ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT HAITI Task Order No: AID-521-O-12-00135 January 2013 This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Creative Associates International. Haiti Electoral Security Assessment Report January 7, 2013 I. Executive Summary Introduction From October 24 through November 13, 2012, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in Haiti funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Creative team was led by Mr. Jeff Fischer and included Ms. Sophie Lagueny, Mr. Jules Lalancette, and Mr. Rudolf Derose. The objective of the mission was threefold: 1) to identify the vulnerabilities and history of electoral conflict in Haiti; 2) to develop profiles on potential conflict in the 2013 electoral cycle; and 3) to put forward a set of recommendations on programming to prevent, manage, or mediate this conflict. These three objectives combine to produce an Electoral Security Framework for Haiti. The assessment team met with state, non-state, and international stakeholders in Haiti, with a focus on the departments of Northeast (Fort-Liberté and Ouananinthe), South (Les Cayes), Nippes (Miragoâne), and Grand’Anse (Jeremie). This Framework seeks to address the following problem statement and development hypothesis: Problem Statement: Without new strategic interventions, the cycle of electoral violence in Haiti will continue to de-stabilize governance, politics, and society. The factors contributing to this violence include a “win-at-all-cost” political culture; lack of economic opportunities, particularly for youth; and a culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence and malpractice. Development Hypothesis: If multi-sectoral interventions can be conducted involving electoral assistance, political party development, rule of law, civic participation, gender, media, security sector reform, and livelihoods, some reduction in electoral violence may be achieved in 2013. However, security, political, social, and economic vulnerabilities for electoral violence have been longstanding, varied, and resistant to reform. These factors will pose ongoing obstacles to development objectives and associated programming. This approach to developing the Electoral Security Framework for Haiti has been guided by USAID’s Electoral Security Framework – Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers (2010).1 This Framework is organized into the following sections: 1) Executive Summary; 2) Introduction; 3) Contextual Analysis (security, political, social, and economic factors); 4) Historical Electoral Conflict Factors (pre-election, Election Day, and post-election phases); 5) Electoral Security Stakeholder Analysis (state, non-state, and international); 6) Preliminary Electoral Conflict Profile (departments of Northeast, South, Nippes, and Grand’Anse; 7) Mitigating Factors and 1 The Handbook describing the Framework can be found at the following link: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/1-Electoral-Security- Framework.pdf. This document includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the Recipient and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed – in whole or in part. 2 2 Haiti Electoral Security Assessment Report January 7, 2013 “Wild Cards;” 8) Electoral Conflict-Related Issues; 9) Electoral Security Planning and Programming; 10) Monitoring and Evaluation; and 11) Conclusion. Contextual Analysis The contextual analysis identifies the fundamental security, political, social, and economic factors which can create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur. The impact of each factor on the potential for violence will vary in weight and timing during the electoral cycle. A description of these factors and their relationships to electoral conflict are discussed in the section below. By identifying these factors, strategic objectives and program interventions can be crafted to address the conflict which they potentially foster. These factors have created vulnerabilities in past elections and will pose similar vulnerabilities for the 2013 electoral cycle. The security factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral conflict are: a) Haitian National Police (PNH) enforcement capacity; b) availability of firearms; c) private armed groups (PAGs); and d) drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The political factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral conflict are: a) regime type; b) electoral administration; c) electoral and political party systems; d) money and electoral violence; e) return of opposing political exiles; f) relocation of public officials; g) timing and sequencing of elections; and h) culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence and malpractice. There are two social factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur: a) post-disaster displacement/shelter; and b) youth bulge. Also, Haiti’s economic indicators create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur as a consequence of poverty, unemployment, and lack of economic fairness. Placing these vulnerabilities into perspective, some may be responsive to development programming such as capacity building for electoral administration, the PNH, and judicial officials. Additional vulnerabilities can be reduced by legislative action such as the electoral framework and political finance reform, and the timing and sequencing of elections. Some vulnerabilities, however, are conditional in nature and may be the least responsive to short term programming including the availability of firearms, regime type, and the economic factors. Other factors are present on such a scale, such as the post- disaster displacement and youth bulge, that comprehensive solutions cannot be anticipated over the short term. It can also be anticipated that DTOs will be unresponsive to development programming and remain targets for law enforcement and anti-drug trafficking initiatives. Finally, some factors are behavioral in nature, such as the “win-at- all-cost” political culture, government pressure on local officials, and engaging armed groups in electoral violence. These vulnerabilities will only diminish if the political will is created for behavioral reform to occur. Historical Electoral Conflict Factors Based upon this history of Haitian electoral conflict, the conflict profile is summarized in the matrix below. This document includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the Recipient and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed – in whole or in part. 3 3 Haiti Electoral Security Assessment Report January 7, 2013 Historical Patterns of Electoral Conflict Profile Focus Pre-Election Phase Election Day Phase Post-Election Phase Perpetrators Primary - State and Primary – State and Primary – Political State Proxies State Proxies Rivals Incumbent youth Incumbent agents General supporters and Private Armed PNH Secondary – State Groups (PAGs) Secondary – and State Proxies PNH Political Rivals PNH Elites Political party DTO financing agents and enforcers Secondary – Voters Political Rivals Political party agents and enforcers Victims Opposition Poll workers Election officials candidates and Candidates Poll workers supporters Voters Public officials Journalists Journalists Opposition PNH PNH supporters and MINUSTAH MINUSTAH voters PNH MINUSTAH General public Motives Eliminate or force Suppress voter Overturn election withdrawal of a turnout results candidacy Disrupt voting Inhibit campaigning Falsify tally sheets and support for Disenfranchisement opposition candidates Tactics Homicide Physical assaults Street actions Assaults with Intimidation Physical assaults firearms Bribery Destruction of Physical assaults Destruction of property Intimidation property Intimidation Bribery Locations Candidate home Polling stations Public street towns Areas around Election facilities Constituencies with polling centers close contests This document includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the Recipient and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed – in whole or in part. 4 4 Haiti Electoral Security Assessment Report January 7, 2013 Electoral Security Stakeholder Analysis Electoral security stakeholders can be grouped into three categories: 1) state; 2) non-state; and 3) international. State stakeholders can be regulatory, security, or judicial in nature. The primary regulatory stakeholder is the Electoral Council (CEP) and its associated administrative units at the departmental (BED) and communal (BEC) levels, as well as the National Electoral Challenges Office (BCEN). The primary security stakeholder is the Haitian National Police (PNH). Judicial stakeholders are the ordinary courts of Haiti and justices of the peace. Non-state stakeholders include political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), other domestic observer groups, and media organizations. International stakeholders include the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “international community,” and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) involved with electoral assistance, domestic observation, conflict mediation, rule of law, and political party development. Preliminary Electoral Conflict Profile There are vulnerabilities which may potentially trigger violence in all phases of the electoral cycle. However, the profile of that violence will vary with each phase. In the