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Towardsa“PoliticalTurn” CONFERENCE in the Fightagainst Jihadist Terrorism POLICY

Guido Steinberg WORLD

Guido Steinberg, FormerAdvisoron internationalterrorism(FederalChancellery, ),isaresearchfellowatthe Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik (SWP, German InstituteforInternationaland Security Affairs)inBerlin.

Despiteall the measurestaken against al-Qaedaand like-minded organizationsafterSeptember11,2001,Jihadist terrorismhasremained a dangerous threat.Although itwould beexaggerated tostatethatJihadist organizationshavebecome stronger,al-Qaeda’sbiggest success mayhave been thatitavoided totaldisintegration. Tosurviveinanincreasingly hostile environment,itchanged its structuresand strategies.Asa consequenceofthe failuretorootout al-Qaedaafter2001,Jihadist terrorismislikelytoposeathreatforyears tocome.

Itisdifficulttojudge the extenttowhichal-Qaedaand affiliated organizationsand networksremain aforcetobereckoned withbecause the Jihadist phenomenon hasdeveloped. The coreorganization around Osamabin Laden and hisdeputy Aimanal-Zawahirimayhaveweakened, but affiliated groupsand cellsin the Arab world and Pakistanhavegained in importanceand havecontinued theirHolyWaragainst the West and regimesin theirhome countries.

Since2001,three trendshavecharacterized the developmentof Jihadist terrorism:the returnofArab volunteers from Afghanistantotheirhome countries,the emergenceofneworganizationsonlylooselyaffiliated with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda’schange from organization toideology.

•In2001al-QaedawasmainlyanArab organization. When itlost its headquarters in Afghanistan,manyof its fighters returned totheircoun- triesof origin in the Arab world. Asaconsequence,Jihadist terrorism returned tothe Middle East,wherethe terrorist threathadlost some of the importanceithadhadinthe mid-1990s.Forinstance,al-Qaedaon the ArabianPeninsulastarted anunprecedented terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabiain May2003,whichlasted well into2005. Today,Jihadists areagain aforcetobereckoned withall overthe Middle East.North

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Africa isthreatened in particular,asthe newal-Qaedain the Islamic Maghrebisspearheading atrend towardsmilitantactivity in Algeria and its neighboring countries.

•NewJihadist organizationshaveemerged and aligned themselves with“al-Qaedacentral” in the Pakistani mountains.The Iraqwarhas proven tobethe most importantbreeding ground fortheseorganiza- tions.In2004,the JordanianAbuMusab al-Zarqawifounded al-Qaeda in Mesopotamiaand used the rareopportunity tofightthe American troopsand theiralliesin one of the corecountriesof the Arab world. Until 2007,al-Qaedain Iraqwaseven morepowerfulthanthe al-Qaeda leadership around bin Laden. Byrenaming itself,al-Qaedain Iraq aimed ataccessing al-Qaeda’srecruiting and financing networksin the Gulf region. Itwasclearlynotsubordinatetoal-Qaedacentral,but spreadthe impression thatal-Qaedawasindeed atransnationalorgani- zation withglobalreach. However,al-Qaedain Iraqwasseverelyweak- ened afterthe American“surge” in 2007.

•The al-Qaedaleadership escaped tothe Pakistani side of the Afghan- Pakistani borderin late2001. From October2001,bin Laden and Zawa- hiriincreasinglyrelied on video and audio messagestospreadtheir ideology,but alsostrategicand tacticaladvicetotheirfollowers world- wide. Thereby,theymanaged toretain some of theirformerinfluence. Infact,in severalcasesattackswereperpetrated in countriesafter Osamabin Laden haddemanded action there. Tothe extent,however, thatthe al-Qaedaleadership wasno longerable toorchestrateattacks from its headquarters,Jihadist terrorismbecame moreindependent from largerorganizations,especiallyin Europe.

