Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense Adam Przeworski nal deliberation, and to be represented as the Introduction view of the informed majority, the fact that rulers are elected is of no particular significance. I want to defend a ‘‘minimalist,’’ Schumpeterian, Voting is just a time-saving expedient (Buchanan conception of democracy, by minimalist, Pop- and Tullock 1962) and majority rule is just a perian, standards. In Schumpeter’s (1942) con- technically convenient way of identifying what ception, democracy is just a system in which everyone would or should have agreed to. Yet if rulers are selected by competitive elections. Pop- the point of departure is that in any society there per (1962: 124) defends it as the only system in are conflicts, of values and of interests, electing which citizens can get rid of governments with- rulers appears nothing short of miraculous. out bloodshed. Let us put the consensualist view of democ- Since neither the position I wish to defend nor racy where it belongs—in the Museum of the claim in its favor are new, what do I defend Eighteenth-century Thought—and observe that them from? Perusing innumerable definitions, all societies are ridden with economic, cultural, one discovers that democracy has become an al- or moral conflicts. True, as the modernization tar on which everyone hangs his or her favorite theory (notably Coser 1959) emphasized, these ex voto. Almost all normatively desirable aspects conflicts can be ‘‘cross-cutting’’: they need not of political, and sometimes even of social and pit class against class or religion against religion. economic, life are credited as intrinsic to de- They can be attenuated by an ‘‘overlapping con- mocracy: representation, accountability, equal- sensus’’: consensus about practicalities compati- ity, participation, justice, dignity, rationality, ble with di¤erences of values (Rawls 1993). They security, freedom, . , the list goes on. We are may be also moderated by public discussion of repeatedly told that ‘‘unless democracy is x or both normative and technical reasons, although, generates x, . .’’ The ellipsis is rarely spelled out, as I have argued above, deliberation is a two- but it insinuates either that a system in which edged sword, for it may lead just to solidifying governments are elected is not worthy of being conflicting views. Yet in the end, when all the called ‘‘democracy’’ unless x is fulfilled or that coalitions have been formed, the practical con- democracy in the minimal sense will not endure sensus has been elaborated, and all arguments unless x is satisfied.2 The first claim is normative, have been exhausted, conflicts remain. even if it often hides as a definition. The second My defense of the minimalist conception pro- is empirical. ceeds in two steps. I take it as obvious that Yet suppose this is all there is to democracy: that rulers are elected. Is it little? It depends on the point of departure.24 If one begins with a vi- 2. Widely cited statements in this vein are We¤ort sion of a basic harmony of interests, a common 1992 and Schmitter and Karl 1991, but the phrase is ubiquitous. Here is Shapiro (1996: 108): ‘‘If democracy good to be discovered and agreed to by a ratio- does not function to improve the circumstances of those who appeal to it, its legitimacy as a political sys- Excerpted from: Adam Przeworski, ‘‘Minimalist Con- tem will atrophy.’’ Even Kelsen (1988 [1929]: 38) poses ception of Democracy: A Defense.’’ In Democracy’s the threat that ‘‘Modern democracy will not live unless Value, edited by Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker- the Parliament will show itself an instrument appro- Cordo´n. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, priate for the solution of the social questions of the 1999. 6 Cambridge University Press, 1999. Reprinted hour.’’ with the permission of Cambridge University Press. 24. Shapiro (1996: 82) also takes this position. Defining Democracy 13 we want to avoid bloodshed, resolving conflicts Yet the very prospect that governments would through violence.25 Starting with this assump- alternate may induce the conflicting political tion, I first argue that the mere possibility of forces to comply with the rules rather than en- being able to change governments can avoid gage in violence, for the following reason. Al- violence. Secondly, I argue that being able to though the losers would be better o¤ in the short do it by voting has consequences of its own. run rebelling rather than accepting the outcome Popper’s defense of democracy is that it allows of the current round, if they have a su‰cient us to get rid of governments peacefully. But why chance to win and a su‰ciently large payo¤ in should we care about changing governments?26 the