Governing Fragmented Societies: State-Building and Political Integration in Chechnya and Ingushetia (1991-2009) Ekaterina Sokirianskaia Political Science Department, Central European University In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Budapest, Hungary 2009 I confirm that the thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless otherwise noted ii Abstract My dissertation analyzes state-building and political integration in the two North Caucasian Republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya. The study is to a large extent designed as a reaction to the mainstream claim that the degree of national consolidation and stability of these North Caucasian regimes are primarily a result of clan politics, i.e. political process where the main actors are pre-existing kin-based identity organizations. The task of this research was thus to assess the relative role of informal social structures in projects aimed at establishing and consolidating indigenous political units in the North Caucasus and to identify the principal internal reasons for the outcomes of these projects. On the basis of long-term participant observation, interviews with experts, analysis of historical data and modern political processes this thesis argues that clans (teips) have seized to be patterns of political integration of any prominence in Ingushetia and Chechnya. As a result of demographic growth and social change brought about by colonization, Soviet modernization and frequent forced and voluntary resettlements, they lost their organizational structure and are incapable to mobilize members for action. Five case studies show that although certain traditional institutions and practices still play an important role in the society, state-building is determined by struggle for power between socially heterogeneous groups that are driven by ideologies, programs, economic or military interests, and can be based on strong or weak ties. Five structural factors influence elite formation and state-building in the region: descent, kinship, territory, religion and ideology. The prominence of each of them is dependent on elite choices and the particular demands of the state-building project. Governments differ in how homogeneous they are, and how strong are the ties binding their members together. I conclude that the lack of checks and balances and a risk-prone environment increase the relevance of strong ties. I also show that the role of kinship in iii structuring the elite and the determining the strength of ties within governments do not covary, despite the expectations to the contrary. Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor Zsolt Enyedi without whom my return to academia would not have happened and this thesis would have never seen light. It is only due to his pedagogical wisdom, flexibility and strong faith in me that this project became possible. I am grateful to him for becoming an expert on Chechen and Ingush clans together with me and for illuminating discussions, which helped me shape out the argument. Special thanks for teaching me how to sketch graphs, for understanding and friendship. I am very grateful to Matteo Fumagalli who joined my project at a later stage and was its most thorough, thoughtful and stimulating reader and critic. His guidance helped me develop the theoretical framework, elaborate argument, focus on methodology and structure. His encouragement and support helped me get till the end. I am truly indebted to my friends and colleagues in Ingushetia and Chechnya, who helped me in my fieldwork, spent hours trying to explain to me the logic of Wajnakh informal social institutions, drove me all around Ingushetia and Chechnya for interviews. I thank them for being frank and open about many sensitive issues that we have discussed and for making me warm and safe all the five years in the region. I am grateful to my interviewees for their stories and hospitality. 90% of the credit for this work goes to my mom. Her love and care kept me going. iv The Table of Contents: INTRODUCTION 11 1. GOVERNING FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES: LATE STATE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION 10 1.1. Late State-building and Social Integration: Analytical Problems and Concepts 11 1.2. State-Building: State-Centered Perspectives 16 1.2.1. Finding Balance: The “State-in-Society Approach” 23 1.2.2. Neo-Primordialism: “Clan Politics” Approach and the Factor of Kinship 25 1.3. Kinship in Anthropological Theory 34 1.4. Trust Networks and the „Economy of Favors“ 44 2. POLITICAL ORDER, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION BEFORE COLONIZATION AND IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 51 2. 