Nevertheless,aresurgental-Qaedamanaged toregain some of its formercapabilities.From 2005on,the organization managed toplan severalterrorist attacksin Europe. Newoperationalleaders based in the Pakistani tribalareasplanned the July2005London underground bombings,the 2006 transatlanticaircraftplot,and attackson Americanand Uzbek targets in Germanyin September2007. 1 Al-Qaedaspectacularly regained its capabilitiestoactasatransnationalterrorist organization. Its focus,however,wasnowfirmlyseton Afghanistan,wherethe chancesof success grewafterthe Talibanintensified the insurgencyagainst the multinationalforcesfrom spring 2006 on. The al-Qaedaleadership seemed tobefirmlyestablished in the Pakistani tribalareas.Itisnotentirelyclear

1. The twomost importantoperationalchiefsbetween 2005and 2007 werethe EgyptianAbuUbaidaal- Masri(d. 2007)and the LibyanAbuLaithal-Libi(d. 2008).

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whetheral-Qaedawill beable tosustain thesesuccessesin the coming CONFERENCE years.But if itdoes,itwill remain aforcetobereckoned with. Itisnotvery likelytotopple regimesin the Arab and Muslim world. Yetif itcontinues its resurgenceinPakistanand Afghanistan,itmighthavethe chanceto POLICY remain asecurity problem foryears tocome. Most importantly,itmight become agraverthreatif itevermanagestoperpetrateattackswith WORLD radioactivedevicessuchas“dirty bombs.” The moresophisticated its organizationalstructure,the morelikelysuchascenario becomes.

While the balancesheetof seven years of countering Jihadist terrorism ismixed,thisshort summary on the stateofal-Qaedaand the Jihadist phenomenon in generalmakesitclearthatthe “waron terror”has failed. Seven years afterthe attacksin NewYorkand Washington, Jihadist terrorismisamorewidespread phenomenon thanin2001. Its most Seven years afterthe 2001 importantproponents,al-Qaedaand its attacks,Jihadist terrorism leaderbin Laden,remain active. The organization hasincreased its appealto isamorewidespread EuropeanMuslimsand hasreturned tothe phenomenon Arab world,whereithasspearheaded an insurgencyin Iraqformorethanfiveyears and whereitischallenging authoritarianregimesall overthe region. Obviously,the strategies adopted in the fightagainst Jihadist terrorismhaveproven inadequate.

The reasonsaremanifold. The most serious tacticalmistake wasthe invasion of Iraq,whichgaveanewgeneration of Jihadist fighters the opportunity tofightthe United Statesin the heart of the Arab world. The loss of focus on Afghanistanplayed arole aswell. Manyof the successes in the fightagainst al-Qaedain 2002 and 2003 wereduetointensive cooperation withPakistani security forces.Alreadyasof 2002,the United Statesconcentrated its intelligenceresourceson Iraq,amistake that allowed al-QaedatoreorganizeinPakistanand toreestablishtheiralliance withthe Taliban. However,the gravest strategicmistake wasthat the United Statesand its alliesignored the Arab dimension of the phenomenon:The differentgroupsthatlaterconstituted al-Qaedahad emerged in the fightagainst the authoritarianregimesof theirhome countries(Egypt,Saudi Arabia, and others). Onlyaftertheyhadfailed in theirbid totopple the ruling regimesthere,did theydecide tofocus their fightagainst the most importantsupporterof thesegovernments,namely the United Statesand the West in general. Thismotiveisstill importantfor manyJihadists in the Arab world. Asaconsequence,politicalchange in the Arab world isthe most importantprecondition forsuccessfullycountering Jihadist terrorism.

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InternationalCooperation

Despiteall the measuresadopted afterSeptember11,2001,multilateral cooperation in counterterrorismdid nothavemuchinfluenceonthe actual situation. The Bushadministration followed anessentiallyunilateral strategyand invited its partners tojoin in “coalitionsof the willing.” Itwas quitesuccessfulinthisregardwhen –shortlyafterSeptember11th–it looked foralliestohelp ittotopple the TalibaninAfghanistanand laterto rebuild the country.Manycountriesfollowed,including GreatBritain, ,Germany,Canada, Spain,Italy,and manyothers.However, doubts soon spreadastowhetherAmericanstrategiessuited the phenomenon. Especiallythe Americanpredilection forconventional military solutionscreated resistanceamong Europeanpopulationsand governments.