future rounds, they are better o¤ continuing My answer is that the very prospect that gov- to comply with the verdict of the coin toss rather ernments may change can result in a peaceful than fighting for power. Similarly, while the regulation of conflicts. To see this argument in winners would be better o¤ in the short run not its starkest form, assume that governments are tossing the coin again, they may be better o¤ in selected by a toss of a, not necessarily fair, coin: the long run peacefully leaving o‰ce rather than ‘‘heads’’ mean that the incumbents should provoking violent resistance to their usurpation remain in o‰ce, ‘‘tails’’ that they should leave. of power. Regulating conflicts by a coin toss Thus, a reading of the toss designates ‘‘winners’’ is then a self-enforcing equilibrium (Przeworski and ‘‘losers.’’ This designation is an instruction 1991: chap. 1). Bloodshed is avoided by the mere what the winners and the losers should and fact that, a` la Aristotle, the political forces expect should not do: the winners should move into a to take turns. White or Pink House or perhaps even a palacio; Suppose first that the winners of the coin while there they can take everything up to the toss get some predetermined part of the pie, constitutional constraint for themselves and their 1=2 < x < 1, while losers get the rest.27 Winners supporters, and they should toss the same coin decide at each time whether to hold elections at again when their term is up. The losers should the next time and losers whether to accept defeat not move into the House and should accept get- or to rebel. If democracy is repeated indefinitely ting not more than whatever is left. from t ¼ 0 on, the winner at t ¼ 0 expects to get Note that when the authorization to rule is DW ¼ x þ VW(e; x) and the loser at t ¼ 0 expects determined by a lottery, citizens have no elec- to get DL ¼ (1 À x) þ VL(1 À e; x), where V toral sanction, prospective or retrospective, and stands for the present value of continuing under the incumbents have no electoral incentives to democracy beyond the current round, e is the behave well while in o‰ce. Since electing gov- probability the current incumbent will win the ernments by a lottery makes their chances of next toss. Let ‘‘democratic equilibrium’’ stand survival independent of their conduct, there are for a pair of strategies in which the current win- no reasons to expect that governments act in a ners always hold tosses if they expect losers to representative fashion because they want to earn comply and the current losers always comply re-election: any link between elections and rep- if they expect the winners to hold tosses. Then resentation is severed. such an equilibrium exists if everyone is better o¤ under democracy than under rebellion: if 25. I am not arguing against Locke that violence is DW > RW and DL > RL, where R stands for the never justified, just that a system that systematically expected values of violent conflict for each of the avoids it is preferable to one that does not. two parties. 26. I want to thank Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca for pos- ing this question. 27. This analysis is based on joint work with James Fearon, still in progress. Chapter 1 14 Moreover, the prospect of alternation may mine the strength of the adversaries in an open induce moderation while in o‰ce. Suppose that conflict. Hence, to avoid violence, the conflicting the current incumbent can either manipulate the political forces adopt the following device: agree probability, e, of being re-elected or can decide over those issues that can be specified and allow what share of the pie, x A [0; 1], to take, or both. the residual control to alternate according to There are some initial values {e(0); x(0)}; at t ¼ 1 specified probabilities. In this sense, the consti- the coin is tossed and it designates winners tution specifies x, the limits on incumbents, and losers. Whoever is the winner now chooses and e, their chances in electoral competition, but {e(1); x(1)}: the rules for this round, etc. Hence, a random device decides who holds residual rules are not given ex ante: the incumbent control. manipulates them at will. Yet there are con- Yet we do not use random devices; we vote. ditions under which a democratic equilibrium What di¤erence does that make? exists in which the incumbents do not grab Voting is an imposition of a will over a will. everything. If the cost of rebellion is su‰ciently When a decision is reached by voting, some high for both, each incumbent will prefer to people must submit to an opinion di¤erent from moderate its behavior while in o‰ce under de- theirs or to a decision contrary to their inter- mocracy rather than provoke a rebellion by the est.28 Voting authorizes compulsion.