— RETURN THIS BOOK ON OR BEFORE THE DATE INDICATED 1 O-XA Q/in Q V 1 ^ tV • nr V Ctffl — Tfival St n V -r _cl£ tb n 792 224 1 '.7 a |rlG v/ar. <7^ 1 1 '/ii 7 ? lApr20’43>Cv,\ DO NOT REMOVE SLIPS FROM BOOKS. A CHARGE IS MADE IF BOOKS ARE LOST OR DAMAGED. IDENTIFICATION OF BORROWERS IS REQUIRED Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 https://archive.org/details/navalhistoryofwo01thom i I I % 1 THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS The Naval History of the World War OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 1914-1915 BY THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM CAPTAIN U. 8. R. With Maps and Diagrams CAMBRIDGE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1925 COPYRIGHT, I»e4 BY H.VBVABD UNI VEHSITT PRESS Second Printing PRINTED AT THE HARVARD DNIVER9ITT PRBAA CAUBRIDOE. MASS., D. S. A THIS WORK HAS BEEN COMPILED FROM DATA PROVIDED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION, UNITED STATES NAVY OD Military Historical Society of Massachusetts 224793 t f *»* < ^ !• < » < • « * » t # « » 4 t » <44 • 1 # *1 « ACKNOWLEDGMENT In addition to the invaluable help of Captain Dudley W. Knox, U. S. N., Chief of the Historical Section, United States Navy, in conjunction with whom this book has been written, the author desires to express sincere thanks for the assistance of Rear Admiral N. C. Twining, U. S. N., and of Lord Sydenham. These emi- nent authorities have gone over the text, and their con- structive comments and suggestions are here gratefully acknowledged. ' ^ I I.' { %ISl m .7 k\i.^ CONTENTS I. The German “Dry-Land” Plan of War . II. Control of the Seas at the Beginning of the World War 17 III. The Distribution of Naval Forces 24 IV. The Outbreak of War 43 V. First Naval Movements throughout the World 53 VI. Naval Strategy at the Beginning of Hostilities. Escape of the Goehen and Breslau to Constan- tinople 66 VII. The Far East, August 1914 91 VIII. Transporting the British Expeditionary Force. The Action in the Heligoland Bight .... 101 IX. The Mediterranean and the Outlying Seas . 120 X. Loss of the Belgian Coast. Lord Fisher in the British Admiralty 140 XI. The Battle of Coronel 158 XII. The New Naval Situation and the Battle of the Falkland Islands 177 XIII. Changes of Naval Strategy 207 XIV. German Naval Raids. The Dogger Bank Chase 223 XV. The Dardanelles Project 240 XVI. The Dardanelles. First Naval Attacks . 253 XVII. The Dardanelles. Final Defeat of Naval At- tacks 274 X CONTENTS Appendices: A. Tables showing Initial Naval Forces of the Powers 288 B. Letter of Admiral Jellicoe to the Admiralty 315 C. Development of the Blockade of the Con- federacy in the ('ivil War (1861-1865) . 320 D. Vice-Admiral Carden’s Plan for the Reduc- tion of the Dardanelles by Naval Forces Alone 323 E. Table of Dates of the ^Vo^ld War 327 Index 337 LIST OF MAPS Note as to the Maps. Instead of the usual bulky and cumbersome charts, which are difficult to handle and hard to use with the text, the Historical Sec- tion, U. S. Navy, has prepared diagrammatic maps that will open outside the book, to be available when the text is read. This scheme of maps was used in the author’s “A Guide to the Military History of The World War,” and it has been widely approved in the Services. 1. European Situation at Outbreak of World War, 1914 16 2. Distribution of Naval Forces at the Outbreak OF War, 1914 42 3. Situation in Mediterranean (August 6, 1914) AND ITS Results 90 4. Cruiser Operations in the Pacific, 1914 . 138 5. Battle of Coronel (November 1, 1914) .... 176 6. Battle of the Falkland Islands (December 8, 1914) 206 7. Northwestern Europe 238 8. The Dardanelles 284 THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR F M ' \ 'I .Kl ; CHAPTER I THE GERMAN “DRY-LAND” PLAN OF WAR (See Map at page 16) N any work on the naval operations of the World I War, it should be stated at once that the great Ger- man offensive of 1914 must be studied as an attempt to win a quick victory on land before Sea Power was given time to influence the result; in the words of Falken- hayn,^ the German “hope of forcing a decision by over- throwing our enemies by a few great blows, the product of an extreme concentration of effort and complete dis- regard of all secondary considerations.” This fact has been conclusively established by the bitter complaint of Admiral Tirpitz, the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval Administration: “At the outbreak of the war I was surprised to learn that the Navy’s plan of operations, which had been withheld from me, had not been arranged in advance with the Army. The Army based itself on the view, quite compre- hensible from its standpoint, that