3/27/19 Seminar 6 Apollo and the Space Race Orbit Transfer, Interplanetary Travel FRS 148, Princeton University Robert Stengel • A Space Strategy for the United States • Sparrow in the Falcon’s Nest • The Shape of Things to Come Impulsive Orbit Transfer Interplanetary Travel: … the Heavens and the Earth, Ch 8 to 10 Understanding Space, Ch 6, Sec 7.1, 7.2 Copyright 2019 by Robert Stengel. All rights reserved. For educational use only. 1 http://www.princeton.edu/~stengel/FRS.html A Space Strategy for the United States 2 1 3/27/19 National vs. International Interests § Arms race § Treaties § Prestige and perceptions § Eisenhower, 1958 § Outer space only for peaceful purposes § Willingness to let UN play a central role § Division over procedures § National Security Council, missile technology § Reconnaissance and bombs in orbit (FOBS) § NSC, manned and unmanned spaceflight 3 Earliest Possible Time Periods of Various Soviet and U.S. Accomplishments in Outer Space, NSC-5814/1, Aug 18, 1958 4 2 3/27/19 Space for Peace, for All Mankind § UN: Law of outer space, IGY § Karman line, 100-km altitude [why?] § Boundaries of national sovereignty § Principal concern of American space policy § Two schools of thought on space policy § Natural law school § Positivist school § Spacecraft registration and liability § sharing the radio spectrum and scientific data § no restrictions on competing states http://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/Kármán_line 5 Space for Peace, for All Mankind § Space “pacifists” shut out § Irony § Competition was the engine of space flight § Incentive to make needed large investments § Space programs stunted with malnutrition § Project Rover, 1960s § Nuclear rockets § High specific impulse § Safety concerns § Atmospheric contamination § Reactor re-entry in launch failure 6 3 3/27/19 Pioneer 1, NASA’s First Moon Shot, October 11, 1958 Pioneer 1 Thor-Able § Lunar mission § 3-stage launch vehicle § Vanguard 2nd stage § 3rd stage same as Scout 4th stage § Failed to reach the moon § 71,000-mi apogee § Returned valuable data on the Van Allen Belt 7 Fractional Orbit Bombardment System GR-1 SS-X-10 FOBS, 1960s 8 4 3/27/19 Sparrow in the Falcon’s Nest 9 NACA/NASA Research Laboratories 1940 1939 1959 1946 1915 1962 1936/58 1920 1963 1961 1960 10 5 3/27/19 Civilian or Military Space Program? § Why have a civilian space agency? § Finding a suitable administrator: T. Ke it h Glennan § Infighting within DoD: Army, USAF, OSD, ARPA § ABMA: leading agency for large rocket development § USAF sought expanded role § NASA raid on military capabilities and facilities § Critical role of ARPA § Military benefits as side effects of civilian space program § “Born as a civilian sparrow in a nest of warbirds, NASA grew up and flew.” 11 Civilian AND Military Space Program? § Two space programs with distinct objectives § NASA and USAF the winners § Army and Navy the losers § Who owns manned space flight? § Reasons for Eisenhower’s posture § Marxism vs. capitalism § Prestige in third world § Traditional and modern conservatives § NASA’s budget: large or small? § Justification: science or space race? § Embracing technocracy 12 6 3/27/19 Critical Points § Development of the F-1 engine § Influence of “committee of outsiders” § Vice President Nixon’s input § Newsweek: “How to Lose the Space Race!” 1) Start Late 2) Downgrade Russian Feats 3) Fragment Authority 4) Pinch Pennies 5) Think Small 6) Shirk Decisions § Inaccuracy of NY Times reportage § NSC-5918, 1/12/1960, “U.S. Policy on Outer Space” § Laymen:“true conquest of space” as manned spaceflight 13 International Cooperation § Help or hindrance? § Technology, knowledge, and funding § Global tracking networks, international relations § Goodwill and positive image § British and French interests § UN role § Views of Eisenhower: § Tight-fisted § However, he secured NASA’s role in growing technocratic enterprise § Root principles, and dualities of space policies § Ironies behind decisions § “Honest” space policy: good or bad? 14 7 3/27/19 Authorization vs. Appropriation § Appropriation vs. Authorization in legislation § Military and civilian activities in "scientific warfare and total cold war” § Civilian scientific programs were tools of competition. § "All aspects of national activity were becoming increasingly politicized, if not militarized" § NASA upgraded to an administration § Patent policy, contract system of R&D § Eisenhower took uncomfortable initiatives § Accelerated military R&D § Increased funding of civilian R&D § Moved federal government into education funding § Created a new agency devoted to state-sponsored R&D § 3 major components: § Management § Policy § Budget 15 NACA, ABMA, and NASA § Difference between German and NACA engineers? § “Testing … makes the difference between ‘a