Notes 1 The History and Theory of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions 1. John Woolman dressed almost entirely in white/cream because many of the dyes of the day, including indigo, were produced by slave labor. 2. There are many active BDS networks in Europe, which operate in a completely different sociopolitical and economic context. Because of the focus on local configurations and how local context shapes the social change mechanisms used by activists (as well as due to practical considerations), I selected cases in the United States to provide at least a measure of “control” for comparing thematically between them. After speaking with European scholars, BDS is not viewed as radical and controversial in the same way as it is in the United States. 3. There are many instances of the US Congress issuing unsolicited statements indicating their strong support of Israeli government policies and actions, not all of which are factually accurate, and some of which are seen as too “pro-Israel” even by Israelis. For example, Congress issued a strong statement against the Goldstone Report in 2009 (Goldstone 2009), in support of Israeli armed action against the Gaza Flotilla in 2010 (Zunes 2010), and against the Palestinian bid for statehood in 2011 (Guttman 2011a). 4. To be clear, the BDS movement is not calling for sanctions like those that were placed on Iraq, but for targeted, limited sanctions. 5. For simplicity sake I refer to the collection of activists and groups engaged in boycott and divestment activities as the “BDS movement”, although as discussed in this book, it is not a coherent, monolithic, tightly knit social movement in the traditional sense, particularly since the European and American variants are quite different due to very different socioeconomic and political contexts. Furthermore, some groups, like the Presbyterian Church (USA) were careful to differentiate their call for divestment from three specific companies from the broader BDS movement, even though opposition sought to lump them together. 6. The concept of “pro-Israel” is contested, and Jewish groups on both sides of the BDS issue assert that they are “pro-Israel.” Conventionally, “pro-Israel” has been associated with the Israel lobby in the United States, which tends to stand behind the policies and practices of the Israeli government without question. This issue of what it means to be “pro-Israel” is discussed more in the various case studies, as it is a highly salient issue. 200 ● Notes 7. I have seen multiple email discussions that illustrate this misunderstand- ing; while PACBI repeatedly emphasizes the focus on institutions, individual Israeli academics report being targeted independent of institutional affilia- tion, and many Israeli academics face pressure from their home institutions and broader society for their political activism, such as Neve Gordon at Ben Gurion University (Flusfeder 2012). 8. As discussed more in the case study of UC Berkeley, the history of divest- ment activism against South African apartheid has influenced student activ- ism regarding the BDS campaign against Israeli occupation. For example, Hampshire College in Massachusetts was one of the first to divest from South Africa and was again the first to divest from military corporations profiting from the occupation (Horowitz and Weiss 2010; Soule 2009, 81). UC Berkeley, likewise, played an active role in the struggle to end apartheid. 9. While the boycott still exists on the books of some states, overall most gov- ernments in the region engage in trade with Israel (Stop the Wall Campaign 2007). 10. There are many excellent accounts of the history of the Oslo Accords and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the debates surrounding the “no partner” narrative and what actually occurred at the July 2000 Camp David meet- ing between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat are widely available. The Geneva Initiative of 2002 demonstrated that there was indeed a Palestinian partner, as have subsequent Palestinian efforts at state building and reform in the Salam Fayyad era. In addition to histories of the conflict by acclaimed scholars such as Avi Shlaim and David Lesch, for more on the conflict and the Oslo process, see Bröning (2011); Agha and Malley (2001); Miller (2008); Meital (2006); Said (1995); Karsh (1996); and Milton-Edwards (2009). 11. The PLO was first created by the Arab League in 1964, but after the 1967 war in which Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (along with the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt), Palestinian nationalists sought to take control of their destiny rather than rely on Arab states. The umbrella organization, which includes representatives from numerous political factions and other key Palestinian constituencies, like trade and agricultural unions, included a quasi-government, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) as well as armed elements such as the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). It is worth mentioning that Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, is not a part of the PLO because it did not exist at the time of the PLO’s formation, and negotiations for Hamas to join the PLO in the wake of the 2005 Cairo agreement have not ever been finalized due to the worsening of relations between Hamas and Fatah in the aftermath of the 2006 Parliamentary elections, when Hamas won a majority of seats (Milton- Edwards 2009, 131–133; Caridi 2012, 333). 