Theseconflicts erupted when the Americangovernmentdecided to invade Iraq. While some Europeangovernments,suchasGreatBritain, Spain,Italy,and Poland,decided tosupport the ,Franceand Germanyrejected the invasion,reflecting awidespreadEuropeanunease withAmericanpoliciesafter9/11. The warhadserious consequencesfor transatlanticrelations,sinceitled toaprolonged estrangementbetween the Bushadministration on the one side and ChancellorSchröderand PresidentChirac on the other.Furthermore,the EuropeanUnion wassplit on thisissue,weakening its cohesion forthe coming years.Thishindered the Europeansfrom moreeffectivelyinfluencing and therebymoderating US policies.Infact,internationalinitiativesweremoreoften thannotill- fated efforts of Americanalliestoconvincethe Bushadministration thatits policiesonlyaggravated the problem theyweredesigned tofight.Rather thanwinning trust in the home countriesof the Jihadists,the US lost the last remnants of credibility and support itmighthavehadamong Arabs and Muslimsafter2001.

Ratherthanwinning the hearts and mindsof potentialal-Qaeda supporters,USpoliciesseemed perfectlydesigned toprovethatOsama bin Laden’sclaim,thatthe world haddeclared waron Islam,wascorrect. InEuropeancounterterrorismcircles,itisrathercommon sensethatastate thathasbecome the targetof aterrorist organization should notoverreact. Bydefinition,terrorists areweakand perpetrateattacksin orderto mobilizesympathizers fortheirgoals.Astatethatoverreacts and cracks downnotonlyon the terrorists themselvesbut alsoontheirpotential supporters risksalienating and pushing them intothe armsof the terrorists.Onthe otherhand,astatethatreacts in acircumspectway mightisolatethe terrorists from theirsympathizers and therebyhinder

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theirradicalization,recruitment,and mobilization. Some terrorist CONFERENCE organizations,among them manyJihadist ones,even try toprovoke their adversariestooverreactin ordertoconvincetheirsympathizers thatonly violenceoffers the chancetoreachtheirgoals. POLICY

The United Statesgovernment(over-)reacted just asthe Jihadists WORLD wished. The treatmentof prisoners in Guantanamo and AbuGhraibwere onlytwoofthe most blatantexamplesof counterproductivemeasures. “Extraordinary renditions”toMiddle Easterncountrieslike Jordan, Egypt,and Syria, wheretortureduring interrogation iscommon,is anotherexample. The United States’blatant disregardforhumanrights played intothe Astatethathasbecome handsof al-Qaeda.Todaymorethanin2001, the targetof aterrorist Muslimsall overthe world believethatthe US and the West arefighting Islamorthe Muslim organization should world ratherthanjust terrorism. The invasion notoverreact of Iraqin2003 finallyconvinced manyyoung Arabsthatthe Muslim world isthe target.Manyof thoseyoung Arab men who havetraveled toIraqinordertojoin the insurgencyare motivated bythe desiretodefend the Muslim world against this aggression (Steinberg,2008). Asaconsequence,the Iraqwartriggered awaveofterrorist activity in the Arab and Muslim world aswell as in Europe.

Furthermore,the Bushadministration’soverreactionsdamaged relationswithallied countries.Inseveralcases,Europeangovernments protested when theircitizensbecame victimsof renditions.Inothercases, theytried toconvincethe US thatits policieswerecounterproductive. Nevertheless,Europeanand Middle Easternalliesshared the US focus on security.Ratherthanlooking forpoliticalstrategiesin ordertoisolatethe terrorists’sympathizers,theyfocused on repressivemeasures.Thiswas trueonthe domesticlevel,but alsoinfluenced internationalcooperation. After2001,internationalcooperation in security matters wasexpanded in anunprecedented way.Most internationalorganizationseithersetup counterterrorismcommitteesorintensified theiractivitiesin thisfield. Theirinfluenceislimited,however,becausethe fightagainst terrorism largelyremainsthe prerogativeofthe memberstates’policeforcesand intelligenceservices,if nottheirmilitaries.Nation-statesin general considertheirsecurity forces’efforts tobecentraldimensionsof their sovereignty –especiallywithregardtocounterterrorism. Therefore,these servicestend toworkonabilateralratherthanamultilateralbasis.Their readiness toshareinformation islimited. Onlyin the context of larger military allianceslike NATO doesmultilateralcooperation playaslightly

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largerrole.2 Atthe same time,the CIA hasbecome aclearinghousefor intelligenceservicesworldwide. The US security serviceshaveintensified (bilateral) cooperation withalarge numberof statesand theirservicesin ordertomoreeffectivelyfightJihadist terrorismworldwide. Multilateral efforts arefarless importantin practice.