the war at sea, and in- deed the whole campaign against England, was merely a secondary matter. Steps could have been taken before the war, under the control of the Chancellor, to draw up a single plan for a war on three fronts ^ or a world war * It has become the custom, even in books of German origin, to give the names Bismarck, Moltke, Hindenburg, and the like, without the prefix “ von.” To secure uniformity in a book of this nature, this practice will be followed in the case of all German names. ^ The German military plan of 1914 was described as “a war on two fronts ” by Bethmann-Hollweg. - 4 NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR but, as I have already stated, no such steps had been taken.” ^ All the volumes that can be written on the naval strategy of the World War will not be able to add any- thing to this unmistakable statement of the real situa- tion. To understand this utter failure on the part of the Germans to prepare in advance for an aggressive use of the naval arm, it is only necessary to realize the strange, abnormal development of Germany in the forty years before the World War, and the resultant military regime, which had assumed control of all the nation’s accumu- lated forces. d'he impetus of the united strength of the German Empire, evolved from the War of 1870, had never been appreciated by outside nations. For Germans the War of 1870 had become their text and their inspiration. d'hey had made it the foundation of their national struc- ture. d'he followinr; generations of Germans modeled the life of Germany, military, civic, commercial, scien- tific, and social, on the efficiency of the War of 1870. Their industries were shaped in the same mould, and their expanding foreign trade was so well organized that the Germans in the markets of the world were like in- vading armies. This all-pervading .system had also inevitably shaped the German ideals and the (ierman philosophies.^ It was maintained that this German Kultur was the strongest force in the world. This doctrine was preached with a fanatical contempt for weaker nations and all other modes of living. From these convictions had * Admiral Tirpitz: “My Mt-moirs.” ^ “Those who h.ad behind them the glories of 1870." — Bcthmann- Ilollweg. ’ The cult of Nietzsche, Trcitschkc, etc. GERMAN “DRY-LAND” PLAN OF WAR 5 grown a self-centred and self-justified German national ambition, which became a most dangerous menace to the world, after Germany had been allowed to gain strength and to muster all the resources of this system for an effort to gain dominion by arms. After the War of 1870 Germany had steadily gained power, under the shrewd policies of Bismarck, who skil- fully took advantage of the enmity between Great Brit- ain and Russia at the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, and made Germany a dominating power in Europe at the Congress of Berlin (1878), at which the treaties were drawn up after that war. In 1879 the alliance be- tween Germany and Austria-Hungary had been made, which became the Triple Alliance when joined by Italy. But Great Britain was influenced by anti-Russian poli- cies, and in fact had even fostered the growth of Ger- many as a buffer against Russia. Taking full advantage of this, Germany was able to cement together the Teutonic countries, under the abso- lute control of Germany, to gain also dominating in- fluence over Turkey, and to make undisturbed prepara- tions for a German war to gain world power. These plans were made almost openly, and they were accom- panied by a campaign of propaganda all over the world, to strengthen German interests. It was not until the last years of the nineteenth century that Great Britain real- ized this menace — that Germany was not a “friendly nation,” ^ but a hostile rival. As a result of this dawning knowledge, enmity had re- placed friendship between Great Britain and Germany. The natural common interest in curbing this growing danger had drawn Great Britain, France, and Russia ‘ Lord Salisbury. G NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR together, and these three powers became the Entente Allies. Tills course of events had resulted in the European situation at the beginning of the World War in 1914, and this situation was greatly to the disadvantage of the En- tente Allies. Germany had been allowed to grow into a power that dominated Central Europe, fully organized for war and almost openly committed to ambitions that aimed at the leadership of the world. The Germans had taken shrewd advantage of the fact that the policies of 1878 had continued to maintain the Turks in their posi- tion on the Dardanelles, as a barrier against Russia.