Number 19 — June 2014 RESEARCH NOTES THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY Turkey’s Commitment to NATO NOT YET GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE Richard Outzen urkey’s September 2013 preliminary selection of Concern, in fact, has become widespread—some a Chinese company to build its first long-range observers now view Turkey as the most problematic T air- and missile-defense system raised eyebrows member of the alliance, a view quietly echoed by in Western capitals and boardrooms. Was Turkey NATO insiders.5 This is not just because of the Chi- signaling an important shift away from its commit- nese air-defense deal; other reasons include authori- ment to NATO by selecting a Chinese system in an tarian measures taken by Prime Minister Recep area of serious and sensitive need?1 Turkey has long Tayyip Erdogan,6 disagreements over whether the supplemented its array of U.S. and European defense United States should continue to maintain nuclear purchases with gear from non-NATO allies such as weapons in Turkey,7 public ambivalence in Tur- South Korea or Israel, and has sought generally to key regarding NATO,8 and the growing perception develop its defense-industrial capacity, but the Turks that Turkey’s foreign policy goals and ambitions do have not previously partnered with a non-Western not overlap with the U.S. or NATO sphere of inter- power on such a critical technology—let alone with est and influence as they once did.9 No doubt, Tur- the Chinese.2 Fears that the air-defense deal indi- key’s continued active role in NATO organizations cated a deepening strategic rift have been exacerbated and its helpful deployment of troops to Afghanistan by other troubling signs, including Turkey’s reported underline a continued willingness to play major roles sharing of sensitive intelligence with the Iranians and in NATO when its key interests are at stake. Never- public courting of the Russians for admission to the theless, when Turkey holds competing interests, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.3 The recent country is not afraid to cause headaches for NATO; resumption of European Union accession talks did of particular concern to some is Turkey’s insistence on not alleviate unease regarding the mutual commit- prohibiting NATO partnership with Israel.10 ment of Turkey and the West, given the preceding The popularity of NATO in Turkey, meanwhile, has three-year deadlock and the focus of the upcoming taken several hits over the past decade. Some of this talks on just one of more than thirty accession chap- stems from Turks’ conflating U.S. policy in Iraq with ters. In any case, public enthusiasm for EU acces- NATO more generally, given the extreme unpopular- sion remains low both in Turkey and in Europe, ity of the former and the perceived association with and NATO remains the key indicator of Turkey’s the latter.11 The Iraq war constituted a negative water- “Western-ness.”4 In that sense, any sign of wavering shed in U.S.-Turkey relations, one from which there commitment to NATO is cause for concern. has not been and perhaps never will be a full recov- Col. Richard Outzen (USA) is a senior military fellow at the Center for Strategic Research in National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. His research focuses on Middle East and Central Asian strategic affairs, language and culture, and civil-military relations. © 2014 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. All rights reserved. Outzen ery. 12 Incidents of Quran desecration in Afghanistan 1990s.19 During the Cold War and for a decade there- by U.S. troops had the same effect.13 NATO’s popu- after, Soviet threats, Turkish economic weakness, and larity may have suffered collateral damage from grow- Kemalist ideology enforced NATO’s primacy as a ing Turkish frustration over stalled EU accession talks, strategic identity for Turkey rather than just a security based on the sense that Europe has gained more from organization to which it belonged. With those ele- the relationship than Turkey.14 ments removed and corresponding Turkish economic Despite these concerns, NATO remains firmly and political development, the wavering commitment committed to Turkey in concrete ways. Three promi- to NATO may have been inevitable. nent examples of this commitment include the 2011 Altogether, NATO membership provides Turkey decision to base a major early-warning radar system too much political and strategic value to be forsaken near Malatya, the deployment of Patriot batter- entirely. In any case, the alliance has no mechanism ies along Turkey’s border with Syria since late 2012, for expelling a NATO member, and NATO has tol- and the continued presence of a significant Ameri- erated undemocratic and disruptive behaviors from can nuclear deterrent force in Turkey.15 NATO also member states throughout its history.20 Yet the rela- activated a major subordinate headquarters, Allied tionship has changed in fundamental ways. Evidence Land Command, in Izmir in 2012.16 These steps serve points to a coming decade