The Silent Service Understanding the Covert World of Canadian Submarine Operations During the Cold War. Quinn Leitch: V00485756 History 394: Veterans and Oral History Submitted to: Dr. David Zimmerman Submitted on: December 1, 2008 The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States along with their respective alliances, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during the 1950s onwards was a serious matter at sea. During this timeframe, the Soviet Navy transitioned from a small coastal defence force into a large, general-purpose, ocean-going navy which was second only to the United States Navy in range of activities and apparent power. 1 This became a serious threat to Canada, an important NATO ally, for two reasons. Firstly, Soviet naval presence began to increase in the Pacific Ocean which, subsequently, led to increased Soviet naval activity such as long-range patrols by ballistic-missile submarines, attack submarines and intelligence gathering ships off Canada’s West Coast. 2 Secondly, Canada’s Arctic Islands could serve as alternate routes for Soviet submarines heading north or south between the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic. 3 Due to the surmounting threats of the Soviet Union, the Canadian Submarine Service re-emerged as a strategic and tactical asset for the Royal Canadian Navy that would reinforce Canada’s sovereignty and her commitment to NATO. Furthermore, the thorough and intense training received by Canadian submariners translated into repeated successes in clandestine operations, whether training exercises or covert operations, at sea. To fully understand this covert world, the utilization of Oral History is paramount since documentation of clandestine aspects of the Canadian Submarine Service is extremely limited; therefore, this paper will draw upon the interviews of three well distinguished Canadian Submarine Commanders: Captain Wilfred Lund, Commander Lloyd Barnes, and Commander Maurice Tate. 1 Canada. House of Commons. The Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project. (Ottawa: House of Commons, 1988), 21. 2 House of Commons, The Submarine Acquisition Project, 22. 3 House of Commons, The Submarine Acquisition Project, 22. 1 The Cold War was not the first time that the Canadian Submarine Service asserted Canada’s sovereignty. During the beginning of the First World War the Premier of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, ordered the Provincial acquisition of two American built submarines from the Chilean Government. 4 Neither the Liberal nor Conservative Governments at the time formulated, and indeed even seriously considered, a separate defense policy for the West Coast. 5 Furthermore, Liberal Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his cabinet agreed with the Colonial Defence Committee that they could not perceive any real threat to the West Coast communities; therefore, they would not commit resources to a West Coast defensive strategy. 6 Premier McBride did not agree with the Federal Government as he was motivated by the possibility of German warships raiding British Columbia’s Coal stocks, thriving fishing and lumber industries as well as shipping facilities. 7 Moreover, both submarines were commissioned by the Royal Canadian Navy on August 6, 1914 as HMCS CC-1 and HMCS CC-2 along with praise from the Federal Government. 8 Both submarines were decommissioned shortly after the war; however, the Canadian Government would not make the same mistake twice regarding the acquisition of submarines. Beginning in the early 1960s, the Canadian Government paved the way for the re- emergence of the Canadian Submarine Service. Unlike the previous disapproval by Parliament in 1914, Prime Minster John Diefenbaker’s Conservative Government supported the re- emergence of the Canadian Submarine Service since “submarines in the hands of an aggressor are more dangerous today then they were in either of the world wars. To meet the challenge, the 4 Dave Perkins, Canada’s Submarines 1914 – 1923 (Erin, ON: Boston Mills Press, 1989), 23. 5 Perkins, Canada’s Submarines, 17. 6 Perkins, Canada’s Submarines, 20 . 7 Perkins, Canada’s Submarines, 17, 19. 8 Perkins, Canada’s Submarines, 23. 2 Royal Canadian Navy now needed its own submarines to improve the existing anti-submarine operational capability.” 9 Furthermore, Pierre Sevigny, Canadian Associate Minister of Defence, outlined the importance of this rebirth because “with the Soviet and satellite navies gaining strength and destructive potential, the threat to the security of the seas has assumed greater and more menacing proportions.” 10 Beginning on the West Coast the first submarine to join the new Canadian submarine squadron was HMCS Grilse , previously the United States Navy submarine named USS Burfish , was commissioned on 11 May 1961. 11 A Second World War Balao class submarine that was designed for operations in the Pacific theatre, HMCS Grilse had electronic weapon systems that were not up to date with current anti-submarine warfare. 12 However, the submarine was in beautiful shape and was further used to attract new recruits to enter the submarine service. 