UC Riverside UC Riverside Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Institutions and Legislative Consensus in National Parliaments Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0h26f8tp Author Williams, Brian Donald Publication Date 2014 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE Institutions and Legislative Consensus in National Parliaments A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Brian Donald Williams August 2014 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Indridi Indridason, Chairperson Dr. Shaun Bowler Dr. Kevin Esterling Copyright by Brian Donald Williams 2014 The Dissertation of Brian Donald Williams is approved: Committee Chairperson University of California, Riverside ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to express appreciation and gratitude to my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Indridi H. Indridason, for his patient guidance and mentorship as I progressed through the doctoral program. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Kevin Esterling and Dr. Shaun Bowler for their assistance and support throughout. Other faculty and staff in the Department of Political Science were also supportive and helpful in a variety of ways for which I am thankful. Teachers of the various seminars I took in the earlier years of the program in the department, faculty whom I worked for as a teacher's assistant, those who provided words of wisdom at various times on questions pertaining to my progress in the doctoral program, my dissertation, and other matters related to political science and beyond are also appreciated. I would also like to acknowledge and thank fellow graduate studies with whom I spent time socializing on and off campus, and whom often provided advise and support during my years in the doctoral program. Finally, I should express my gratitude for the employment and financial support provided by the Department of Political Science and the University of California Riverside which made the completion of this dissertation possible. iv ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Institutions and Legislative Consensus in National Parliaments by Brian Donald Williams Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science University of California, Riverside, August 2014 Dr. Indridi Indridason, Chairperson This study focuses on how political institutions—electoral systems and legislative rules, and coalition agreement policy pledges—affect consensus in national parliaments. Two theoretical propositions are established and tested empirically. Proposition 1 contends that consensus will be higher under proportional systems of representation (PR) than under its majoritarian alternatives. Proposition 2 contends that under coalition government, legislative consensus should be higher on legislative motions lacking governing coalition commitment. Proposition 1 is tested with new legislative vote data from New Zealand and Belgium covering those countries' institutional transformations to PR. To test Proposition 2, I focus on periods of coalition government in New Zealand and Belgium after their transition to PR, and in Britain during the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. The analysis indicates that New Zealand's electoral system change in the mid-1990s caused a significant increase in consensus, and after reform bills assigned to a v select committee chaired by an opposition MP were more likely to result in a bipartisan vote outcome, consistent with Proposition 1. Belgium's institutional transformation from 1893 to 1921 coincided with a decrease in consensus on budgetary legislation. This development suggests that PR will not have a consensus inducing effect in the near-term if the adoption of PR coincides with democratization, though the adoption of PR sets the stage for consensus building over time. Support for Proposition 2 is mixed. In post-reform New Zealand I find that confidence and supply agreements hold those parties to the agreement together when the corresponding bill comes up for a final vote. However, governing coalition commitments are not found to increase consensus in New Zealand. During the Catholic-Liberal coalition government in Belgium from 1921-23, the opposition Socialist Party was significantly more likely to oppose the government on votes approving bills prioritized in the government's post-election declaratory speech, consistent with Proposition 2. During the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in Britain, government policy commitments have a limited effect on vote outcomes. This finding confirms that the effect of coalition agreements on legislative voting in an otherwise majoritarian parliamentary system will be limited. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………….. 1 1.1 Why Focus on Consensus in National Parliaments?……………………… 1 1.2 Consensus and Structural Institutions…………………………………….. 4 1.3 Consensus and Governmental Institutions………………………………... 19 1.4 Summary of the Theory…………………………………………………… 30 1.5 Research Design and Roadmap…………………………………………… 33 Chapter 2: Institutions and Parliamentary Consensus in New Zealand, 1987-2013……………………………………………………………………….. 36 2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 36 2.2 Structural Institutions and Parliamentary Consensus in New Zealand…… 37 2.3 Coalition Agreements and Parliamentary Consensus in New Zealand…… 58 2.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 75 Chapter 3: Institutions and Parliamentary Consensus in Belgium, 1893-1923…. 77 3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 77 3.2 Structural Institutions and Parliamentary Consensus in Belgium………… 78 3.3 Coalition Agreements and Parliamentary Consensus in Belgium………… 93 3.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 104 Chapter 4: Institutions and Parliamentary Consensus in Britain, 2010-2013…… 106 4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………... 106 4.2 Structural Institutions and Parliamentary Consensus in Britain…………... 106 4.3 Coalition Agreements and Parliamentary Consensus in Britain…………... 116 4.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 143 Chapter 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………….... 145 5.1 Summary of the Analysis………………………………………………….. 145 vii 5.2 Refinements to the Model………………………………………………… 147 5.3 Institutional Implications…………………………………………………. 152 5.4 Proportional Representation and Parliamentary Consensus……………… 157 5.5 Continuing Research on Parliamentary Consensus………………………. 163 Appendices……………………………………………………………………… 167 Appendix A: Term Clarifications…………………………………………. 167 Appendix B: Legislative Vote Data from Parliamentary Democracies…… 172 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………….. 173 Legislative Vote Data Sources…………………………………………….. 173 References………………………………………………………………… 173 viii LIST OF TABLES 1.1 Institutional variables focused on in this study…………………………… 8 1.2 Mechanisms and arenas of coalition control……………………………… 20 2.1 Coalitions under FPP in New Zealand (1987-1996)……………………… 42 2.2 Coalitions under MMP in New Zealand (1997-2007)……………………. 43 2.3 Bipartisan vote outcomes before and after reform in New Zealand……… 50 2.4 Government pledges and confidence and supply commitments on government bills in New Zealand………………………………………… 62 2.5 Confidence and supply party votes against government bills given different types of policy commitment…………………………………….. 64 2.6 Frequency of recorded votes on enacted principal government bills under MMP in New Zealand…………………………………………………….. 68 2.7 Number of principal government bills referred to various select committees since MMP reform in New Zealand………………………….. 70 2.8 Bipartisan vote outcomes and coalition commitments in New Zealand, censored probit models……………………………………………………. 72 2.9 Consensus and coalition commitments in New Zealand, probit and OLS regression………………………………………………………………….. 74 3.1 Electoral system transformation in Belgium from 1893 to 1921………….. 79 3.2 Overview of the Belgian legislative vote data…………………………….. 84 3.3 Majority size on budgetary issues regressed on elapsed day variable spanning transitionary period in Belgium, OLS regression……………….. 88 3.4 Political party seat totals and shares in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 1890-1925…………………………………………….…. 90 3.5 Government commitment and bipartisan vote outcomes during the Theunis governments of 1921-23, probit models…………………………. 97 3.6 Effect of policy commitments on government unity and share of opposition voting with government during the Theunis cabinets of 1921-23, OLS regression………………………………………………….. 101 ix 4.1 Results of the 2010 British general election………………………………. 117 4.2 Government unity and coalition agreement in the Britain House of Commons, OLS regression………………………………………………... 130 4.3 Share of opposition MPs voting with government as a function of coalition agreement pledge in the British House of Commons, OLS regression………………………………………………………………….. 130 4.4 Average treatment effect of coalition agreement pledge on government unity where legislative motion is introduced by Conservative MP……….. 133 5.1 Summary of empirical analysis……………………………………………. 146 x LIST OF FIGURES 1.1 Legislative consensus and electoral system proportionality across parliamentary democracies………………………………………………... 18 1.2 Overview of the theory……………………………………………………. 32 2.1 Total Government bills enacted with and without a final vote in New Zealand, 1987-2007……………………………………………………….. 45 2.2 Governing coalition seat share and consensus levels in New Zealand, 1987-2007…………………………………………………………………. 47 3.1