American University in Cairo AUC Knowledge Fountain Archived Theses and Dissertations 6-1-2000 Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia: the case of Israel and India Kareem Kamel Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds Recommended Citation APA Citation Kamel, K. (2000).Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia: the case of Israel and India [Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/2379 MLA Citation Kamel, Kareem. Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia: the case of Israel and India. 2000. American University in Cairo, Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/2379 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Archived Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA: THE CASES OF ISRAEL AND INDIA KAREEM MAHMOUD KAMEL A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (MAY/2000) The American University in Cairo i The American University in Cairo NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA : THE CASES OF ISRAEL AND INDIA A Thesis Submitted by Kareem Mahmoud Kamel To the Department of Political Science (May/2000) In partial fulfillment of the requirements for The degree of Master of Arts Has been approved by Dr. William De Mars Thesis Committee Chair/Adviser . Affiliation . Dr. Bahgat Korany Thesis Committee Reader/Examiner . Affiliation . Dr. Anthony Lang Thesis Committee Reader/Examiner . Affiliation . _______________ ______ ____________ ______ Department Chair/ Date Dean Date Program Director ii CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………... V ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………....................... vi Chapter Page 1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………….. 1 Historical Background………………………………………………………... 5 Research Objectives………………………………………………………….. 8 Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………….. 10 Strategic Literature………………………………………………………… 11 The Security Perspective & Decision-Making Theory..…………………... 19 2. ISRAEL: THE RELENTLESS QUEST FOR SECURITY………………….. 36 The Security Perspective………………………………………………………… 37 The Middle East Regional System…………………………………………. 38 The Strategic Utility of Israel’s Nuclear Weapons………………………… 40 Israel’s Nuclear Decision-Making…………………………………….................. 53 “Nuclear Mythmaking” – The Cognitive Approach to Decision-Making………………………………………………………….. 56 Bureaucratic Politics and Israel’s Nuclear Decision-Making……………… 75 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………. 83 3. INDIA: INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES OR DOMESTIC FACTORS?................................................................................... 86 India and the South Asian System………………………………………………. 87 The Security Perspective…………………………………………………………. 90 iii India’s Nuclear Decision-Making…………………………………………….. 103 The Cognitive Approach to Decision-Making – Norms, Identity, and Nuclear Weapons…………………………………………. 108 Bureaucratic Politics and India’s Nuclear Decision-Making…………… 122 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………… 125 4. CONCLUSIONS…………………………………………………………… 128 REFERENCES………………………………………………………………… 141 iv All praises due to Allah, for His mercy, guidance and support, without which nothing would be possible…. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Dr. William De Mars, for his relentless dedication, his valuable suggestions, and his constant support and encouragement during the course of this research. Also, I would like to extend my gratitude to my readers, Dr. Anthony Lang and Dr. Bahgat Korany, for their useful methodological and theoretical insights….. A special thanks to my family for their patience, goodwill, and enthusiasm….. v ABSTRACT University Name: The American University in Cairo Thesis Title: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia: The Cases of India and Israel Student Full Name: Kareem Mahmoud Kamel Name of Advisor: Dr. William De Mars Name of Readers: Dr. Anthony Lang & Dr. Bahgat Korany This research attempts to offer a multivariate explanation for the decisions of Israel and India to build nuclear weapons and deploy them, and their choice of nuclear strategy by ‘theorizing’ the largely descriptive but undertheorized literature on the topic. It focuses on the formative period of each country’s nuclear program during which time its nuclear program was set on track. The major aim of the work is to open the ‘black box’ of nuclear politics and shed light on the anomalies in the nuclear decisions of both countries, that are not adequately addressed by the security model and its accompanying principles of state rationality. This thesis will argue that while the nuclear decisions of both countries have been, no doubt, shaped by its strategic threat perceptions, two other variables played, to different degrees, an important role in nuclear proliferation: the attitudinal prisms of its chief nuclear decision-makers in relation to their perceptions of ‘national interest’, ‘science’, ‘modernity’ and ‘prestige’ and chief bureaucrats residing over key scientific establishments. In order to account for the reasons behind key nuclear decisions, three theoretical models were used: the security perspective with its focus on strategic threat perceptions, the cognitive approach to decision-making with vi its emphasis on the attitudinal prisms of decision-makers, and the bureaucratic approach with its ability to account for the pulling and hauling that is characteristic of bureaucratic politics. Finally, the thesis comparatively evaluated the Israeli and Indian cases of proliferation and related them to other cases of proliferation and non-proliferation in the third world. vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Most analysis of Cold War nuclear policy, and of proliferation, rely almost exclusively on the security model of state rationality. This explanation assumes that states act as coherent units in their relentless pursuit of power (defined largely in material terms) amidst an anarchic international environment. In this regard, nuclear weapons are seen as facilitators of much-needed security. In other words, “many U.S. policymakers and most international relations scholars have a clear and simple answer to the proliferation puzzle: states will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means: if they do not face such threats, they will willingly remain non- nuclear states.”1 This thesis will examine the decisions of India and Israel to build nuclear weapons and deploy them, and their choice of nuclear strategy. Moreover, it will focus on nuclear decision-making in both countries. A closer look at each of the two countries reveals anomalies in their nuclear decisions that are not well-explained by the security model. First, the nuclear programs of India and Israel have been shaped by the “attitudinal prisms” of their chief nuclear decision-makers and their different perceptions of ‘national interest’. Secondly, nuclear politics in both countries involved important “normative” concerns. Of particular importance, is the interaction between 1 Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons ?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/1997): 54. 1 ‘science’ and ‘prestige’, as important normative constructs, and how they were understood by nuclear decision-makers in relationship to perceptions of modernity and identity. Third, nuclear decisions were pioneered by chief bureaucrats residing over an extensive nuclear bureaucracy. In other words, nuclear decision-making largely involved pulling and hauling between bureaucrats whose interests and perceptions were largely shaped by personal and partisan interests. India and Israel invite analysis because they have the longest nuclear history in the developing world, and their democratic systems, however flawed, yield relatively greater information on domestic decision-making. More specifically, it will enable one to better understand the “attitudinal prism” of key decision-makers, bureaucratic politics and important “normative” concerns that played a role in nuclear decision- making. This is not to say that authoritarian regimes lack the previous attributes, but rather a realization that the nature of democratic governments makes it easier to obtain information on a sensitive issue that is already concealed by multiple veils of secrecy. Hence, the democratic systems of both India and Israel enable one to better understand the domestic dimension of decision-making that would have otherwise been further obscured by personalized politics, authoritarian regimes, extremely rigid censorship and lack of informative publications pertaining to the subject-matter of the thesis. The main problem in proliferation studies lies in the lack of analytical appreciation of the complexity of nuclear politics, the reasons behind key strategic decisions, and the range of reasons why states choose to go nuclear. More importantly, an exclusive reliance on the security model for understanding proliferation is called into question by recent literature recognizing the important role 2 that domestic factors and normative concerns