1 The London School of Economics and Political Science Robert S. McNamaraʼs withdrawal plans from Vietnam: a bureaucratic history Aurélie Basha i Novosejt A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2014. 2 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 90,350 words. I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edition, for referencing. I have also used American English except in cases of quoted text that originally appears in British English, official names or titles. 3 Abstract The thesis looks at Robert S. McNamaraʼs support for withdrawal from Vietnam between 1962 and 1964, during the John F. Kennedy administration and during the transition to the Lyndon B. Johnson presidency. It offers a reassessment of McNamaraʼs role as one of the primary architects of the Vietnam War. From a methodological point of view, it approaches McNamaraʼs recommendations on Vietnam from the bureaucratic perspective of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), explaining the evolution of the office and the balance of civil-military relations during his tenure. Through a bureaucratic lens, McNamaraʼs support for a policy aimed at disengagement from Vietnam is logical. First, the withdrawal plans – the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) – supported a strategy informed by the counterinsurgency thinking of the Kennedy administration. McNamaraʼs changes at the OSD were designed to align defense tools to civilian strategy. As a result, as Kennedy and McNamaraʼs counterinsurgency advisers suggested, the CPSVN put the onus on self-help (i.e. the South Vietnamese doing the fighting themselves), clear-and-hold strategies and the strategic hamlet program that was buttressed by paramilitary, rather than traditional military, forces. Secondly, the CPSVN dovetailed with McNamaraʼs economic priorities for the OSD, both mitigating the departmentʼs impact on the nagging balance of payments deficit and, in the nearer term, the impact of South Vietnamese operations on the Military Assistance Program. 4 Table of Contents Abstract Table of Contents List of Abbreviations 5 Acknowledgements 7 Introduction: The mistakes I made: Robert McNamaraʼs OSD and planning for Vietnam 9 Prologue: The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1947-1961 41 Part I: Civilian control of national security policy-making Chapter 1. Civilian control of policy 71 Chapter 2. Continuity and change 83 Chapter 3. Taking charge of Vietnam policy 99 Chapter 4. Strategies for Vietnam 112 Chapter 5. McNamara the sceptic 127 Chapter 6. The many purposes of the October announcement 137 Part II: The OSD as a bridge: the economic implications of defense and of Vietnam Chapter 7. Civilian control of the defense budget 148 Chapter 8. Economic constraints 160 Chapter 9. The economic dimensions of the Vietnam strategy 177 Chapter 10. Vietnam as a budgetary problem 189 Part III: Aftermath and Conclusion Chapter 11. McNamaraʼs Transition into the Johnson Administration 206 Chapter 12. Conclusion 242 Bibliography 257 Appendix 1: Figures and charts 283 5 List of Abbreviations ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency ARVN South Vietnamese Army Forces BRIAM British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam CDTC Combat Development Test Center CG Civil Guard CI Counterinsurgency CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group CINCAL Commander in Chief, Alaska CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support Program CPSVN Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam CY Calendar Year DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DoD Department of Defense DPM Draft Presidential Memorandum FO Foreign Office FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States Series FY Fiscal Year GDP Gross Domestic Product GFL Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library GWU George Washington University, National Security Archive HBS Harvard Business School C&C Commissions & Committees Files INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research ISA International Security Affairs JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JFKL John F. Kennedy Presidential Library LBJL Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library LoC Library of Congress M&M Meetings & Memoranda Series MAAG Military Assistance and Advisory Group MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam MAP Military Assistance Program MBA Master of Business Administration MC Miller Center, University of Virginia NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park NCP National Campaign Plan NME National Military Establishment NSA National Security Advisor Files NSAM National Security Action Memorandum NSC National Security Council NSF National Security Files NSRB National Security Resources Board OH Oral History OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense