C O R P O R A T I O N The AMERICAN WAY of IRREGULAR WAR An Analytical Memoir CHARLES T. CLEVELAND WITH DANIEL EGEL For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/PEA301-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9974-0544-9 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Rick Penn-Kraus; image from ArtCore/AdobeStock Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface American irregular warfare is the United States’ unique, and in recent times troubled, approach to conflict in which armed civilian or para- military forces, and not regular armies, are the primary combatants. In most forms, it emphasizes the importance of local partnerships and gaining legitimacy and influence among targeted populations. It is thus a critical capability in contests where populations, rather than ter- ritory, are decisive. This analytical memoir draws on my nearly four decades of experience in the U.S. Army to explore the strengths and limitations of America’s current irregular warfare capability and pro- vide recommendations for what the United States must do to develop the world-class American way of irregular war it needs. I wrote this memoir because I remain deeply troubled by the fact that the United States has failed to achieve its strategic objectives in nearly every military campaign in which I was involved. Time and time again I saw tremendous success at the tactical level, whether it was the war on drugs in Bolivia, peace enforcement in Bosnia, coun- terinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, or partnered counterterrorism operations in Lebanon and Yemen. But in each case, American tacti- cal brilliance was followed by strategic muddling and eventual failure. The United States failed, in large part, because it has not developed the understanding, capabilities, and structures necessary to achieve strategic successes in population-centric contests, which are won and lost by controlling and influencing populations rather than occupying territory. In the wake of the coordination failure that led to the failed Oper- ation Eagle Claw and the intelligence failure that led to September 11, iii iv The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir it took action by Congress and the support of the President to drive the reforms that we needed. I believe that Congress and the President will need to act again. To provide a proactive defense against the irregular warfare campaigns of our enemies and the necessary offensive poten- tial to destabilize our Great Power adversaries, we must turn to, and not away from, the American way of irregular war. This research was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, U.S. State Department, allied foreign governments, and foundations. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage). To Mary Ann, for her encouragement, patience, understanding, and love. To my Dad, Walter, for the right start and support along the way. To Dobromir Neikov, Kenny McMullin, Roy Trumble, and Geoff Lambert, for their inspiration and leadership. To the men and women who fight America’s irregular wars, for their sacrifice and service. v Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................. xxv Abbreviations ..................................................................xxvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 An American Way of Irregular War ............................................. 3 Prevalence of Population-Centric Conflict ..................................... 7 America’s Irregular Warfare Misadventures ..................................... 9 Analytical Approach .............................................................13 Organization of the Analytical Memoir ........................................15 CHAPTER TWO Irregular Warfare and the Cold War in Europe ...........................19 Unconventional Warfare in Europe: 10th Special Forces in the Cold War ........................................................................... 20 Emergence of Strategic Reconnaissance: The Beginning of Special Forces’ Transition to a Supporting Role ................................. 23 Operation Eagle Claw: The American Pivot Toward Counterterrorism ... 26 CHAPTER THREE Bolivia and the Department of Defense’s Entry into the War on Drugs ..........................................................................29 Building Bolivia’s Counternarcotics Capability: Success at the Tactical Level ...........................................................................32 vii viii The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir Unprepared for This New Form of Population-Centric Warfare: Difficulties Above the Tactical Level ......................................37 Strategic Failure in the U.S. Mission in Bolivia: Inadequacy of Existing Models and Structures for This Population-Centric Conflict ..........41 CHAPTER FOUR El Salvador and the Fight Against Communism in the Americas ......45 Building an El Salvadoran Counterinsurgency Capability: Provisional Success at the Tactical Level ............................................... 48 Professionalizing the Armed Forces of El Salvador: Success at the Operational Level ............................................................52 Strategic Success by Accident: Inadequacy of Existing Models and Structures for This Population-Centric Conflict ....................... 54 CHAPTER FIVE Panama and the Transition from Traditional to Irregular ..............59 Planning for Regular and Irregular War: My First Special Operations Campaign Plan ...............................................................62 Speed, Surprise, Overwhelming Firepower . and Good Preparation: Success in the “Traditional” Warfare Component of Just Cause ...... 66 Postinvasion Unconventional Warfare: The Peaceful Surrender of Panamanian Security Forces ................................................69 Securing the Peace: Transition into an Irregular Warfare Mission..........73 Winning the Peace: More Luck Than Planning in the U.S. Strategic Success .........................................................................76 CHAPTER SIX The Decade of Delusion and My Pentagon Wars ..........................81 Operation Desert Storm: Validation of America’s New Conventional and Raiding Capabilities .................................................. 84 My Pentagon Wars: Fighting for America’s Irregular Warfare Capability .................................................................... 86 Developing Unconventional Warfare Campaigns: Creating Special Operations Policy Options ..................................................91 CHAPTER SEVEN Peacekeeping in Bosnia and the Reemergence of Irregular Warfare...95 Rebirth of Unconventional Warfare: The Joint Commission Observer Mission ....................................................................... 98 Contents ix Communicating the Value of Irregular Warfare: Growing Pains in Achieving Unity of Effort ................................................. 104 Organizing for Irregular Warfare: Growing Pains in Establishing the New Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force ................. 108 CHAPTER EIGHT Unconventional Warfare in the War on Terror .......................... 113 Building a Tactical Unconventional Warfare Capability for the 21st Century: 10th Special Forces Jedburgh Teams ......................... 115 Task Force Viking and Unconventional Warfare in Northern Iraq ....... 118 Inadequate Irregular Warfare Capabilities Above the Tactical Level: Difficulties in Achieving Enduring Successes .......................... 128 CHAPTER NINE Special Operations Campaigning in Latin America .................... 131 Success Through Partnering: Operation Jaque ............................