Thisdevelopmentisunfortunate,becausebothmultilateraland bilateralcooperation areimportantin ordertoeffectivelycounterJihadist terrorism. Itisthe transnationalnatureofthe threatand its broadrange of goalsthatrequireincreased internationalcooperation. Jihadist organizationstargetthe United States,Russia, the West in general,and the regimesof the Arab and Muslim worlds.Thus,itisonlylogicalthatthe potentialtargets cooperate. However,while cooperation in repressive counterterrorismhasincreased,thereisstill no consensus on the exact natureofJihadismand the strategiestocounterit.Most importantly,there isno consensus on rootcausesand politicalstrategies.

The Roots of al-Qaedain the Arab World

Even atthe time of the 9/11 attacks,al-Qaedawasnotthe global organization manyanalysts claimed thatitwas.Rather,al-Qaeda’sgoals havealways been ambivalent.Onthe one hand,ithasfollowed aglobal agenda.Thiswasaconcretegoalinsofarasthe organization aimed tocause the US towithdrawfrom the Arab and Muslim worlds,especiallyEgypt and Saudi Arabia.Thisagendabecomesdiffuse,however,withregardto its goalsbeyond thiswithdrawal. Al-Qaedaand its affiliated organizations haveneverclearlystated whereand when theirjihadwould end. Onthe otherhand,al-Qaedahasalways constituted the sumofits member groups’nationalaims.The Egyptianswanttotopple the Mubarakregime in theirhome country.Bin Laden and hisSaudi followers demand the overthrowof the Saudi ruling familyin Saudi Arabia.Asaconsequence, al-Qaedaaimsatmultiple revolutionsin its Arab home countriesin order totopple the authoritarianregimesthere. Its globaljihadsupports this originalgoalofmost Jihadists onlytosome extent.Onlyfrom the mid- 1990s,when itbecame clearthatJihadist militants would notbeable to reachtheirgoalsin theirhome countries,did al-Qaedaadoptananti- Americanstrategy.Byforcing awithdrawalofthe United Statesfrom the Arab world,al-Qaedahoped toweaken the regimesthatdepended on Americansupport.

2.See,e.g.,the reports about “AllianceBase,”ajointintelligencecenterin ,whichincludes representativesfrom Britain,France,Germany,, Canada, and the United States.See Priest (2005) and Smolar(2006).

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The most importantexample forthistrend in Jihadist terrorismhasbeen CONFERENCE the history of the EgyptianJihadgroupled byAimanal-Zawahiri,today numbertwointhe al-Qaedahierarchy.The Egyptianmilitants hadtargeted the regime in Cairofrom the 1970s and hadassassinated PresidentAnwar POLICY al-Sadatin October1981. However,theirplottotopple the regime failed and triggered awaveofarrests in the coming years.From the mid-1980s, WORLD manyEgyptiansfled the repression in theirhome country and joined the Arabsfighting alongside the Afghaninsurgents in Pakistan. Farfrom adopting aninternationalist agenda, the Egyptiansregarded theirstay ratherasaprelude toanothereffort tofightthe “nearenemy,”namelythe Mubarakregime. Infact,in 1992,the Egyptiangroupsstarted aninsurgency in Egyptitself. In1995,however,itbecame clearthatthe Egyptianstatehad gained the upperhand and thatthe Islamists hadfailed. Aimanal-Zawahiri drewthe consequencesand devised anewstrategy:insteadoffighting the “nearenemy,”the Jihadists should redirecttheirefforts towardsthe United States,Russia, and Israel. From nowon,the Jihadists should fight“the near and the farenemy”inanintegrated worldwide campaign.3

Subsequently,Zawahiriand hisfollowers laid the organizationalbasis forthe implementation of theirstrategy.In1996–1997,theyentered intoan alliancewithOsamabin Laden and hisfollowers in Afghanistan. This eventmarked the foundation of al-Qaedaasaglobalterrorist organization. Nevertheless,al-Qaedachosetoattackthe US first and foremost becauseit wasthe most importantforeign supporterof boththe Saudi and Egyptian governments.And although al-Qaedaincreasinglywidened the scope of its activitiesand developed aglobalagenda, itremained committed tothe goalofoverthrowing the autocraticgovernments in its militants’ respectivehome countries.Asaresult,itwasable toattractyoung men from all overthe Arab world,from MoroccotoIraq. Infact,its ideological and strategicflexibility allows ittorecruitbothmorenationalist-minded and moregloballyoriented fighters.

