politique étrangère l specialissue:2008 8 200 Towardsa“PoliticalTurn” CONFERENCE in the Fightagainst Jihadist Terrorism POLICY Guido Steinberg WORLD Guido Steinberg, FormerAdvisoron internationalterrorism(FederalChancellery, Germany),isaresearchfellowatthe Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik (SWP, German InstituteforInternationaland Security Affairs)inBerlin. Despiteall the measurestaken against al-Qaedaand like-minded organizationsafterSeptember11,2001,Jihadist terrorismhasremained a dangerous threat.Although itwould beexaggerated tostatethatJihadist organizationshavebecome stronger,al-Qaeda’sbiggest success mayhave been thatitavoided totaldisintegration. Tosurviveinanincreasingly hostile environment,itchanged its structuresand strategies.Asa consequenceofthe failuretorootout al-Qaedaafter2001,Jihadist terrorismislikelytoposeathreatforyears tocome. Itisdifficulttojudge the extenttowhichal-Qaedaand affiliated organizationsand networksremain aforcetobereckoned withbecause the Jihadist phenomenon hasdeveloped. The coreorganization around Osamabin Laden and hisdeputy Aimanal-Zawahirimayhaveweakened, but affiliated groupsand cellsin the Arab world and Pakistanhavegained in importanceand havecontinued theirHolyWaragainst the West and regimesin theirhome countries. Since2001,three trendshavecharacterized the developmentof Jihadist terrorism:the returnofArab volunteers from Afghanistantotheirhome countries,the emergenceofneworganizationsonlylooselyaffiliated with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda’schange from organization toideology. •In2001al-QaedawasmainlyanArab organization. When itlost its headquarters in Afghanistan,manyof its fighters returned totheircoun- triesof origin in the Arab world. Asaconsequence,Jihadist terrorism returned tothe Middle East,wherethe terrorist threathadlost some of the importanceithadhadinthe mid-1990s.Forinstance,al-Qaedaon the ArabianPeninsulastarted anunprecedented terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabiain May2003,whichlasted well into2005. Today,Jihadists areagain aforcetobereckoned withall overthe Middle East.North 175 politique étrangère l specialissue:2008 Africa isthreatened in particular,asthe newal-Qaedain the Islamic Maghrebisspearheading atrend towardsmilitantactivity in Algeria and its neighboring countries. •NewJihadist organizationshaveemerged and aligned themselves with“al-Qaedacentral” in the Pakistani mountains.The Iraqwarhas proven tobethe most importantbreeding ground fortheseorganiza- tions.In2004,the JordanianAbuMusab al-Zarqawifounded al-Qaeda in Mesopotamiaand used the rareopportunity tofightthe American troopsand theiralliesin one of the corecountriesof the Arab world. Until 2007,al-Qaedain Iraqwaseven morepowerfulthanthe al-Qaeda leadership around bin Laden. Byrenaming itself,al-Qaedain Iraq aimed ataccessing al-Qaeda’srecruiting and financing networksin the Gulf region. Itwasclearlynotsubordinatetoal-Qaedacentral,but spreadthe impression thatal-Qaedawasindeed atransnationalorgani- zation withglobalreach. However,al-Qaedain Iraqwasseverelyweak- ened afterthe American“surge” in 2007. •The al-Qaedaleadership escaped tothe Pakistani side of the Afghan- Pakistani borderin late2001. From October2001,bin Laden and Zawa- hiriincreasinglyrelied on video and audio messagestospreadtheir ideology,but alsostrategicand tacticaladvicetotheirfollowers world- wide. Thereby,theymanaged toretain some of theirformerinfluence. Infact,in severalcasesattackswereperpetrated in countriesafter Osamabin Laden haddemanded action there. Tothe extent,however, thatthe al-Qaedaleadership wasno longerable toorchestrateattacks from its headquarters,Jihadist terrorismbecame moreindependent from largerorganizations,especiallyin Europe. Nevertheless,aresurgental-Qaedamanaged toregain some of its formercapabilities.From 2005on,the organization managed toplan severalterrorist attacksin Europe. Newoperationalleaders based in the Pakistani tribalareasplanned the July2005London underground bombings,the 2006 transatlanticaircraftplot,and attackson Americanand Uzbek targets in Germanyin September2007. 1 Al-Qaedaspectacularly regained its capabilitiestoactasatransnationalterrorist organization. Its focus,however,wasnowfirmlyseton Afghanistan,wherethe chancesof success grewafterthe Talibanintensified the insurgencyagainst the multinationalforcesfrom spring 2006 on. The al-Qaedaleadership seemed tobefirmlyestablished in the Pakistani tribalareas.Itisnotentirelyclear 1. The twomost importantoperationalchiefsbetween 2005and 2007 werethe EgyptianAbuUbaidaal- Masri(d. 2007)and the LibyanAbuLaithal-Libi(d. 2008). 