Contents Editor’s Note vii Chapter 1 The Value of the Quad Plus 1 Kanwal Sibal Chapter 2 Democracy and Regional Security: © Individual Contributors An Australian Perspective 11 Andrew Davies First published 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval Chapter 3 system or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, Democracy and Regional Security in Asia 23 photocopying, recording or otherwise—without the prior permission of the author/s Daniel Twining and the publisher. ISBN 978-81-8328-395-3 Chapter 4 Maritime Multilateral Security Cooperation in Published by East and South Asia 39 Wisdom Tree 4779/23, Ansari Road Bonji Ohara Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110 002 Ph.: 23247966/67/68 Chapter 5 [email protected] Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea 51 Printed in India Sam Bateman Chapter 6 A National Strategy for the South China Sea 61 Steven Groves Chapter 7 India–China Land Border Disputes 83 RN Ravi Chapter 8 Sino-Indian Border Tensions and Editor’s Note the US–Asia Rebalance 99 Lisa Curtis In May 2007, mid-level foreign ministry officials of the US, Japan, Chapter 9 Australia and India met on the margins of the ASEAN Regional The Case of the Philippines’ Balancing Policy Against Forum (ARF) in Manila to explore the potential for a quadrilateral the China Challenge in the South China Sea 115 strategic dialogue. Amid misgivings from the partner nations’ foreign Renato Cruz De Castro policy establishments, changes in political circumstances, and most importantly, protests from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Quad Plus Dialogue Delegate List 139 the initiative soon withered. The concept, however, has not gone away. There is something Index 143 commonsensical about four vibrant, committed democracies spanning the Indo-Pacific coming together to discuss their common strategic security interests. Three of the countries are formal treaty allies, and India, although steadfastly independent in outlook, is engaged in interlocking dialogues which ultimately include all four. Since 2007, coordination among these four nations—as well as other like-minded neighbours—has come to make even more sense. In the intervening seven years, the spectrum of opinion in all four capitals about the appropriate management of the China- challenge has shifted in the direction of concern. Officials have yet to abandon hope of the PRC becoming a cooperative ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system. Indeed, it remains the goal viii l THE QUAD PLUS EDITOR ’S NOTE l ix of all concerned. The record of late, however, from the PRC’s activity the analysis at such time as they choose, whether in conjunction with on India’s northern border to its attempts to physically alter the a restart of the official Quad or piecemeal. territorial status quo in the East and South China Seas has put a In 2013, The Heritage Foundation, The Tokyo Foundation, much higher premium on hedging against risk. In turn, hedging Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) and the Australian speaks to the need for allies and partners pooling analytical resources Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) came together in Canberra, Australia and exploring areas of cooperation to address common threats. The to develop such an agenda. In an effort to expand the dialogue to other aim is not a strategy for containment of China. That is not a sensible democracies with a strategic stake, they extended the partnership goal in any case given the many interdependencies between all the to the Yuchengco Center at De La Salle University in Manila and countries involved. Rather, the aim is for the perspectives represented called the resulting dialogue the ‘Quad Plus’. Scholars from all in the quadrilateral dialogue to produce a coherent approach to five partner nations participated, as did a scholar from Indonesia. managing the new power balances in the Indo-Pacific region. Delegation leaders included Masahiro Akiyama, President of the The Political environments in all four countries have also changed Tokyo Foundation; Dr James Jay Carafano, Vice President of The in ways to support dialogue. Each new government is seized with Heritage Foundation’s Davis Institute for International Studies; Dr geopolitically related security concerns and looking for solutions. Andrew Davies, Director of Research from ASPI; and Ambassador Japan’s new prime minister was the author of the quadrilateral concept Kanwal Sibal, Dean of VIF’s Centre for International Relations and during his former turn in office. Australia’s prime minster has been Diplomacy. The day-and-a-half long discussion revolved around critical of a previous government’s withdrawal from the dialogue. several papers prepared by select participants, discussants assigned The approach of India’s new government to the PRC, particularly on to critique the papers, and roundtable discussions. The papers, as border issues, is also firming up. And for its part, theUS has in many revised, follow in this volume. The plan of the partner organisations is to continue the Track II dialogue indefinitely on an annual basis ways very publicly reaffirmed its bipartisan commitment to Asia by and rotate the ‘plus’ role among other democratic stakeholders in the way of its ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’. region. For all this convergence of circumstances, unfortunately, the The official quadrilateral dialogue was abandoned after 2007. PRC’s objections to the Quad have in all likelihood not disappeared. Perhaps, it was an idea ahead of its time. Circumstances have Genuine or calculated, anticipated cries of ‘containment’ by PRC developed such that today, few in Quad Plus country capitals would officials and government-controlled media may still have the effect argue that some manner of coordination and consultation among of deterring consultations. them is not desirable. At the very least, we would hope for an All of these factors contribute to the imperative of restarting intensification of that process and that our private dialogues can help Quad dialogue at the Track II or non-government level. Argument prudently feed it. for officially restarting the Quad and recommendations for handling diplomatic fallout from the PRC can be made in a different time and Walter Lohman place. In the interim, non-government agendas can be developed. Director, Asian Studies Center Governments can determine whether and how to avail themselves of The Heritage Foundation CHAPTER 1 The Value of the Quad Plus KANWAL SIBAL he Quad Plus dialogue is a useful platform to exchange views on TAsian security issues. The first attempt to establish this dialogue under Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first term faltered because of China’s opposition and Australia’s decision to back away from it. It is not clear how enthused the US was about this move. India was ambivalent, neither clearly for or against. The rise of China and its implications for Asian security was the driving reason for proposing the Quad arrangement, and remains so. China’s claim that its rise will be peaceful and that any parallel with the rise of Germany that triggered World War I would be mistaken, can be legitimately doubted, though the nature of the conflict that may arise may be different. China’s demographic, territorial, economic and growing military size makes its rise almost unique in history. Its 1.3 billion population, its status as the second largest economy in the world and the world’s biggest exporter, with foreign exchange reserves of USD 3.7 trillion, coupled with the sense of historical grievances that it carries and its territorial claims on land and sea affecting several neighbours, are enough reasons why other countries 2 l THE QUAD PLUS THE VALUE OF THE QUAD PLUS l 3 need to be wary of its rise. If China acquires more and more political, While concerns about China are central to Quad members, the economic and military power, it will use it to advance its interests in diplomatic need exists not to project the Quad as an anti-China the natural course of things. This will inevitably be at the cost of the group, given that all the countries involved have extensive ties with interests of others in different degrees, irrespective of the rhetoric of China and are committed to a policy of engaging, not containing ‘win-win’ situations. it. The Quad can be, therefore, projected as a group of democracies China’s political system adds to the concerns, as it is opaque and seeking to strengthen their ties with each other on the basis of shared decision-making processes are clouded in mystery. For a major global values. Indirectly, this helps to isolate China as a non-democratic player like China to have such a centralised political system that is state and erode its political standing. intolerant of any dissent against the Communist Party, and in which Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been quite blunt about the relationship between the armed forces and the political authority democratic Japan, believing in universal values, seeking strategic ties is not clear to outsiders, is worrisome in itself. with other democratic partners to counter the Chinese naval threat China has begun to flex its muscles, becoming more ‘self- in the East China and South China Seas. He has textually said that assertive’. It has drawn the nine-dash line in the South China Sea he ‘envisages a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US (SCS) arbitrarily, it has raised tensions over the Senkakus in the East state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons China Sea with Japan, stoking them further by declaring an Air stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific’, adding that Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in this area that also extends to he was ‘prepared to invest, to the extent possible, Japan’s capabilities these islands.