THE THEORY OF REPRESSION IN ITS RELATION TO MEMORY1. BY ERNEST JONES. THE following remarks represent in a sense a continuation of the discussion that took place at. the Durham meeting last July when papers were read on this subject by Pear, Wolf, Mitchell, and Loveday2, my object being to elucidate furthm certain points that were incompletely dealt with on that occasion and to raise certain other questions that are indirectly cognate to the same theme. The theory itself may be formulated in several different ways, the most comprehensive of which would run somewhat as follows: There exist in the mind certain inhibiting forces, which tend to exclude from consciousness all mental processes the presence of which would evoke there, either directly or through association, a feeling of “unpleasant- ness” (Unlust). It is, of course, evident that the efficacy of such forces is at best a relative one, for otherwise consciousness would never experience Urdust, but the thesis is maintained that, whenever this experience occurs, it is only because the action of the forces in question has first been neutralised by other tendencies and motives in the mind, whether volitional or not. It will be noticed that in the definition given the word “exclude” has been used as a common term for what some writers consider to be two independent processes, namely, on the one hand the expulsion from consciousness of an “ unpleasant’’ mental process, and on the other the tendency to prevent the return of this to consciousness on any subsequent occasion. As it seems possible to adopt one of these conceptions and not the other, they will be separately discussed, but I may remark that those who accept the theory of repression as here formulated are not much concerned to Read before the British Psychological Society, Jan. 3&h, 1916. Published in this Jozcrnnl, m. No. 2. J. of Psych. VIII 3 34 Theory of Repreasion in its ReZation to Memory make a sharp distinction between the two, considering it to be relatively unimportant. For them the inhibiting force of repression is a tendency in constant operation, independently of whether the “ unpleasant” mental process is of recent date or not, of whether it is at the time conscious or not, and even of whether it has ever been conscious or not, all matters which do not concern the main point at issue. The question of the relation of the inhibiting forces to consciousness and the unconscious is more obscure. Freud himself seems to place what he terms the “censorship”-an expression covering the sum total of the repressing forces in question-at the place of transition between the unconscious and the preconscious, with a less important one at the place of transition between the preconscious and consciousness. While it may be agreed that the action of repression is mainly exhibited at these points of junction, the evidence, in my opinion, induces one rather to picture the inhibiting tendencies as being distributed, in a streaming fashion, throughout the whole mind, conscious as well as unconscious, incrming in strength, however, as one proceeds from the level of consciousness to the lowest layers of the unconscious. The bearing that the theory of repression has on the problems of memory is a manifold one, and we may divide up the subject under the headings of registration, conservation, recollection, and recognition respectively. I. REGISTRATION. Practically all observers seem to agree that in attention there is a selective operation according to the pleasure-pain principle, whereby we attend to that which is pleasurable rather than to that which is not. (It is hardly necessary to say that no universality is claimed for this principle to the exclusion of others.) In so far, therefore, as variations in attention affect the registration of impressions, the process of exclusion, which is the essence of repression, must play a part. Ih action, however, is by no means always in the direction that it might at first sight be imagined to be. It might be thought that, if repression determines the ignoring of some unpleasant sight or sound, these, being less attended to, would undergo a fainter registration and would fade more readily than other impressions. One should exercise caution, however, before coming to this conclusion, apparent as it may seem. To say that a given idea is unpleasant is not at all the same as saying it is without interest or significance to the subject, in fact the reverse is more often the case. Any psycho-analytical ERNESTJONES 35 experience will provide numerous instances where an idea that has been presented to consciousness has been immediately ignored and its meaning not apprehended, but has nevertheless made a deep impression on the subject’s mind, and has been registered with unusual distinctness. It is quite common, for example, for girls in the period of adolescence genuinely to ignore in an astounding manner all allusions to sex matters, which they meet with at every turn, in newspapers, in novels, and in daily life, and it is remarkable to observe later in a psycho-analysis the precision with which these impressions have been registered and their significance appreciated without the subject being at all consciously aware of it. It is also a commonplace observation in insanity that in a state of excitement or delirium certain expressions may be reproduced by a lady who certainly must have completely ignored them at the time of hearing them1. The only means of estimating the intensity of registration is by studying the conditions of subsequent recall, conditions which are themselves influenced by various other factors that are not easy to eliminate or allow for, but so far as the evidence goes it does not, in my opinion, favour the view that incoming impressions which are ignored through the action of repression are more faintly registered than others which have not been submitted to this action. Much might be said concerning the selective action of repression in regard to attention (and also to perception) that is of importance to the general theory of attention, but as the subject is not strictly germane to the problems of memory it must be passed over here with merely this short allusion. 11. CONSERVATION. The theory of repression, and the observations on which it is founded, has one very important contribution to make regarding the conservation or retention of memory-impressions. It is to the effect that the capacity of the mind for such retention is vastly greater than is generally supposed. It is ditlicult to lay too much emphasis on this point, one to which attention has repeatedly been called by medical psychologists, for even after a considerable experience of such data one is constantly being surprised at the truly extraordinary manner in which minute details may be revived after having apparently been completely for- gotten for many years, for half a century or longer. This applies both A well-known literary example is the case of Ophelia. 3-2 36 Theory qf Repres&on m $68 Relation to Nemory to significant, repressed memories and to those of a more trivial nature. With regard to the latter class I must say that I become increasingly sceptical about its supposed involvement in what Mr Pearl calls a, process of physiological decay, for delicate methods of investigation constantly succeed in demonstrating the continued presence in the mind of trivial elements that one might have imagined had disappeared long ago. At the same time, the distinction Mr Pear draws between the two classes of forgotten material, the significant and the insignificant, appears to me to be of great importance, and the explanation of the process of forgetting in the two cases raises some interesting questions, to which I shall return later in this paper. 111. RECOLLECTION. Professor Brough has somewhere remarked that psychologists may be divided into two schools as regards the subject of memory, com- prising those who hold that the facts in most need of explanation are those of remembering, and those who hold that they are the facts of forgetting. Psycho-analysts certainly belong to the latter school, which I imagine to-be the less numerous one. To us, and contrary to the usual opinion, it would seem more natural if everything were remembered, and it is the circumstance of a given mental impression not being capable of recall, while still in the mind, that demands an explanation. A consideration to which I would attach great importance is that the phenomenon of recall seems to be too often regarded as being induced by conscious volition, the fact being overlooked that in the majority of instances it proceeds quite spontaneously and independently of volition. If, now, the matter be thought of in other than volitional terms, the question is, not what is the mechanism whereby we recall a given idea when we want to, but rather how is it that such a relatively small number of ideas actually flow into consciousness, or have the capacity of ever entering consciousness? To this question Freud’s ’ theory of repression attempts to provide an answer. The main fact that this theory sets out to explain is that it is more difficult to recall an unpleasant memory than a pleasant one, other things being equal. The fact itself is, I think, beyond dispute, and has not been questioned by anyone who has seriously investigated the phenomena, either experimentally or clinically. According to the theory of repression, the reason why it is more difficult to recall an 1 Loc. cit. p 139. ERNESTJONES 37 unpleasant memory is because it is kept back from entering conscious- ness by the action of .certain inhibiting, “repressing” forces, the function of which is to guard consciousness, so far as possible, from the pain of disagreeable affects.