INDIA AND SRI LANKA AFTER THE LTTE Asia Report N°206 – 23 June 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. INDIA IN SRI LANKA – INTERESTS VS. ASPIRATIONS ....................................... 2 A. HOW DELHI GOT HERE: INDIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN SRI LANKA’S CONFLICTS .............................. 2 B. INDIA’S POST-WAR SRI LANKA POLICY AND COLOMBO’S GO SLOW APPROACH .......................... 6 1. Economic integration – moving slowly ....................................................................................... 6 2. Fishing disputes ........................................................................................................................... 7 3. Humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in a militarised north and east ................................ 8 4. TNA-government talks: little prospect of a negotiated political settlement .............................. 11 III. CONSTRAINTS ON INDIA’S LEVERAGE ............................................................... 14 A. THE ECONOMIC TIES THAT BIND ............................................................................................... 14 B. COLOMBO DIVERSIFIES ITS PARTNERS ....................................................................................... 14 1. Ambivalence over military assistance ........................................................................................ 15 2. Deepening ties to Pakistan ......................................................................................................... 16 C. CHINA AND SRI LANKA .............................................................................................................. 17 D. GROWING INDIAN FEARS ABOUT CHINESE INFLUENCE ............................................................... 19 E. RESPONDING IN KIND? ............................................................................................................... 20 IV. THE TAMIL NADU FACTOR ...................................................................................... 21 A. PARTY POLITICS AND THE EBB AND FLOW OF THE SRI LANKAN TAMIL CAUSE .......................... 21 B. ENDURING RESONANCE, TENUOUS TRACTION ........................................................................... 23 C. KEEPING UP APPEARANCES ....................................................................................................... 25 D. KILLING THEM SOFTLY .............................................................................................................. 26 E. SMOULDERING EMBERS ............................................................................................................. 28 V. OTHER FACTORS ......................................................................................................... 30 A. THE LTTE IN INDIA? ................................................................................................................. 30 B. SRI LANKA TAMIL REFUGEES .................................................................................................... 32 VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT INDIA CAN DO.................................................................... 36 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA ......................................................................................................................... 39 B. MAP OF TAMIL NADU ...................................................................................................................... 40 C. GLOSSARY OF TERMS ...................................................................................................................... 41 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 43 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2008 ......................................................... 44 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 46 Asia Report N°206 23 June 2011 INDIA AND SRI LANKA AFTER THE LTTE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY India has long been the country with the greatest influence is concentrated in the president’s family and the military; over Sri Lanka but its policies to encourage the govern- attacks on independent media and political opponents ment there towards a sustainable peace are not working. continue with impunity. Even on Indian-sponsored devel- Despite India’s active engagement and unprecedented opment projects and economic integration, the Sri Lankan financial assistance, the Sri Lankan government has failed government has dragged its feet; for example, construc- to make progress on pressing post-war challenges. Gov- tion has begun on only a handful of the 50,000 houses ernment actions and the growing political power of the India has offered to build in the northern province. military are instead generating new grievances that in- crease the risk of an eventual return to violence. To sup- While officials in New Delhi admit they are frustrated, port a sustainable and equitable post-war settlement in India remains hesitant to press President Rajapaksa’s regime Sri Lanka and limit the chances of another authoritarian very hard. This is due in part to its history of counter- and military-dominated government on its borders, India productive interventions in Sri Lanka. India’s misguided needs to work more closely with the United States, the policy of arming Tamil militants in 1980s significantly European Union and Japan, encouraging them to send the expanded the conflict, and its decision to send peace- message that Sri Lanka’s current direction is not accept- keepers to enforce the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord ended in able. It should press for the demilitarisation of the north, a disaster as the LTTE fought them to a standstill and later return to civil administration there and in the east and the took revenge by assassinating former Indian Prime Minis- end of emergency rule throughout the country. ter Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. India’s interventions have made Sri Lankans of all communities suspicious, limiting India’s New Delhi’s relations with Sri Lanka in the two years room for manoeuvre. Many Sinhalese see India as favour- since the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ing Tamils and as wanting to weaken or divide the coun- (LTTE) have had four main priorities: try, despite its crucial role in destroying the Tamil Tigers. For many Tamils, on the other hand, India is seen as hav- providing humanitarian assistance to displaced Tamils ing repeatedly broken its pledges to defend their rights in the north and east; and protect their lives, especially during the final phase of the war in 2009. supporting major development projects, primarily in the north, with concessionary loans; India’s reluctance to put serious pressure on the Sri Lankan pressing the Sri Lankan government and the main Sri government is also due to strategic considerations, in par- Lankan Tamil political alliance, the Tamil National Al- ticular its desire to counter the growing influence of China, liance (TNA), to work towards a negotiated settlement whose financial and political support the Rajapaksa gov- of ethnic conflict through the devolution of power to ernment has been cultivating. India’s own growing eco- Tamil-majority areas in the north and east; and nomic interests in Sri Lanka have also tempered its politi- cal activism. New Delhi’s traditional reluctance to work encouraging greater economic integration between the through multilateral bodies or in close coordination with two economies. other governments – due in part to its fear of international scrutiny of its own conflicts, particularly in Kashmir – India’s approach has so far paid only limited dividends. has also significantly weakened its ability to influence Sri Deepening militarisation and Sinhalisation in the northern Lanka. province have increased the insecurity and political mar- ginalisation of Tamils and are undermining prospects for India, nonetheless, has strong reasons to work for funda- inter-ethnic reconciliation. The government continues to mental changes in Sri Lanka’s post-war policies. It has a resist any investigation or accounting for mass atrocities clear interest in preventing either a return to violent mili- in the final months of the war. Democratic governance is tancy or the consolidation on its borders of another au- under sustained assault throughout the country, as power thoritarian government with an overly powerful military. India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE Crisis Group Asia Report N°206, 23 June 2011 Page ii India’s own democratic values and successes in accom- conference to review post-war progress and to push the modating ethnic diversity should also encourage an activ- government to demilitarise the north, lift the state of emer- ist approach, especially as it seeks recognition as a rising gency and relax anti-terrorism laws. global power with hopes of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. India’s own restive domestic Tamil con- In New York, Geneva and Colombo, India should pub- stituency, to which the central government needs to re- licly acknowledge the importance and credibility of the spond for electoral considerations, is pressing for stronger report by the UN Secretary-General’s panel of experts on action. After decades of actively