Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/30241/ The US Commitment to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period Yanan Song i Contents List of Abbreviations............................................................................................................ iii 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 2 The Purpose of the Transatlantic Community .......................................................... 9 3 A New Framework: Two Levels of Analysis ........................................................... 27 4 The Clinton Administration’s Recommitment to NATO ..................................... 65 5 NATO’s Engagement in Kosovo ................................................................................ 99 6 NATO’s Ongoing Engagement after Kosovo ........................................................ 132 7 NATO’s Engagement in Libya ................................................................................. 173 8 Libya: The US Policy-Making Process ................................................................... 201 9 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 248 Appendix ............................................................................................................................. 275 Notes .................................................................................................................................... 279 Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 346 Index .................................................................................................................................... 420 ii List of Abbreviations ANSF Afghan National Security Force AFRICOM US Africa Command ACTWARN Activation Warning ACTORD Activation Order Av-Det Air Force Aviation Detachment CPG Comprehensive Political Guidance CJTF Combined Joint Task Forces CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe DCI Defence Capabilities Initiative EU European Union ESDP European Security and Defence Policy FPA Foreign Policy Analysis GCC Gulf Cooperation Council HATs Humanitarian Assessment Teams ISAF International Security Assistance Force ICC International Criminal Court ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty KPJ Communist Party of Yugoslavia KLA Kosovo Liberation Army KVM Kosovo Verifying Mission LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group LNC National Liberation Movement LCY League of Communist iii List of Abbreviations LDK Democratic League of Kosovo MAP Membership Action Plan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council NRF NATO Response Force NTM-A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan NSS National Security Strategy NSC National Security Council NOP Libya’s National Oil Corporation OAF Operation Allied Force OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OOD Operation Odyssey Dawn OUP Operation Unified Protector OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PfP Partnership for Peace PRTs Provincial Reconstruction Teams QDR Quadrennial Defence Review R2P Responsibility to Protect SOPs Standard Operating Procedures TNC Transitional National Council UN United Nations USFOR-A US Force Afghanistan USAID US Agency for International Development UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution iv List of Abbreviations WTO World Trade Organisation WWII World War Two WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction XFOR Extraction Force v 1 Introduction The geopolitical conditions which led to the creation of NATO in 1949 rapidly disappeared following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. According to neorealism, if alignment is formed because of threat, it will falter in the absence of a threat. Scholars like John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz even predicted that without the Soviet threat, NATO would cease to be a durable alliance.1 The ending of the Cold War unlocked a period of profound soul-searching within the Alliance. The new conditions indeed led to an American rethinking of the US commitment to NATO, just as it led to a refocusing of priorities within European members of the Alliance. In May 1990, NATO’s Military Committee announced that it no longer considered the Warsaw Pact a threat to the Alliance. President George H.W. Bush then called for spending cuts which would eventually result in significant reductions in funding and force levels for NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces. He also proclaimed the emergence of a “New World Order”, suggesting that NATO was bereft of a strategic anchor. In addition, President Francois Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany delivered a Franco-German statement on joint defence policies in late 1991, the provisions of which facilitated the formation of the Eurocorps on May 22, 1992.2 This symbolic gesture was even interpreted by some observers as indicating that the two leaders hoped to replace NATO with a European defence “identity” as Europe’s primary security apparatus. 3 In short, the possibility of the termination of institutionalised US support for European security was seriously raised in this period, as was the possibility of NATO ceasing to exist. The survival of NATO 1 Introduction Following major debates about the appropriate direction for post-Cold War American internationalism, the administration of President Bill Clinton not only committed itself to the continuation of NATO, but also began to sponsor a major programme of NATO renewal and enlargement. After progressive transformation, NATO expanded rather than disbanded. It went on to participate in “out-of-area” action in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. It developed a set of more or less concerted doctrine regarding “new threats”, and broadened the function of NATO to include effective mechanisms for solving disputes and coordinating foreign and political policies instead of strictly focusing on military responses. 4 All these commitments were accompanied by major debates about the purpose and capabilities of NATO. Relevant debates included continuing tensions between Washington and European capitals over defence spending levels; accusations that the US was using NATO as an instrument of extra-United Nations unilateral power; especially the preference of Washington immediately after 9/11 for working through ad hoc rather than institutionalised alliance structures; and the developing relationship between NATO and Russia (particularly in the context of possible Georgian and Ukrainian membership of the organisation). However, NATO continued to exist and Washington remained formally committed to the defence of Europe. The recent history of the US commitment has been dominated by economic pressures, squabbles over NATO’s military performance in Afghanistan, and the apparent American preference for “leading from behind” in Libya. The current tensions within NATO were graphically expressed in retiring Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ June 2011 speech, “Reflections on the Status and Future of the Transatlantic Alliance”: In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, between members who specialise in “soft” humanitarian development, peacekeeping, 2 Introduction and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions…This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.5 But no matter how complicated the history of NATO debates has been, there was always a consensus on the fact that the US attitude was most crucial to the survival as well as continued existence of NATO. The US and NATO Looking back on the period since the end of the Cold War, Washington was more than once expected to support NATO dissolution: when the Soviet threat subsided; when US decision on bypassing NATO was announced after 9/11; when NATO demonstrated its incapability to assume the overall responsibility for all military operations in Afghanistan; when the US insistence on “leading from behind” in Libya became conspicuous. Nevertheless, by 2011 when the Libyan crisis subsided, NATO had remained for 20 of the most eventful and challenging years in the post-Cold War history, regardless of how frequently NATO was relegated to the very margins of debate. This interesting phenomenon raised a question: why did the US remain committed to NATO in the post-Cold War period? In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Americans had high expectations of seeing the US scaling down its international commitments. They believed that there was no need to continue the institutionalised protection for European security, and that it was time to focus on domestic affairs. With respect to this domestic demand, why did the Clinton administration nonetheless choose the opposite course: to remain committed to NATO and to support NATO enlargement? Moreover, NATO not only expanded its membership, but also participated in “out-of-area” actions, which were regarded as “the most visible manifestation of NATO’s development in the post-Cold 3 Introduction War period”.6 Kosovo was basically a NATO operation, though 80 per cent of its tasks were completed by the US. Hence why did the US support the Kosovo mission to be accomplished under the framework of NATO? On the contrary, Afghanistan at first saw the US declining to work through NATO. Why did the Bush administration prefer an ad hoc