The localand regionaldimensionsof al-Qaeda’s Arab civil wars have activity hintatthe roots of the movementand at laid the foundation the rootcausesof Jihadist terrorism:the brutal suppression of Islamist opposition movements in the of globalJihadism Arab world through authoritarianregimes.After first attempts totopple theseregimesin the 1970s,1980s,and 1990s failed, Islamist militants used the opportunity touniteand reorganizeabroad. Arab civil wars havelaid the foundation of globalJihadism.

3.Zawahirihimself described thischange of strategyin hisbook Knights underthe Prophet’s Banner ( Fursantahtarayatal-nabi ),whichappeared shortlyafterSeptember11,2001. See al-Zawahiri(2001).

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The Internationalization of Jihadist Terrorismafter2001

Since2001the Islamo-nationalists havelost some of theirformerinfluence in the Jihadist movement.Thisispartlyduetothe factthattheyare confronted withareckless globalfightagainst terrorist organizationsled by the United States.Therefore,fighting the West hasgained importancefor thesemovements and theirsupporters.Perhapsmost importantly,al- Qaedahasbeen able tobroaden its basebysuccessfullyrecruiting and increasing the numberof non-Arab Muslims SeveralIslamo-nationalist in its ranks.Especiallyfrom 2003,ethnic organizationshavejoined Pakistanis,Kurds,and Turkshavejoined the al-Qaeda movement,most of them in Europe. Al- Qaedahasprofited from the growing attractiveness of its globalaimsamong young Muslimsworldwide. Likewise,severalIslamo-nationalist organizationshavejoined al-Qaeda. The most importantwasthe AlgerianSalafist GroupforPreaching and Combat(Groupe Salafistepour laPrédication etle Combat,GSPC). Inlate January 2007,itannounced thatithadchanged its name to“al-Qaedain the IslamicMaghreb”(Qaidatal-JihadfiBiladal-Maghribal-Islami).

The GSPC hadbeen asmuchanationalist asanIslamist organization. Sinceits founding in 1998,itexplicitlyconfined its activitiestoAlgeria, whereitaimed totopple the governmentand setupanIslamicstate. Bythe turnofthe century,the GSPC hadestablished itself asthe most important militantorganization in Algeria, but remained farfrom achieving its stated goals.While itmanaged togain limited support among Algerianmilitant Islamists,the population wasconvinced thatarmed struggle wasnota waytobring about changesin Algeria.Asaconsequence,the GSPC was forced ontothe defensiveand the security forcessucceeded in confining the group’soperationstoamountainous region east and southeast of Algiers.Larger-scale terrorist attackswereexceptions.

AfterSeptember11,2001,pressureonthe GSPC grew.The Bush administration identified Algeriaasanimportantfield of al-Qaeda activity and enhanced its counterterrorismcooperation withthe Algeriangovernment:the weakening of the GSPC waspartlya consequenceofAmerican(and alsoEuropean) technologicaland logisticalsupport forAlgeria’ssecurity forces.Internationalcooperation withAlgeriaintensified afterthe kidnapping of 32 Europeantourists in the Saharain spring 2003. 4 The kidnapping supported the Algerian

4. The hostageswerereleased in twogroupsin Mayand August 2003.AGermanwomandied of heat stroke.

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government’sassertions,whichsince2001hadtried toreframe its CONFERENCE struggle against the country’smilitantgroupsaspart of the American “waron terrorism.” POLICY

AsearlyasOctober2003,Nabil Sahraoui,then the GSPC’sleader, announced thatthe organization hadsubordinated itself toOsamabin WORLD Laden’sal-Qaedaorganization and tothe TalibanleaderMullahOmar, and would support theirfightagainst the US.Inthe coming years,itbuilt contacts toal-Qaeda, especiallytothe JordanianAbuMusab al-Zarqawi and his“al-Qaedain Mesopotamia”(Qaidatal-JihadfiBiladal-Rafidain).5 Sahraoui’ssuccessor,AbuMusab Abdalwudud,continued his predecessor’spolicy.InJune 2004,he confirmed the newinternational thrust of the GSPC bydeclaring waron all Westernforeigners in Algeria. InDecember2006,the groupcarried out its first attackonaforeign target in severalyears and in January 2007 joined al-Qaeda.

