Syracuse University SURFACE Dissertations - ALL SURFACE August 2019 Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers Giles David Arceneaux Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Arceneaux, Giles David, "Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers" (2019). Dissertations - ALL. 1080. https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1080 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust administrative, physical, and technical controls over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against nuclear use? The nature of a state’s nuclear command and control systems underpin the deterrent capacity of a state’s nuclear arsenal, determine the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use, and affect the likelihood of conventional conflict escalating across the nuclear threshold. Despite the importance of command and control systems for nuclear stability and security, however, detailed analysis on the sources of nuclear command and control remain scarce outside the context of the Cold War superpowers. Current explanations of command and control in regional nuclear powers are largely built upon lessons from the U.S. nuclear experience, but these explanations prove unpersuasive under empirical scrutiny. In this dissertation, I analyze the origins of command and control systems in regional nuclear powers. My dissertation makes three broad contributions to the study of nuclear strategy and operations. First, I develop a typology of nuclear command and control systems that measures the administrative, physical, and technical controls that a state deploys over its nuclear arsenal. With these indicators, I identify three ideal types of command and control that categorize command and control frameworks by when political leaders delegate the capability to use nuclear weapons to lower-level commanders: delegative control systems that delegate nuclear use capability during peacetime, conditional control systems that delegate nuclear use capability early in crises, and assertive control systems that delegate nuclear use capability late in crises. Second, I provide a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to explain variation in command and control arrangements across regional nuclear powers: the presence of a conventionally superior adversary, the severity of domestic threats to the political regime, and the level of military organizational autonomy. This framework generates specific predictions for command and control outcomes in regional nuclear powers and identifies the conditions under which each variable influences command and control systems. Third, I evaluate my argument and a series of alternative explanations with a combination of historical and primary source material. Specifically, I draw upon archival and original interview data with political and military elites from India, Pakistan, and apartheid-South Africa to describe and explain nuclear command and control arrangements in these states. By employing extensive primary source evidence to evaluate the competing perspectives, my dissertation offers the descriptive accuracy and theoretical leverage necessary to explain command and control arrangements in regional nuclear powers. BEYOND THE RUBICON: COMMAND AND CONTROL IN REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS by Giles David Arceneaux M.A., Syracuse University, 2014 M.A., Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2012 B.A., Sam Houston State University, 2009 Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. Syracuse University August 2019 Copyright © Giles David Arceneaux 2019 All Rights Reserved Acknowledgements I was fortunate to have several institutional homes and affiliations during the writing of this dissertation. First, I spent the majority of my time researching this project as a graduate student in political science at Syracuse University. I would like to thank Colin Elman, my advisor, for his guidance and mentorship throughout the graduate program. I would also like to thank Jim Steinberg and Brian Taylor for their persistent support and dedication as members of my dissertation committee. These individuals served as the core of my dissertation committee and deserve recognition for their commitment to improving my research. Many other faculty members offered significant help along the way, including Matthew Cleary, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Jonathan Hanson, Seth Jolly, Audie Klotz, and Daniel McDowell. Syracuse also provided numerous friends and colleagues to whom I owe more extensive thanks than space permits, including Jason Blessing, Lindsay Burt, Erik French, Pedram Maghsoud-Nia, Angely Martinez, Brandon Metroka, Aykut Ozturk, Carly Rasiewicz, Beatriz Rey, Elise Roberts, Li Shao, Prakhar Sharma, Catriona Standfield, Logan Strother, and Kyungwon Suh. The office staff at the Syracuse University department of political science also deserve special recognition for all that they do. In particular, I am deeply thankful to Candy Brooks, Sally Greenfield, and Jacquie Meyer for their exceptional support and assistance. Second, I spent the 2017-2018 academic year as a predoctoral fellow with the Carnegie International Politics Scholars Consortium and Network (IPSCON) through the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. The IPSCON program provided me with the guidance and opportunity to improve the academic basis and policy relevance of my research. I am especially grateful to v Francis Gavin, Peter Feaver, and the participants at the 2018 IPSCON Minnowbrook conference for their valuable insight into the project and continued support of my research endeavors. Third, I spent the 2018-2019 academic year as a predoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with an affiliation at the Security Studies Program (SSP) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The faculty, students, and fellows at MIT immediately welcomed me into the SSP community and offered invaluable assistance in improving the project. I owe my greatest thanks to Vipin Narang, who served as a member of my dissertation committee and has challenged and encouraged me for several years. Vipin’s substantive expertise and commitment as a mentor have dramatically improved the quality of my dissertation and broader research agenda. I am also grateful to Owen Coté, Jr. for his willingness to repeatedly discuss my research projects and for his help as a member of my dissertation committee. Other faculty members at SSP also demonstrated a sincere willingness to assist in the improvement of my research, including Roger Petersen and Barry Posen. The students and fellows make SSP the rewarding intellectual environment that it is, and I owe significant thanks to many individuals from the SSP community for their feedback on numerous projects, including Marsin Alshamary, Benjamin Chang, J. Andres Gannon, Andrew Halterman, William James, Se Young Jang, Jason Kwon, Philip Martin, Tim McDonnell, Aidan Milliff, Kacie Miura, Cullen Nutt, Reid Pauly, Sara Plana, and Paul Van Hooft. I will forever be grateful for the opportunity to complete my dissertation while embedded within the SSP community. This dissertation heavily relies upon interviews with political and military elites to substantiate my claims. I would like to express my most sincere appreciation to the dozens of officials from India, Pakistan, and South Africa who agreed to interview requests in support of my dissertation research. Additionally, I am extremely grateful to those individuals that helped vi me coordinate these interviews, including Mark Bell, Debak Das, Yogesh Joshi, Vipin Narang, and Anna-Mart Van Wyk. Finally, I would like to thank the funding institutions and organizations that made the necessary travels for these interviews possible, including the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Tobin Project, and Syracuse University’s Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) and Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs. My research would not have been possible without the generous support of these institutions. vii Table of Contents Acknowledgements v List of Figures ix List of Tables x Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers 24 Chapter 3: India 61 Chapter 4: Pakistan 98 Chapter 5: South Africa 136 Chapter 6: Conclusion 166 Appendix A: Abbreviations 187 References 190 Curriculum Vitae 208 viii Figures Figure 2.1. Theory of Nuclear Command and Control 39 Figure 2.2. Theory of Nuclear Command and Control: Empirical Predictions 60 Figure 5.1. South African Administrative Control 141 Figure 6.1. Theory of Nuclear Command and Control: Empirical Results 175 ix Tables Table 2.1. Patterns of Nuclear Command and Control 33 x 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear powers? Why do some states implement robust administrative, physical, and technical controls over their nuclear arsenals while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized