The Dramatization of Determinism: A lexander of Aphrodisias' De Fato DOROTHEA FREDE 'Determinism has many meanings, but there are, mainly and for the most part, four different kinds of problems connected with this notion', Aristotle might have said had he employed the concept of determinism. In his philosophical writings we can distinguish the following questions. (a) There is logical determinism, i.e. the necessity of the conclusions following from their premises (under this title I also want to subsume the problem of the Sea Battle)', (b) there is physical determinism, the necessity of the connection of cause and effect, (c) there is ethical determinism concerning the dependence of human action on internal ('character') and external conditions, and (d) there is teleological determinism, i.e. that everything has an end or serves some purpose. Aristotle does not always distinguish between these kinds of determinateness nor is he always con- sistent in his own position but it seems clear to me that he was aware of the 2 determinist's dilemma.2 But since no radical deterministic theory comprising all these notions of determinism seems to have been proposed by any of the rival schools (pace Megaricorum) Aristotle did not have to maintain an all encompassing position. The need for a clarification of the Peripatetic position with respect to the problem of determinism and the concept of fate must have existed long before Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most important commentator on Aristotle's writings, produced the little treatise On Fate which he dedicated to the emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla (terminus ante quem 2111 AD). As we know from other sources,3 there raged a never ending battle about the notion of fate among the schools, a battle in which the various opponents seem to have relied on the same kind of arguments, counter- arguments and examples time and again. Alexander himself does not claim originality; he professes to give only an account of the Aristotelian position (cf. 164, 13; 212,5) which he compares with and defends against the more rigid determinism of a rival school. All commentators agree that the target of Alexander's criticism must be the Stoa. Opinions differ on the question why Alexander does not mention the Stoa or any of its members. The 276 ancient habit of not citing the name of a living person in criticism would suggest that Alexander is dealing with the position of a contemporary, a contemporary as it seems who maintained a stronger determinism than, e.g., Chrysippus himself as witnessed in Cicero's De fato, and who does not always understand the refinements of the earlier Stoic compatibilism. There is, of course, the problem of our sources' historical accuracy and fairness. The openly polemical tone and arguments in Alexander make it difficult to assess what, precisely, the Stoic position was and whether Alexander in his reductio arguments (his favourite method of criticism) does not distort the Peripatetic position sometimes too. I will try to present a 'reasonable' Stoic position and work out what the main points of 4 disagreement are.4 ( 1 )Fate as the 'efficient ' cause (aitia poietike) Since Aristotle himself does not employ the notion of fate or 'heimarmen%', the traditional Greek term for fate, Alexander has to give an account of how this concept fits into the Aristotelian system. In the opening chapters he simply identifies fate with nature (169, 18ff) such that whatever is or happens by nature is or happens by fate. This identification allows him to give a definite limit to the scope of fate: since not everything in nature happens in accordance with nature but some things take a course against nature the same holds true for fate; there are things which go against fate (170,5). This seems, at first sight, to be a simple and harmless enough device. Upon a closer look, however, it turns out not to be quite so simple. For Alexander assigns only one of the four causes in nature to fate, namely the aitia poiëtikë, viz. the efficient cause. This is remarkable because one would have expected that form and telos would be regarded as natural determining factors as important as the efficient cause, if not more so. For Aristotle often treats the efficient cause as if it were of minor importance; it usually figures as the source from which a change or motion originates, but it does not bring about the effect by itself (artefacts excluded, of course - here the artist is the efficient cause). As I will further explain later it is, in fact, quite misleading to translate Aristotle's poiëtikë aitia (even when he uses that term, which he often does not) by 'efficient cause'. For the notion of a cause (or the cause) which brings about an effect with necessity bears rather un-Aristotelian conno- tations. It seems to originate from the debate over the Stoic conception of fate and determinism and to have gradually seeped into the general 5 understanding of causality in later antiquity.5 277 .