SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Uwe Halbach Russia’s Internal Abroad The North Caucasus as an Emergency Zone at the Edge of Europe RP 5 November 2010 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 2010 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the directing staff of the Institute. They express exclusively the per- sonal views of the author(s). SWP SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, und Politik Berlin German Institute is the German Institute for for International International and Security Affairs and Security Affairs SWP comprises 8 research divisions and 60 researchers Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 provides in-depth analysis and 10719 Berlin policy-oriented recommenda- Germany tions to the German Parliament Phone +49 30 880 07-0 and government on the full Fax +49 30 880 07-100 range of international and www.swp-berlin.org European affairs [email protected] produces English-language analysis of issues being dealt Brussels Office with at an EU and international Rue du Commerce 31 level B–1000 Bruxelles bundles analysis of global issues Phone: +32 2 792 10 20 with expertise on the EU, US and [email protected] other world regions www.swp-berlin.org/en/brussels ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Robert Blasiak (English version of SWP-Studie 27/2010) Table of Contents 5 Problems and Conclusions 8 Russia’s Internal Abroad 10 Effects for the Near Abroad and Beyond 11 Escalating Violence on the Edge of Europe 15 Factors Causing Instability 15 Socio-economic Problems and Corruption 16 Jihad, Jama’at, Emirate: Islamist Mobilisation 19 The External Dimension of North Caucasian Jihadism 21 Islamic Traditionalism versus Islamist Radicalisation 22 Renaissance of Ethnic Nationalism: Danger of Separatism? 25 The Federal Vertical of Power and Subnational Authoritarianism 26 The New North Caucasian Government and Its Viceroy 29 The Political Regimes in the Caucasian Republics 29 The Private Kadyrovian State 31 Dagestan: From Model of Ethnic Concordance to Power Vertical 33 Outlook: Europe and the North Caucasus 34 List of Abbreviations Dr. Uwe Halbach is researcher at SWP’s Russian Federation / CIS division Problems and Conclusions Russia’s Internal Abroad The North Caucasus as an Emergency Zone at the Edge of Europe Over the past 15 years, developments in the North Caucasus, which belongs to the Russian Federation, have primarily been viewed within the context of the military conflict in Chechnya. The entire region was understood as being proximate to the war zone and security deficits across the region were interpreted as having emanated from this conflict. After the fighting in Chechnya ceased and was replaced by a reconstruc- tion phase, international interest in the North Cauca- sus evaporated. Since 2009, however, international attention to the region has returned. In April 2009, Moscow lifted the special designation as an anti- terrorism operation zone, which it had placed ten years earlier on Chechnya. Russia thereby put its stamp of approval on transferring responsibility away from the federal level and putting local authorities in charge of fighting Chechen armed resistance groups and for rebuilding the war-ravaged republic. This cannot, however, be considered to represent regional appeasement. The North Caucasus’s appearance as a zone characterised by instability and violence on the periphery of Russia and Europe extends far beyond the borders of Chechnya, and the factors causing instabil- ity are no longer solely linked with Chechnya. During his state-of-the-nation address to the Federal Assembly in November 2009, President Medvedev declared that the entire region constituted Russia’s primary domes- tic problem. In a report from June 2010, the Council of Europe also characterised the situation there as the most sensitive within its membership zone. The continued confrontation between state security forces and armed resistance groups draws into ques- tion a proclaimed goal of Vladimir Putin’s presidency (2000–2008): long-term peace in the region through the reintegration of Chechnya into Russia’s constitu- tional space. In addition to larger areas of land like the Far East, Russia counts the North Caucasus among its most strategically important territories. It includes seven republics stretching from Adygea near the Black Sea to Dagestan on the Caspian Sea. The region ac- counts for 6.5% of Russia’s entire population and consists mainly of Muslims belonging to dozens of different ethnic groups. Important North-South trans- portation routes and pipelines extend across this SWP Berlin Russia’s Internal Abroad November 2010 5 Problems and Conclusions exposed border region. This is where Russia extends oped western regions and the area surrounding the into the greater Caucasus region, the southern half ambitious projects associated with the Sochi 2014 of which contains the three independent states of Winter Olympics. At the same