176 Towardsa“PoliticalTurn” in the Fightagainst Jihadist Terrorism 8 200 whetheral-Qaedawill beable tosustain thesesuccessesin the coming CONFERENCE years.But if itdoes,itwill remain aforcetobereckoned with. Itisnotvery likelytotopple regimesin the Arab and Muslim world. Yetif itcontinues its resurgenceinPakistanand Afghanistan,itmighthavethe chanceto POLICY remain asecurity problem foryears tocome. Most importantly,itmight become agraverthreatif itevermanagestoperpetrateattackswith WORLD radioactivedevicessuchas“dirty bombs.” The moresophisticated its organizationalstructure,the morelikelysuchascenario becomes. While the balancesheetof seven years of countering Jihadist terrorism ismixed,thisshort summary on the stateofal-Qaedaand the Jihadist phenomenon in generalmakesitclearthatthe “waron terror”has failed. Seven years afterthe attacksin NewYorkand Washington, Jihadist terrorismisamorewidespread phenomenon thanin2001. Its most Seven years afterthe 2001 importantproponents,al-Qaedaand its attacks,Jihadist terrorism leaderbin Laden,remain active. The organization hasincreased its appealto isamorewidespread EuropeanMuslimsand hasreturned tothe phenomenon Arab world,whereithasspearheaded an insurgencyin Iraqformorethanfiveyears and whereitischallenging authoritarianregimesall overthe region. Obviously,the strategies adopted in the fightagainst Jihadist terrorismhaveproven inadequate. The reasonsaremanifold. The most serious tacticalmistake wasthe invasion of Iraq,whichgaveanewgeneration of Jihadist fighters the opportunity tofightthe United Statesin the heart of the Arab world. The loss of focus on Afghanistanplayed arole aswell. Manyof the successes in the fightagainst al-Qaedain 2002 and 2003 wereduetointensive cooperation withPakistani security forces.Alreadyasof 2002,the United Statesconcentrated its intelligenceresourceson Iraq,amistake that allowed al-QaedatoreorganizeinPakistanand toreestablishtheiralliance withthe Taliban. However,the gravest strategicmistake wasthat the United Statesand its alliesignored the Arab dimension of the phenomenon:The differentgroupsthatlaterconstituted al-Qaedahad emerged in the fightagainst the authoritarianregimesof theirhome countries(Egypt,Saudi Arabia, and others). Onlyaftertheyhadfailed in theirbid totopple the ruling regimesthere,did theydecide tofocus their fightagainst the most importantsupporterof thesegovernments,namely the United Statesand the West in general. Thismotiveisstill importantfor manyJihadists in the Arab world. Asaconsequence,politicalchange in the Arab world isthe most importantprecondition forsuccessfullycountering Jihadist terrorism. 177 politique étrangère l specialissue:2008 InternationalCooperation Despiteall the measuresadopted afterSeptember11,2001,multilateral cooperation in counterterrorismdid nothavemuchinfluenceonthe actual situation. The Bushadministration followed anessentiallyunilateral strategyand invited its partners tojoin in “coalitionsof the willing.” Itwas quitesuccessfulinthisregardwhen –shortlyafterSeptember11th–it looked foralliestohelp ittotopple the TalibaninAfghanistanand laterto rebuild the country.Manycountriesfollowed,including GreatBritain, France,Germany,Canada, Spain,Italy,and manyothers.However, doubts soon spreadastowhetherAmericanstrategiessuited the phenomenon. Especiallythe Americanpredilection forconventional military solutionscreated resistanceamong Europeanpopulationsand governments. Theseconflicts erupted when the Americangovernmentdecided to invade Iraq. While some Europeangovernments,suchasGreatBritain, Spain,Italy,and Poland,decided tosupport the United States,Franceand Germanyrejected the invasion,reflecting awidespreadEuropeanunease withAmericanpoliciesafter9/11. The warhadserious consequencesfor transatlanticrelations,sinceitled toaprolonged estrangementbetween the Bushadministration on the one side and ChancellorSchröderand PresidentChirac on the other.Furthermore,the EuropeanUnion wassplit on thisissue,weakening its cohesion forthe coming years.Thishindered the Europeansfrom moreeffectivelyinfluencing and therebymoderating US policies.Infact,internationalinitiativesweremoreoften thannotill- fated efforts of Americanalliestoconvincethe Bushadministration thatits policiesonlyaggravated the problem theyweredesigned tofight.Rather thanwinning trust in the home countriesof the Jihadists,the US lost the last remnants of credibility and support itmighthavehadamong Arabs and Muslimsafter2001. Ratherthanwinning the hearts and mindsof potentialal-Qaeda supporters,USpoliciesseemed perfectlydesigned toprovethatOsama bin Laden’sclaim,thatthe world haddeclared waron Islam,wascorrect. InEuropeancounterterrorismcircles,itisrathercommon sensethatastate thathasbecome the targetof aterrorist organization should notoverreact. Bydefinition,terrorists areweakand perpetrateattacksin orderto mobilizesympathizers fortheirgoals.Astatethatoverreacts and cracks downnotonlyon the terrorists themselvesbut alsoontheirpotential supporters risksalienating