The GSPC’sinternationalization seemstohavebeen the resultof its obvious problemsin keeping upits fightagainst the Algerianregime. Theseproblemswereaccentuated bythe Iraqwar.From 2003,the organization hadtocope withthe increasing trend among young Algerianstotravel toIraqtofightthe US ratherthantojoin the fight against the Algeriangovernment.Itadopted aninternationalist agenda partlytokeep thesepotentialrecruits in Algeria.However,the coincidence of the first stepstowardsinternationalization withthe intensification of Americanand Europeancounterterrorismcooperation istoo obvious to ignore. Bygranting technologicaland logisticalsupport toAlgeria’s security forces,the US governmentcontributed tothismove. The United Statesand its Europeanalliesbecame atargetforthe GSPC becausethey joined Algiers in its fightagainst the GSPC.Underthe circumstances,it wasonlylogicalforthe GSPC toseek closercontactwithanti-American terrorists in Iraqand Pakistan. Infact,the GSPC’sleader,AbuMusab Abdalwudud,confirmed thishypothesisin aninterviewwiththe NewYork Times in summer2008(Droukdal,2008).

Whereasthe GSPC wasapurelyAlgerianorganization withanAlgerian agendain 2001,internationalcounterterrorismcooperation in NorthAfrica and the Sahel contributed toits decision toadoptaninternationalist agenda.Thiswasthe resultof amisinterpretation of Jihadist terrorism. As in Egyptand in Saudi Arabia, AlgerianJihadismarosefrom anational

5. InOctober2004,Zarqawideclared hisallegiancetoal-Qaedaand Osamabin Laden and renamed his “Tawhid and JihadGroup” “al-Qaedain Mesopotamia.” InDecember,bin Laden publiclyaccepted Zarqawi’s oathofallegiance.

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struggle against anauthoritarianregime. Bysupporting the Algerian regime,the United Statesand Europe could expectshort-termsecurity gains,namelyaweakening of the capabilitiesof the GSPC.Atthe same time,however,theystrengthened thosewithin the GSPC leadership who demanded aninternationalization and therebycontributed tothe creation of the monsterthattheyclaimed theywerefighting. Anylong-term counterterrorismstrategyshould focus on avoiding anauthoritarian consolidation in the Middle East and insteadmotivateregimesin the region toembarkonpoliticalreforms.

Towardsa“PoliticalTurn” in Countering Jihadist Terrorism

The fightagainst Jihadist terrorismwill bedecided in the Arab world. And if the West continuesits currentpoliciestowardsthe region,itwill perpetuatethe problem ratherthansolveit.Thisdoesnotnecessarilymean thatJihadist movements will win. Theyareweakand lackmass support. However,no matterhowstable regimesmaybetodayin countriessuchas Saudi Arabia, Egypt,and Algeria, if theydo notchange theywill collapse soonerorlater.Whetherthe successfulrevolutionarieswill beIslamists, nationalists,democrats,orsomething else,theywill opposethosewho formerlysupported theirdictators.Ifthe West continuestofocus on security and stability,thesedictatorshipsarevery likelytoprovoke violent opposition forsome time tocome.

Onlyathorough reformofpoliticalsystemsin the region will reduce internalconflicts and therebyopposition torepressiveregimes.Only governments thatintegratelargerparts of the population intothe decision- making process and offervenuesin whichto Reformswill reduce express grievanceswill bestable in the long widespreadsympathies run. Reformsmightnotend terrorist activities, forJihadist movements but theywill reducewidespreadsympathies forthesemovements and will thereforereduce recruitmentopportunitiesand logisticalcapabilitiessuchthattheywill eventuallyrenderterrorist groupspoliticallyirrelevant.Thisisthe dimension of the threaton whichthe internationalcommunity should focus its counterterrorismmeasures.