time, counter-terrorism Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and is characterised would continue to dominate politics in the eastern by unresolved secessionist conflicts and competition parts of the region. among external actors rallying for influence. The bor- In Europe, one should not overlook these develop- der to Russia’s “near abroad” runs through a zone in ments in Russia’s “internal abroad” even if interna- which Russia faces more acute strategic challenges tional policy has in the past had scant access to the than in any other part of its enormous territory. This North Caucasus, in contrast to the South Caucasus. As context provides the backdrop for the disastrous Rus- stated by the Council of Europe, the region is an ex- sian-Georgian relations, which drew global attention posed hot spot on Europe’s borders. In two of the post- in August 2008. Following the five-day war, Russia Soviet space’s sub-regions, there has been Islamist instituted protectorate rule across portions of the mobilisation based on unstable regional structures, South Caucasus in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even namely in the Central Asian areas close to Afghanistan though it continues to struggle with security issues on and in the North Caucasus at Europe’s back door. If its own state territory in the North Caucasus. one uses the number of acts of terrorism as a point of This Russian Caucasus is an area of precarious state- reference, the North Caucasus is the more explosive hood and unfinished decolonisation. Its federal sub- area. jects constitute a political crisis zone, which is charac- Still, acts of terrorism invoking jihad are not the terised to a large degree by corruption and bad govern- only decisive factors causing the spiral of violence. ance. No other portion of the Russian Federation pres- Literature on the North Caucasus also presents a series ents such a harsh collision between the “Illusion of of explanatory paradigms, which pin the blame entire- Putinism” and reality, namely the idea that the cen- ly on Islamic groups or state security bodies; or place tral government can steer politics and society even in absolute blame solely on individual factors like pover- the most distant corners of the country. The vertical of ty, inter-ethnic conflicts, and corruption. The author power which has come to epitomise the Putin era, has of this study, on the other hand, analyses precisely thus far affected territories and political bodies in the this diverse range of factors, which are responsible for North Caucasus that had escaped the central govern- the destabilisation and diffusion of violence in the ment’s direct control. The Russian government is North Caucasus. The author also deals with develop- therefore now looking for new ways to gain control ments that have caused large portions of the North over this region. In January 2010, the government Caucasus to become Russia’s “internal abroad”, ana- took fundamental steps towards administrative re- lyses the most commonly cited factors causing destabi- form in the region. An independent Caucasian entity lisation in the region, and assesses the chances for a was separated off from the larger Southern Federal realignment of Russia’s Caucasus policy. Increased District and was formed into the new North Caucasus European attention for this Russian problem-zone Federal District. To head this eighth district, the Russian should constitute an element of the partnership for government named Alexander Khloponin, who was modernisation that President Medvedev wants to once the governor of Krasnoyarsk, a region of Siberia, establish between Russia and Europe. Berlin and prior to which he served as the chairman of a com- Brussels should support approaches aimed at modern- modities company. He is now meant to act as the new ising Russia’s Caucasus policy as well as self-criticism “Manager of the Caucasus”. for the path pursued in the region in previous years. The administrative reform is being accompanied by a new Caucasus strategy based on business and socio- economic development. In light of continued attacks from armed resistance groups, it remains doubtful whether this new path will take the place of the rather counter-productive past strategy of violent crack- downs, and lead instead to sustainable development policies. A split in policies towards the North Caucasus is also possible. Intensified business development could take place in the calmer and more highly devel- SWP Berlin Russia’s Internal Abroad November 2010 6 asus c au th C Map Nor SWP Berlin Russia’s Internal Abroad November 2010 7 Russia’s Internal Abroad Russia’s Internal Abroad The North Caucasus, which is comprised on seven now say that Russia should have stayed away from the republics1 and is home to dozens of ethnic groups, renegade republic. If the pollsters had replaced constitutes the Islamic southern periphery of the “Chechnya” with “Caucasus”, the response may have European part of the Russian Federation.