AIDING AND ABETTING: FOREIGN AID AND STATE COERCION JESSICA NICOLE TRISKO DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MCGILL UNIVERSITY AUGUST 2012 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) © Jessica Nicole Trisko, 2012 Abstract This study examines the effects of US bilateral foreign aid policy on the internal security dynamics of aid recipient states. I draw upon the international security and contentious politics literatures to develop a theory of the coercive effect of foreign aid. I analyze how US foreign assistance affects the state capacity of recipient countries and, as a consequence, the government’s ability to employ violence as a tool for ensuring its continued tenure. I argue that as a consequence of fungibility—the ability to use foreign aid as a general government resource— foreign aid may increase the likelihood of state coercion by funding increases in the state’s coercive capacity, including changes in military expenditure, force structure and arms acquisitions. I test this argument through a statistical analysis of a cross-sectional time- series dataset of annual US bilateral foreign aid for 132 developing countries during the period of 1976 to 2005. This analysis is complemented by an in-depth case study of Indonesia and shorter analyses of El Salvador and South Korea. I find that the coercive effect of foreign aid is conditioned by the recipient country’s political institutions and conflict history. This research links the study of political violence with the changing nature of international relations and provides considerable insight into international influences on intrastate conflict. The research further suggests that foreign aid undermines aid donor goals by creating conditions propitious to increased political violence in recipient countries. ii Résumé Cette étude analyse les impacts de la politique d’aide étrangère des États-Unis sur la sécurité interne des États bénéficiaires. La documentation sur la sécurité internationale et les politiques conflictuelles m’a servi à développer une théorie sur l’effet coercitif de l’aide internationale. J’analyserai la manière dont l’aide étrangère des États-Unis affecte la capacité de gouverner des États bénéficiaires. J’analyserai particulièrement la capacité du gouvernement de l’État bénéficiaire d’employer la violence pour assurer la poursuite de son mandat. J’argumenterai qu’une des conséquences de la fongibilité – la capacité d’utiliser l’aide internationale comme une ressource gouvernementale – serait la possibilité d’augmentation de coercibilité de l’État en augmentant les dépenses dans les capacités coercitives de l’État, incluant les dépenses militaires, les forces de l’ordre et l’acquisition d’armes. Cet argumentaire sera démontré avec une analyse statistique d’un ensemble de données de l’aide bilatérale des États-Unis pour 132 pays en développement entre 1976 à 2005. Cette analyse est additionnée d’un regard en profondeur sur une étude de cas en l’Indonésie et d’analyses plus courtes de l’El Salvador, la Russie et la Corée du Sud. Je démontre que l’effet coercitif de l’aide étrangère est conditionné par les institutions politiques et l’histoire militaire du pays bénéficiaire. Cette recherche fait un lien entre l’étude de la violence politique et la nature changeante des relations internationales, et expose un aperçu fascinant des influences internationales et des conflits interétatiques. La recherche iii suggère aussi que l’aide internationale va à l’encontre des buts du donateur de subvention en créant des conditions propices à l’augmentation de la violence politique dans les pays bénéficiaires. iv Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. ii Résumé .............................................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... vii Figures, Tables, and Maps .............................................................................................. xi Acronyms and Initializations ........................................................................................ xiii Chapter I. International Influences on Human Rights and State Coercion ................ 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 Mechanisms of International Human Rights Influence ................................................ 10 Structure of the Study ................................................................................................... 21 Chapter II. Aiding Violence or Peace? A Theory of the Coercive Effects of Foreign Aid .................................................................................................................................... 26 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 26 Why States Repress: Coercion, Violence and the Modern State .................................. 29 Opposition and Rebellion ......................................................................................... 31 Defining State Coercion ........................................................................................... 35 The International Dimensions of State Coercion ......................................................... 39 The Implications of Aid Fungibility ......................................................................... 40 The Coercive Effect of Foreign Aid ......................................................................... 43 Domestic Influences on the Coercive Effect of Aid ...................................................... 49 Regime Type and Political Institutions .................................................................... 50 State Strength and the Capacity for Coercion .......................................................... 53 Conflict History ........................................................................................................ 56 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 59 Chapter III. Counting the Costs of Foreign Aid .......................................................... 62 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 62 State Repression, Violence and Mass Killings: Concepts and Definitions .................. 66 Mass Killings ............................................................................................................ 68 State Violence .......................................................................................................... 74 Repression ................................................................................................................ 76 Biases in State Coercion Measures .......................................................................... 79 The International Determinants of State Coercion ...................................................... 82 United States Bilateral Foreign Aid: Economic and Military .................................. 84 Other International Influences .................................................................................. 86 The Domestic Determinants of State Coercion ............................................................ 88 Regime Type and Political Institutions .................................................................... 88 State Strength and Reach .......................................................................................... 90 Internal Conflict History .......................................................................................... 92 Control Variables ..................................................................................................... 93 Empirical Strategy ........................................................................................................ 96 Case Study Structure ................................................................................................ 98 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 99 Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 101 Chapter IV. A Cross-Country Analysis of the Coercive Effects of Foreign Aid, 1976- 2005 ................................................................................................................................. 104 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 104 v Does Foreign Aid Facilitate State Coercion? ............................................................ 106 Does Foreign Aid Facilitate Torture? ..................................................................... 119 Is All Foreign Aid Coercive? ...................................................................................... 122 Robustness Tests ......................................................................................................... 127 Conclusion .................................................................................................................