Suchashiftin Americanand Europeancounterterrorismpolicieswill requireachange in paradigms:from security backtopolitics.While repressivemeasuresarenecessary in ordertofightterrorists effectively, the farmoreimportantand difficulttaskremainstowin overoratleast neutralizetheirsympathizers.While the formerisashort-termtask,the latterisalong-termone.

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The Bushadministration wasawarethat9/11 hadits roots in CONFERENCE Middle Easternauthoritarianismand thattosolvethe problemsthe regimesin the region hadtochange. Itespeciallysingled out Saudi Arabiaand Egypt,its most powerfulArab allies,and American POLICY pressureled tosome efforts atreformbetween 2003 and 2005.

However,the Americanpromotion of ademocraticMiddle East WORLD remained half-hearted and metwithresistancefrom the regimesin question. Most importantly,the naiveideathatthe invasion of Iraq mightserveasastarting pointdisqualified the projectfrom the beginning. From 2005,itbecame clearthatthe Americanshadfailed in Iraqand thattheyneeded the support of theirpro-Westernalliesin the region in ordertoprepareforthe futureconfrontation withIran. In 2006,Washington hadgiven upondemocratization and insteadtried toconvinceits Arab alliesof the need tobuild ananti-Iranianalliance of “moderate” Arab states.Suddenly,the lessonsof 9/11 hadlost their formerimportance.

The newAmericanadministration ismorelikelythanthe outgoing one tolisten tothe adviceofits partners,no matterwhetherBarack ObamaorJohn McCain winsthe election. But itwill soon come under immensepressuretoshowtangible results,and politicalmeasuresare notvery likelytohaveanyshort-termeffect.Nevertheless,the first monthsof the newAmericangovernmentmightpresentthe internationalcommunity its onlychancetoinfluencethe policiesof al- Qaeda’senemynumberone.

Europeannationsshould shoulderthistask. Here,especiallyin Brussels,thereiswidespreadawareness thatthe domesticsituationsin Middle Easterncountrieshaveanimpacton the developmentof Jihadist terrorismand thatinstability in the Arab world posesadirectthreatto Europe. However,in Europe foreign policyconcerning the region hasbeen stronglyinfluenced bythe aforementioned “security paradigm.” Counterterrorismcooperation between the respectivesecurity forces comesfirst,politicalreformsecond,if atall.

Arab statesthemselvesflatlydenythatauthoritarianismisarootcause of Jihadist terrorism. Theypointinsteadtothe Israeli-Palestinianconflict and Westernforeign policyon the region in ordertoavoid addressing questionsabout theirowndomesticpolicies.Oncethe US gaveupits democratization drivein2005and 2006,the Arab statesconsolidated their positions.Most importantly,the oil and gasexporters among them have profited from high energyprices,whichhavestrengthened theirposition withregardtothe US and Europe.

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Therefore,anydriveforpoliticalreforminthe Arab world isunlikelyto haveimmediateand importantresults.Nevertheless,reformisurgent becauseJihadist terrorismhasshownremarkable resilienceand islikelyto poseathreatforanumberof years.Asuitable strategycould beone in whichthe United Statesexerted pressureonits alliestopersuade them to liberalizetheirpoliticalsystemsand allowformorepoliticalparticipation, while the Europeansoffered enhanced cooperation. Bothwould haveto intensifytheirefforts toconvincetheseregimesthatlimited reform,most importantlyregarding the rule of law,mightin the long runstabilizetheir states.Even small progress could make adifference,foritwould restore tothe West some of the credibility withArabsand Muslimsithaslost since9/11.

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REFERENCES CONFERENCE

al-Zawahiri,Aiman. 2001. Fursantahtarayatan-nabi(s) .[Knights underthe POLICY Prophet’sBanner]n.p.

Droukdal,Abdelmalek. 2008. AnInterviewwithAbdelmalek Droukdal. NewYork WORLD Times ,July1. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript- droukdal.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin,accessed August 5,2008. Priest,Dana.2005. Foreign NetworkatFrontof CIA’sTerrorFight. Washington Post,November18,p. A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2005/11/17/AR2005111702070.html,accessed August 5,2008. Smolar,Piotr.2006.Unchef de policeconfirme l’existenced’une cellule antiterroristeàParis. LeMonde,September14,p. 4. Steinberg,Guido. 2008. Author’sInterviewwithaNorthAfricanIslamist,London, July21.

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