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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. WAR AS A SOCIAL TRAP: THE CASE OF TANZANIA by Joyce L. Francis submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree o f Doctor of Philosophy i n International Relations Signatures of Ccrmmittee: Chair: I/UXb- o CO (S tt) <hrr Dean of the School o l J y h n r. / i ^ ° i y D ate 1994 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. © COPYRIGHT by Joyce L. Francis 1994 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. WAR AS A SOCIAL TRAP: THE CASE OF TANZANIA by Joyce L. Francis Professor John M. Richardson, Jr. Principal Adviser ABSTRACT War can entrap the victor as well as the vanquished. Tanzania's victory over Uganda in 1979 was quick and decisive, and it was won with surprisingly few battle deaths. Yet, for Tanzanians it proved a Pyrrhic victory. Despite the defeat of Amin's forces and a two-year occupation, chaos continued in Uganda. The war and occupation caused unintended consequences that were far more costly for Tanzania—politically, socially and economically—than anyone anticipated. An analysis of this war and its consequences permits a theoretical and policy-grounded examination of the efficacy of war as an instrument of public policy and conflict resolution. The disparity between the anticipated and actual outcomes of this war is explained through the depiction of war as a social trap—a set of circumstances in the decision environment that distorts the decision maker's utility calculations, creating a false picture of the probable outcomes of alternate courses of action, thereby leading the decision maker to chose a course of action contrary to her/his self interest. To the extent that leaders who initiate war are acting within a social trap, their ability to anticipate outcomes is distorted. This calls into question war's efficacy both as an instrument of public policy and as a means of resolving conflict. i i i Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The road to this dissertation has been long, and there have been many that I honor for their contribution. Erik Mailer and Steve Lord provided me with the opportunity to live and work in Tanzania for three years, starting me along the road. My parents, Hazel and the late Gene Francis, gave me the support to stay the course, and Nils Pedersen shared the journey. The American University proved a stimulating environment for this work. Professor Ruth Lane asked the questions which stirred my curiosity, and Dean Louis Goodman challenged me to transform my curiosity into a research project. Colleagues Kim Alexander, Betsy Cohn, and Mike Nojeim followed every step, cheering small victories and transforming defeats into opportunities. Committee members, Professors David Hirschmann, Guy Martin, and Fantu Cheru, shared their extensive knowledge of Africa and challenged me to keep my research relevant to an African context. Doing fieldwork in Tanzania was a challenge in which I was greatly assisted. Katy Cooper, Martha Honey, and Tony Avirgan offered their knowledge and valuable contacts. Nassir Mawji and his family went out of their way to make my stay comfortable. The staff and faculty of the University o f Dar es Salaam, the Institute of Science and Technology, the President's Planning Commission, and the Daily News were most generous with their resources. Scores of iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interviewees, some named in the text and others who remain anonymous, took time to help me understand their experience. Above all, I am deeply indebted to Professor John Richardson, director of doctoral studies and chairman of my dissertation committee. He was enthusiastic about the project when it was just a glimmer of an idea and never wavered. His vision was grander than mine, so he expanded my thinking. His criticisms were always accompanied by helpful suggestions, and his praise was based on high expectations and a thorough reading, so it was greatly appreciated. There could be no better mentor. v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.......................................................................... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS............................ v i LIST OF TABLES................................................................................. v iii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..................................................................... i x INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 1 PART I. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY Chapter 1. TANZANIA GOES TO WAR...................................................... 14 Counter-Coup Attempt and Mogadishu Agreement .... 17 Invasion and Counter invasion ......................................... 22 Drive to Kampala ............................................................ 31 Post-War Occupation ....................................................... 39 Pyrrhic Victory................................................................. 44 2. ASSESSING WAR'S LEGACY: THEORY AND METHOD............. 47 Pyrrhic Victories, War Traps, and Paradoxes ................. 51 War as a Social Trap......................................................... 55 A Typology of Social Traps.............................................. 66 Methodology.................................................................... 72 3. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON WAR'S CONSEQUENCES............... 80 War's Consequences of the National Economy ............... 84 War's Consequences for the State ................................ 96 War's Consequences for the Individual and Society. 101 v i Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PART II. TANZANIA'S WAR LEGACY 4. ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF TANZANIA'S WAR 114 Decision to Counter invade .............................................. 116 Assessing Actual Consequences ..................................... 121 Primary Consequences .................................................... 123 5. SECONDARY ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES................................ 131 Trade D e ficit .................................................................. 134 Foreign Reserves ............................................................ 139 Debt.............................................................................. 140 Impact on Production ..................................................... 143 Opportunity Costs of War ................................................ 146 Analysis ................................................. 152 6. SECONDARY POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES............................... 156 Concentration ................................................................. 157 Militarization ................................................................... 160 Disengagement ............................................................. 162 Challenges to the Nyerere .............................................. 171 International Relations ..................................................... 176 Summary and Analysis ...................................................