PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF FORCE AND PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS RESPONSES A Dissertation by DAVID J. BRULÉ Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2006 Major Subject: Political Science PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF FORCE AND PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS RESPONSES A Dissertation by DAVID J. BRULÉ Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved by: Chair of Committee, Alex Mintz Committee Members, John Robertson Christopher Sprecher Arnold Vedlitz Head of Department, Patricia Hurley August 2006 Major Subject: Political Science iii ABSTRACT Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force and Presidential Crisis Responses. (August 2006) David J. Brulé, B.A., Stephen F. Austin State University Chair of Committee: Dr. Alex Mintz This dissertation explores the role of public opinion in U.S. presidential decisions to employ various alternatives in response to an international crisis. Presidents may choose from a range of force alternatives, including non-force alternatives, troop mobilizations, air strikes or ground assaults. Using the Poliheuristic Theory, I argue that public attitudes toward the use of force in a given crisis play a key role in the decision making process leading to such choices. The direction and intensity of public opinion is driven by a relative value assessment by which the public determines whether the benefits of a use of force are worth the costs. Presidents are aware of this relative value assessment and rule out crisis responses that are likely to violate the public’s preferences in the first stage of the decision making process. In the second stage, presidents choose among the remaining alternatives by weighing the relative merits of each with respect to military and international-strategic implications. To test hypotheses following from this theoretical argument, I employ two methodological approaches. The first is statistical analysis. I develop a new data set of presidential crisis response choices and expand an existing data set on U.S. public attitudes toward the use of force, from 1949 to 2001. Using two extant data collections identifying international crises, I conduct Ordered Logit analyses, which produce results that are largely supportive of the hypotheses. The second methodological approach is the iv case study method. I conduct two detailed case studies of decisions to use force in Bosnia (1995) and Afghanistan (2001). These analyses are also supportive of the theoretical argument. I conclude that presidents are largely responsive to public opinion in the selection of crisis responses. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT........................................................................................................... iii TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................... v LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................... vii LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................ viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 1 Outline of the Dissertation.............................................................. 5 II LITERATURE AND THEORY.................................................... 8 Opinion manipulation, constraints, and the use of force................ 9 Theoretical framework.................................................................... 20 Conclusion...................................................................................... 37 III RESEARCH DESIGN................................................................... 39 Data................................................................................................ 40 Dependent variable: Crisis response choice................................... 41 Key independent variables............................................................ 47 Control variables........................................................................... 63 Conclusion.................................................................................... 66 IV DATA ANALYSIS...................................................................... 71 Estimation technique..................................................................... 72 Summary of general findings........................................................ 74 Public opinion............................................................................... 80 Public opposition: Defying (intuitive) expectations?.................... 88 Military and international-strategic factors................................... 99 Control variables........................................................................... 103 Robustness checks........................................................................ 106 Conclusion.................................................................................... 115 V CLINTON’S DECISION TO LAUNCH AIR STRIKES IN BOSNIA, 1992-1994...................................................................... 117 vi CHAPTER Page The Bosnian crisis....................................................................... 119 The alternatives........................................................................... 124 Stage 1: The domestic political dimension.................................. 129 Stage 2: Military and international-strategic factors................... 138 Was the decision compensatory?................................................. 145 Conclusion................................................................................... 152 VI BUSH’S DECISION TO LAUNCH A LIMITED INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, 2001........................................................ 154 9/11 and Afghanistan.................................................................. 155 The alternatives........................................................................... 157 Stage 1: The domestic political dimension.................................. 160 Stage 2: Military and international-strategic factors................... 168 Was the decision compensatory?................................................ 174 Conclusion.................................................................................. 179 VII CONCLUSION.......................................................................... 182 Findings...................................................................................... 183 Contributions.............................................................................. 185 Implications................................................................................ 186 REFERENCES.................................................................................................... 188 APPENDIX A.................................................................................................... 207 APPENDIX B.................................................................................................. 224 VITA.................................................................................................................. 259 vii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE Page 3.1 Dependent variable, international crisis behavior data................. 48 3.2 Dependent variable, militarized interstate disputes data............... 49 3.3 Average public opinion, international crisis behavior data.......... 54 3.4 Average public opinion, militarized interstate disputes data........ 55 3.5 Initial public opinion, international crisis behavior data.............. 57 3.6 Initial public opinion, militarized interstate disputes data............ 58 3.7 Latest public opinion, international crisis behavior data............... 59 3.8 Latest public opinion, militarized interstate disputes data............ 60 5.1 Public opinion toward the use of force in response to the Bosnian crisis, July 1992 – April 1994.......................................... 136 6.1 Public opinion toward the use of force in response to the Afghan crisis, September 2001..................................................... 165 viii LIST OF TABLES TABLE Page 3.1 Selected empirical studies of the use of force................................. 42 3.2 Independent variables...................................................................... 68 4.1. Ordered logit estimates of domestic and international influences on presidential crisis response, 1949-2001................... 75 4.2 Alternative specifications with average public opinion: Domestic and international influences on presidential crisis response choice, 1949-2001............................................................... 76 4.3 Alternative specifications with latest public opinion: Domestic and international influences on presidential crisis response choice, 1949-2001............................................................... 77 4.4 Alternative specifications with initial public opinion: Domestic and international influences on presidential crisis response choice, 1949-2001............................................................... 78 4.5 Probabilities of response category by average public opinion condition....................................................................................... 84 4.6 Probabilities of response category by initial public opinion condition......................................................................................