1. Political Order and Social Institutions Prior to the Caucasian War (- 1817) 52 2.1.2. Debates on Nakh Feudalism 55 2.1.3. Proto-national political institutions and law: Mekhk-Khel, Tukhum and Adat 62 2.2. Political Order, Social Change and Social Institutions during and after the Caucasian War 63 2.2.1. The Beginning of the Caucasian War 64 2.2.2. Shamil’s Imamate 67 2.2.3. Political Structures and Informal Patterns of social integration during the Caucasian War and Shamil’s Imamate 70 2.3. The Russian State and Wajnakh Social institutions after the Caucasian War 72 2.3.1 Land reform. Institutionalization of “dym” as a fiscal and economic unit. The Russian administration 72 2.3.2. Enforcement of Russian institutions and law. Involvement in new sectors of economy 73 2.3.3. New Pattern of Social Integration: Tariqas and Virds 74 3. STATE-BUILDING, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE SOVIET STATE (1921-1991) 78 3.1. Early Bolshevik State and the Social Change (1922-1940) 78 3.2. Wajnakh society and social institutions during the deportation (1944-1957) 83 3.3. Wajnakh society and social institutions upon return (1957-1991) 89 3.4. Collective Memory as a Political Resource 96 4. SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN INGUSHETIA AND CHECHNYA 104 (A FIELDWORK REPORT) 104 4.1. Fieldwork methodology and challenges 105 4.2. Descent Groups in Ingushetia and Chechnya 107 4.2.1. Is the Teip a Social Organization? Looking at Mechanisms for Maintaining the Teip’s Unity 115 v 4.3. Kinship 130 4.3.1. Categories of Kinship and Relations between them 130 4.3.2. Kinship Relations and Kin Solidarity 133 4.3.3 Co-habitation: Kinship enclaves 134 4.3.4. Kinship and Blood Feud 137 4.4. Territory 138 4.5. Religion 140 4.5.1. Tariqas and virds 140 4.5.2. Murid Groups and Local Religious Authorities 142 4.5.3. Fundamentalists 144 4.6. Mechanisms of recruitment to office and getting access to social goods 145 4.6.1. Kinship and descent 146 4.6.2. Neighbors/ Zemlyaks 147 4.6.3. Religion 147 4.6.4. Professional networks, ideological networks and others 148 5. NATIONALIST STATE-BUILDING PROJECT IN CHECHNYA 1991-1994 151 5.1. Socio-Political Processes Preceding State-Building: Nationalist Movement and National Revolution 152 5.2. State-Building Policies (1991-1994) 156 5.2.1 Budget and Tax collection 158 5.2.2. Industry and Unemployment 159 5.2.3. Law Enforcement and Security Services 160 5.2.4. The Judicial System 162 5.2.6. The Military 164 5.2.7. Education and Healthcare 164 5.2.8. Infrastructure and welfare 164 5.3. Political Crisis: The Parliament vs. the President 166 5.4. State Building and Informal Social Institutions in Chechnya 1991-1994 176 5.4.1. Teips and Descent groups 176 5.4.2. Neo-traditionalism: the Mekhk-Khel and Seniors in Politics 181 5.4.3. Kinship 184 5.4.4. Territory 186 5.4.5. Religion 188 5.4.6. Political elite formation: ideology, personal networks 190 5.4.7. Personal networks and “joint responsibility” 191 5.5. Challengers to the Regime: Regions in Opposition 194 6. THE ISLAMIST STATE-BUILDING PROJECT IN CHECHNYA (1997-1999) 204 6.1. Socio-political processes shaping state-building in Chechnya (1997-1999) 204 6.2. Elections and attempts at initial elite consolidation 208 6.3. Regime challengers: formal opposition, informal groups 211 6.4. State-building policies 1997-1999 218 6.4.1. Economy 218 6.4.2. Budget and tax collection 219 6.4.3. Industry 221 6.4.4. Agriculture 223 vi 6.4.5. Education and healthcare 224 6.4.6. The armed forces 227 6.4.7. Law-enforcement and capacity to maintain order 228 6.4.8. The Judicial system 232 6.5. The Political Crisis and the Government’s response 233 6.6. State-building and informal institutions and practices in 1997-1999 240 6.6.1. Paramilitary groups 241 6.6.2. Religion and ideology 241 6.6.3. Regional opposition 242 6.6.4. Teip, seniors, kinship 243 6.6.5. Political elite formation: kinship and personal networks 245 7. THE DEMOCRATIC STATE –BUILDING PROJECT IN INGUSHETIA: 1992-2001 250 7.1. Socio-political processes shaping state-building in Ingushetia: National Movement and Foundation of the Ingush Republic 251 7.2. Creating Institutions, initial consolidation 255 7.3. State-Building Policies 1992-2001 257 7.3.1. The Economy 257 7.3.2. Budget and Tax Collection 260 7.3.3. Agriculture 261 7.3.4. Law-enforcement 263 7.3.5. Education and healthcare 267 7.4. Issues of Political Disagreement: the Ingush-Ossetian conflict, and the Wars in Chechnya 269 7.5. State-building and Informal Social Institutions and Practices in Ingushetia (1992-2001) 273 7.5.1. Teips and Familias 273 7.5.2. Religion 280 7.5.3. Elite formation: Kinship, Personal Networks, Ideology (Program) 282 8. PERSONALISTIC REGIMES: INGUSHETIA UNDER MURAT ZYAZIKOV (2002-2008) AND CHECHNYA UNDER KADYROVS (2003- CURRENT) 291 8.1.