immediately.

Support

For help with questions, suggestions, or problems, please contact us