in which the following as high-profile reminders of Turkey’s value to NATO conditions apply: despite the greatly reduced NATO footprint in Tur- key and ambivalence toward NATO from the ruling Turkey will increasingly view NATO as an party and much of the public. inadequate vehicle to meet the security needs required by its grander, more independent stra- Increasing friction, however, leaves Turkey’s role tegic identity (e.g., arming Syrian rebels). in the NATO alliance at a delicate juncture. Turkey’s economic might has grown dramatically in the past Turkey will therefore pursue many diplomatic decade, and the Turks have ambitious goals for mili- initiatives not coordinated with NATO. tary reform and expansion of the defense-industrial sector.17 Defense-industrial cooperation has increas- Turkey’s political culture will increasingly ingly become a tool for as well as product of Turk- diverge from that of its European NATO allies. ish diplomacy. Meanwhile, Turkey has deployed other Turkey will follow an independent defense- national tools in support of non-NATO regional industrial policy. engagement, including an increased defense atta- ché corps, greater naval cooperation, expanded These trends justifiably cause alarm, but that alarm development-assistance funding, and more aggres- should be kept in perspective and not prompt over- sive covert intelligence and related operations.18 Thus, reaction. NATO, after all, has functioned with vary- NATO activities in Turkey and Turkish activities ing success on multiple levels: as a response to a clear, in NATO continue steadily, but within a broader common military threat; as an aspirational commu- context of separate agendas. Divergence is clearest nity linked by political values; as an informal defense- regarding Russia and Iran, where Turkish interests, industrial consortium; as a broad statement of geopo- sensitivities, and scope of activity differ greatly from litical identity; and as a nuclear umbrella.21 The first those of the United States or Europe. Perspectives two of these components may have lost relevance, also diverge regarding Cyprus, Israel and the Palestin- but the third and fourth still provide value, albeit ians, Iraq, and Syria. One should not be surprised that reduced, and the fifth remains vital. The Chinese a Turkey with rising economic might and a growing air-defense deal is unfortunately a sign of the times— vision of its global role should pursue its interests on that is, of reduced policy convergence between Turk- its own terms rather than in coordination with the ish political elites and their European and American United States or NATO, as was the case through the counterparts—and probably a sign of things to come. 2 RESEARCH NOTE 19 Turkey’s Commitment to NATO: Not Yet Grounds for Divorce In the years ahead, current areas of divergence may tical rather than fundamental purposes. Carried out grow into a more fundamental breach. But this has by elites, however, the arrangement failed to address not happened yet. The differences today are manage- the largely non-Western geographical, historical, and able if leaders in Ankara, Washington, and Brussels cultural ties that underlay Turkish public opinion and communicate, in unambiguous terms, their must- geostrategic context.24 This marked the easiest way to haves for the future relationship. modernize the state and society (through cooperation with the West) and to maintain independence (by Historical and Theoretical Context deterring Russia). For a state like Turkey, the ideal Before probing the evidence on current Turkey- partner in such an arrangement would be a distant NATO tensions, one must consider the historical but powerful patron who would share authority and context. What, for instance, does “normal” look like resources but make relatively light or only theoretical in Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the West? demands. During the Cold War, NATO fit this bill. How have problems in the country’s broader rela- Nevertheless, when demands upon a midsize state tionship with the West affected NATO endeavors? like Turkey increase—whether for political change, Indeed, concerns over Turkey’s Western orientation support of military actions, or commercial matters— are not new: over the past half century, Turkey’s lead- that state will be compelled to reconsider costs and ers have demonstrated a pattern of decisionmaking benefits, always wary of exploitation. Increasingly after that cools, and then rewarms, in its relations with the the Cold War, many Turks viewed the costs as merit- West. The strongly worded “Johnson letter” of 1964 ing a move away from the alliance. NATO expansion, that threatened to leave Turkey at Russia’s mercy the Iraq wars, and Israel-Iran tensions all begat new should the Turks invade Cyprus, the U.S. weapons demands on Turkey by its allies, especially the United embargo after Turkey’s Cyprus operation in 1974, and States, without contributing appreciably to Turkish 25 Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 all led to downturns security.