12. The Arabic word “intifada” is usually translated as “uprising” but literally means “shaking off.” 13. It is important to note that Israelis and Palestinians differ in their interpreta- tion and application of international law, particularly regarding the law as it Notes ● 201 applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which Israel refers to as “Judea and Samaria” or else as the “disputed territories,” denying the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention even as they assert that they uphold its requirements (Hajjar 2005). Similarly, Israel deems the Gaza Strip free from occupation, whereas the international community, particularly those engaged in international humanitarian organizations, consider the Gaza Strip to be occupied, consistent with the definition of occupation as “effective control” (Hallward 2011a; ICRC 2004). 2 Explaining the Contentiousness of BDS: Rival Framings of Identity, Peace, and Power 1. While there may be some activists who do wish to change the nature of Israel so that the state is not defined by its Jewish identity, there are many activists engaging in tactics of BDS who specifically endorse a two-state solution. 2. While an interesting question, it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate why it is that some Jews find themselves critical of Israeli policies as a result of their Jewish identity and why others feel unable to criticize Israel because of their Jewish identity. However, based on conversations over the years, it seems that part of it has to do with how that “Jewish” identity was constructed. Those whose families focused on the social teachings of the Jewish prophets, and who were involved in engaged, “progressive” communities are more likely to be involved in BDS activism than those whose families focused on strict adherence to kashrut and were less involved in organizing around socioeco- nomic and political issues beyond a narrowly defined Jewish community. 3. This statement of course equates BDS with denying the legitimacy of the State of Israel, which is not necessarily the case, depending on one’s approach to BDS. 4. Since June 2007, the PNA has had minimal control in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. 5. It is worth emphasizing again that because of the different strands of opposi- tion to BDS, as well as different strands of BDS activism, power dynamics are exactly that, dynamic, and specific to each context. Some BDS campaigns are more coercive than others, seeking to prevent corporations from attaining contracts, for example, whereas others are more symbolic and would have very little actual economic impact on a target, but would harm the corporate image or raise awareness about an issue. 3 CodePink’s “Stolen Beauty” Campaign: Creativity in Action 1. Video clips and narrative descriptions of Stolen Beauty campaign actions are available on the Stolen Beauty webpage, http://www.codepinkalert.org/article. php?id=5006 (accessed October 11, 2012). 202 ● Notes 2. Although he does not explicitly discuss the BDS movement, Yossi Shain discusses this same phenomenon in Jewish and Armenian diaspora organiza- tions (Shain 2002). 4 UC Berkeley’s Student Government Divestment Bill: Power, Identity, and Fear 1. Many peace activists interviewed by the author for this and other projects note that the issue of one or two states is less important than the type of state(s) resulting vis-à-vis the rights and freedoms of the states’ occupants. For exam- ple, a single state could be an apartheid regime with one party dominating the other or a state for all its citizens with equal standing. 2. Rawls categorizes decent peoples as not having aggressive aims, using peaceful means such as diplomacy and trade to achieve their objectives, having a judi- ciary committed to the rule of law, extending human rights to all members of society, and regarding all citizens as moral (Avila 2007, 95–96). 5 The Olympia Food Co-op Boycott: Brokerage, Networks, and Local Culture 1. Groups like StandWithUs have anti-BDS fliers readily available on their website, and the Jewish Community Relations Council has a “rapid response team” ready to “monitor print, radio, and television media” and write letters to the editor with talking points provided by the JCRC (JCRC n.d.). 6 The Presbyterian Church USA: Institutions, Justice, and History 1. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Church is also a conservative institu- tion, and there is a great deal of variation within and across denominations.