OSS Office of Strategic Services PM Prime Ministerʼs Files 6 POF Presidential Office Files PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System R&D Research & Development RAF Royal Air Force RNL Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library ROK Republic of Korea RSC Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, NL RSM Robert S. McNamara SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SDC Self-Defense Corps SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee SASC Senate Armed Services Committee TFX Tactical Fighter Experimental USAF United States Air Force USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollar USG United States Government USIA United States Information Agency USMC United States Marine Corps USOM United States Operations Mission UVAL University of Virginia Library Archives WH White House Files 7 Acknowledgements Although I expected the PhD to be a monastic experience, it has instead been an incredible human journey. For that, I am grateful to more people than I can acknowledge in these few lines. First, I want to thank Steve Casey who, in 2002, made it possible for me to meet the man at the center of my research, Robert Strange McNamara, and in so doing, planted the seed for this project. Thank you for your guidance and support throughout this process. Errol Morris and Daniel Ellsberg were unusually generous with their time, insight and encouragement. Tom Paullin kindly shared the McNaughton diaries and was an ideal companion on a beautiful visit to Arlington Cemetery. Diego Ruiz-Palmer made military jargon comprehensible, without which many of these chapters would not have been possible. I am grateful for the formal and informal advice that I received from people whose work I admire, chiefly Matthew Jones but also Kori Schake, Stanley Hoffmann, Seth Center, Eliot Cohen, Lawrence Kaplan, Anne Deighton, Marc Selverstone, Erica Wald, Tanya Harmer and Antony Best. John Dumbrell, Mara Oliva and Kasper Grotle Rasmussen were the best co-panelists one could wish for on two occasions. In addition, thank you to Jeremy Schmidt and Tim Holtz at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, to Martin Gedra and Nate Patch at the National Archives in College Park and especially to Stephen Plotkin at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library who put up with my constant questions and helped to make the research much smoother and even fun. I benefited from two particularly collegial and intellectually stimulating summer workshops: Columbia Universityʼs Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studiesʼ Summer Workshop of Military Operations and Strategy and the University of Texas at Austinʼs Clements Centerʼs Summer Seminar in History and Statecraft. At the London School of Economics, I would like to thank my LSE100 colleagues: Jonathan Leape, Jessica Templeton, Diego De Merich, Maria Kyriakadou, Jose Olivas-Osuna, Maria Brock and Rui Lopes. Among my History peers, thank you especially to Maria Chen, Daniel Strieff, Bryan Gibson, Mahon Murphy, Jonas Gjersø, Oliver Elliot, Natasha Telepneva and Tobias Vogelgsang. I probably owe my sanity to my students and to Shreya Das, Uday Mehra and Panikos Patsalides in particular. My research would not have been possible without the financial support from a Marjorie Kovler Fellowship from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Foundation, George C. Marshall/Baruch Fellowship from the George C. Marshall Foundation, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library Research Travel Grant, Roosevelt Study Center Research Grant as well as support from the International History Department at the London School of Economics. Special thanks to MacGregor Knox who, since 1999, has been a role model and has guided my intellectual journey to this PhD. (I note the irony that Word seems to think 8 that last sentence is “fragmented”.) The Knox-Isaacs Thanksgiving dinner has been a highlight of each year and a welcome respite from the grim British winters. Finally, my family both official and unofficial, old and new, for listening to me drum on about McNamara and the stresses of the PhD, especially: Uncle Jerry (the coolest academic there is), Sarah, Laura, Almudena, Ben, Talal, Kostas, Joop, Ed, Lisa, Ines, Natacha as well as the van Vollenhovens and Valleixs. Ollie, who was on the frontlines throughout and who I canʼt thank enough. And finally finally, to my parents, for everything. I dedicate this thesis to them. 9 INTRODUCTION The mistakes I made: Robert McNamaraʼs OSD and planning for Vietnam McNamara, the day before we left for Greece, remarked to Tim Hoopes and me that “weʼve made mistakes in Vietnam…Iʼve made mistakes. But the mistakes I made are not the ones they say I made.” I said, “I know.” The fact is that he believes we never should have gotten into the combat role out there.