successful failure and a complete failure. In one case you know what happened; in the other case you don’t’.” § “We made a lot of tests and, whenever something broke, we redesigned it.” § Switch to contractors for much of the work (outsourcing) § Test and verify everything § In-house technical capability § “a doer as opposed to a thinker, there was nobody in the United States who could snow me.” § Need for corporate memory to keep long-term projects (e.g., Hubble telescope) operating 16 8 3/27/19 March 22, 1952 17 Trouble in the Spacecraft: Ejection Capsule 18 9 3/27/19 USAF Man-in-Space-Soonest Program, 1956-1958 http://www.astronautix.com/fam/manonest.htm 19 Military Space Applications § Military applications satellites § Anti-satellite missiles § X-20 Dyna-Soar USN Space § USN Space Cruiser, and others Cruiser, 1973 USAF X-20 Dyna-Soar Bell BoMi, 1952 20 10 3/27/19 Project Rover Nuclear Rocket , 1960s NERVA Rocket Isp ~ 900 sec Kiwi-B4-A Reactor/Rocket 2018: Resurgent American and Russian interest in nuclear propulsion NERVA-Powered Mars Mission 21 The Shape of Things to Come 22 11 3/27/19 Advancing Toward “MAD” § Jefferson: State and society are natural adversaries § Eisenhower Republicans: Government intervention as a necessary evil § Democrats: Stevenson doves and Symington hawks § Warfare had become politicized and democratized § Nuclear weapons changed the nature of warfare forever – did they? § “Mutual assured destruction” or survivable nuclear war § Proliferation of “Think Tanks” § Space, a “new frontier” for strategy 23 Increased Government Spending § Consensus on need for vastly increased federal spending and power § Ike didn’t buy it § Impacts of the 1960 Presidential election § U-2 flights found no deployed Soviet ICBMs § SAC and CIA still provided defensive wall § Reconnaissance satellites launched in profusion § Project Mercury as a “stop-gap measure” before Apollo? 24 12 3/27/19 TIROS, Transit, and Echo 25 Corona, Discoverer, KH-1 to KH-4 C-119 Recovery Vehicle https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jOGicfF_vQ 26 13 3/27/19 27 Implications of the “Missile Gap” § Follow-on to Mercury required F-1 engine (?) § Hardly! Project Gemini didn’t need it § But F-1 engine was critical for Saturn V § Missile gap myth used to advantage during “critical years” § After Republicans lost 1960 election, Eisenhower § killed the NASA Apollo Program § increased funding for USAF spy satellites § Importance of a non-secret civilian space program 28 14 3/27/19 USAF Reconnaissance Satellites KH-7 Gambit 1 KH-8 Gambit 3 KH-9 Hexagon 29 JFK to LBJ, April 20, 1961 30 15 3/27/19 LBJ to JFK, April 28, 1961 31 John F. Kennedy’s Challenge to Congress May 25, 1961 32 16 3/27/19 Request for Congressional Support § May 25, 1961: Kennedy's Commitment to go to the moon, § Shepard's sub-orbital flight, May 5th § "If we are to win the battle...." § “This is a judgment that members of Congress must finally make...” § Kennedy years: space policy falling captive to image makers § Apollo: Greatest peace-time commitment by Congress in history § McNamara: Strict management reforms at Pentagon 33 Destination Moon § Kennedy men: "The generation that fought the war...” § Eisenhower: Little faith in centralized management § 1958: LBJ’s National Aeronautics and Space Council § Project Mercury: Weisner committee: crash program to put man in space unjustifiable § NASA’s focus § USAF Space Study Committee 34 17 3/27/19 Politics and Advice Robert James Webb McNamara § USAF expectations § Webb finds BoB in dark about space programs § JFK reaction to Gagarin orbit, Bay of Pigs (4/61) § Johnson report, only one possible conclusion § LBJ worked on Webb for backup § Webb-McNamara report § Health of aerospace industry § Congress: $20B on command technology for political goal 35 All Constituencies Onboard § "Of all those who contributed to the moon decision, the ones farthest in the background were the engineers of Langley and Goddard and Marshall” § Kennedy years: Space policy, image makers § Apollo: Greatest peace-time commitment by Congress in history § McNamara at the Pentagon § Playing off NASA against aerospace industry § Keeping NASA alive w/o paying from DoD budget 36 18 3/27/19 “We Choose to Go to the Moon …” Rice University, Texas, September 12, 1962 37 Cold War vs. Open Space Policy § Sputnik made Cold War “total” § Impact confusing at first § Preventing military from going “hog wild” § Space policy as shield for spy satellites § Open space policy real but disingenuous § Flight to the Moon, a self-justifying feat § Big technology not inherently un-American, inevitable replacement for individual innovation § Ike: “Military hero who revolted against war” § Edwin Land: “More and more we tend to resemble the Soviets” 38 19 3/27/19 Impulsive Orbit Transfer and