13 Furthermore, HMCS Grilse provided a valuable training role as “clockwork mouse” for the anti- submarine warfare training of all West Coast naval ships as well as the flight crews of 407 Squadron and some U.S. aviators. 14 Since HMCS Grilse was leased from the US Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy returned the submarine after their second five year lease expired; consequently, replacing her with HMCS Rainbow commissioned on 2 December 1968. 15 Formerly USS Argonaut , this Tench class submarine had the necessary anti-submarine warfare electronic weapon systems which HMCS Grilse was lacking. 16 However, when HMCS Rainbow operated her diesel engines on the surface and at periscope depth, the ship was extremely noisy; 9 Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto, On: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 228. 10 Department of Defence, “HMCS Grilse,” The Crowsnest (May 1961), 6. 11 Milner, Canada’s Navy, 228. 12 Milner, Canada’s Navy, 228. 13 Captain Wilfred Lund Interview, 24 October 2008, Victoria BC, 1:12:17. 14 Julie H. Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope: the Story of the Canadian Submarine Service (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, 1995), 257. 15 Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope, 273. 16 Captain Wilfred Lund Interview, 24 October 2008, Victoria BC, 1:12:17. 3 furthermore, Commander Barnes joked that “when Rainbow operated its main engines, either snorkeling or on the surface, the whole Pacific could hear it.” 17 On the East Coast, the Canadian Government approved the construction of three new Oberon Class submarines on 5 November 1963 which were built at the British naval dockyard in Chatham. 18 The three new submarines included: HMCS Ojibwa commissioned on 23 September 1965, which originally was being built as HMS Onyx until the Canadian purchase, HMCS Onondaga commissioned on 22 June 1967, and HMCS Okanagan commissioned on 22 June 1968. 19 The Oberon Class submarine had many advantages such as speed, low noise creation, and electronic systems. Firstly, the Oberon class submarine could achieve speeds up to 18 knots underwater if its batteries were put in series; however, it would use a lot of battery power. 20 Therefore, if the submarine traveled at slow speeds underwater the boat could stay submerged for a couple of days until it had to surface to recharge its batteries. 21 Secondly the Oberon Class submarines were very quiet, as American submariners discovered the hard way during training. The American nuclear powered submarines were noisier than the Canadian’s conventionally powered Oberon class submarines. 22 Thirdly, the Oberon class submarines were equipped with good electronic systems: long range sonar, short range attack sonar, and a Scanner which detected anything close range that was making noise. 23 However, the electronic countermeasures to detect aircraft as well as radar used for navigation were not very reliable. 24 Furthermore, one 17 Commander Lloyd Barnes Interview, 28 October 2008, Victoria BC, 00:47:00. 18 Julie H. Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope: the Story of the Canadian Submarine Service (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, 1995), 265. 19 Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope, 265. 20 Commander Lloyd Barnes Interview, 28 October 2008, Victoria BC, 00:36:23. 21 Commander Lloyd Barnes Interview, 36:23. 22 Commander Lloyd Barnes Interview, 36:23. 23 Commander Lloyd Barnes Interview, 36:23. 24 Commander Lloyd Barnes Interview, 36:23. 4 of the major challenges with the Oberon class submarines was with their habitability. 25 Not only was there little cabin space for sailors to live in, but also the submarines could only produce 700 gallons of water a day which was barely adequate to address the sailors’ needs. 26 Captain Lund summed the situation up well: “it was basic camping in the O-Boats.” 27 However, despite the different challenges of both the American leased submarines and the Canadian owned Oberon class submarines, the thorough and intense training received by Canadian submariners overruled these pitfalls. The thorough and intense training received by Canadian submariners began with basic submarine training courses for both officers and crew. At the time the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy provided two streams of training that both officers and men were sent to, regardless of their personal preference. 28 The Royal Navy Basic Officer Submarine Qualifying Course, which was held in Britain, was far shorter than the US Navy’s course on land; however, more time was spent on board a Royal Navy submarine in order to qualify in submarines. 29 Commander Barnes was sent to the Royal Navy stream and he spent one year with HMS Opossum, where he qualified in submarines in autumn of 1966.30 Captain Lund and Commander Tate both were assigned to the United States Navy stream to complete the Basic Submarine Officer Training Course, which took place in New London, Connecticut. 31 The course lasted six months where students were trained in all sea disciplines; therefore, they had to qualify in areas such as engineering, electrical, weapons, and navigation, to name a few.