Policy Brief PB-16/16 NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue: What Are New Possible Approaches? by Rachid El Houdaigui

Policy Brief PB-16/16 NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue: What Are New Possible Approaches? by Rachid El Houdaigui

June 2016 Policy Brief PB-16/16 NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue: What are new possible approaches? By Rachid El Houdaigui Summary NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) is a forum for cooperation launched in 1994 for non-NATO members from Mediterranean countries. It currently involves Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. The 2004 Istanbul Heads of State NATO Summit gave new impetus to the dialogue by enhancing the level of partner- ship. Since then, many observers note its difficulty to position itself among other political initiatives that are multiply- ing in the Mediterranean. For our part, we argue that despite the imperfections of the MD, it is still an evolving process; like any institutional process, this dialogue is a process following phases and steps with achievements, inconsistencies and limitations that require a common reflection and debate on effective responses to correct defects and improve cooperation. The current context seems favorable for relaunching the • Utility of redefining risks and threats; debate on the MD, with the upcoming NATO summit to • The need to objectify interoperability; be held from July 8 to 9, 2016 in Warsaw, Poland. The • The need for a pooling of efforts for crisis management. objective is to emphasize that the Alliance now cannot refrain from revising its Mediterranean vision for 1. Priority given to reconceptualizing the security, since the Mediterranean is a security emergency and an essential strategic perspective for Europe, the partnership United States and partner countries. The design of the NATO partnership in general and This article is written within this perspective, and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in particular attempts to contextualize the MD according to its variable should be based on a thought pattern that is more geometry. Indeed, the cooperation equation within the geopolitical than functional. It is time to break with MD framework takes into account four dynamics that the essentialist functionalist spirit; this view in each combine and reinforce each other, thereby producing a country or across the Mediterranean’s southern shore: situation that necessitates the relaunch of the partnership A client, device, structure (omitting that this structure framework on new foundations: has a history), geography, constructed policy and social norms. It is true that the MD introduced new principles 1 2 • Priority given to reconceptualizing the partnership; throughout its process: inclusivity and diversity instead 1. "All MD countries should view themselves as stakeholders in the same cooperative work." 2. "The Mediterranean Dialogue respects and takes into account the regional, cultural, and political context of each partner country." 1 OCP Policy Center Policy Brief of imposition3 tailored to each stakeholder. However, in the NATO-Russia tensions and limitations of the the trend is a transposition of cooperation models and MD. Hence, the question of course is whether the programs in a context of a strategic and technological gap. Alliance would refocus on the Euro-Atlantic to make The supply of expertise seems to fit more in a dynamic of it into a global geostrategic pole in front of China and expanding military-technical diagrams oriented toward Russia while maintaining a minimum of partnership an Atlanticist agenda. with its immediate neighborhood, especially in the Mediterranean. Conversely, does NATO really intend to Yet, it can be noted that NATO and its Mediterranean project itself as a global actor? And even if it wanted to, it partners have neither the same perceptions nor the same should first have the capacity and the necessary strategic instruments, and do not necessarily share priorities. The endurance. Either path will shape the configuration of issue of defense modernization, for example, must be relations between NATO and partner countries. understood in the light of the political sphericity of each partner, most of which have not yet started the transition The partnership also will gain in relevance if North Africa, from a volunteer army to a professional army.4 the Maghreb in this case, acquires a minimum of shared views and vision on the form and substance of relations This process eventually installed a kind of division of with NATO; by together addressing the NATO leaders, labor: NATO provides tailored expertise and contributes the partners can present their arguments concerning to the convergence of standards and procedures. the development of the partnership. Meanwhile, for Mediterranean partners are in turn invited to participate geopolitical reasons these countries prefer the bilateral in part in maintaining peace operations. We are therefore format to the multilateral format. facing a kind of outsourcing that involves a transfer of NATO solutions and, in turn, an alignment on NATO 2. Utility of redefining risks and threats security and strategic objectives. The biggest effort of adaptation is to redefine the MD « The objective is to emphasize that the based on a redefinition of the threat in the Mediterranean. Alliance now cannot refrain from revising Indeed, the perception of the threat and its location has its Mediterranean vision for security.» always been oriented towards the southern shore of the Mediterranean, seen as the only source of instability It is not so much a structural strategic imbalance factors. between the two sides of the Mediterranean than it is a Mediterranean situational paradox that distorts « NATO provides tailored expertise and the partnership; the conceptual and operational over- contributes to the convergence of standards expansion of NATO occurs within a context of a and procedures. Mediterranean partners geopolitical contraction of the Mediterranean’s southern are in turn invited to participate in part in shore. maintaining peace operations.» One of the first projects in reconceptualizing the partnership should focus on the level of visibility of one The geopolitical and security changes underway are another’s strategic intentions. beginning to undermine this certainty, so it is legitimate to speak of a threat on multiple scales: just as it is true that The partnership will gain in relevance if NATO clarifies its the threat is changing in nature and geography: stance (that it still seems to hesitate between) : on the one hand, its Euro-Atlantic centrality and collective defense First, tensions between the Western countries and Russia (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) and, on the other, cause strategic threats to resurface. Strengthening NATO's its strategic projection abroad through partnerships and military presence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic military intervention (Afghanistan, Libya) (Article 4 - countries is a perfect example. NATO defense ministers political consultations). The first is a constant because in Brussels adopted dissuasive measures against Russia on February 10, 2016. The objective is to rapidly deploy it is the Alliance’s purpose and identity; the second is a 5 variable or a dynamic full of uncertainties as illustrated ground, air and naval forces in threatened regions. As 3. "The MD countries are free to choose the pace and extent of their 5. NATO reinforces its defense and deterrence position, cooperation with the Alliance; NATO does not intend to impose anything www.nato.int/cps/fr on them." 4. The Royal Armed Forces (FAR) are the only professional army in the Maghreb since a Royal Decree dated August 31, 2006 abolished the conscription. 2 OCP Policy Center Policy Brief such, the United States intends to strengthen its military threat both for Europe and for the Southern shore of the presence in Europe by allocating a budget of $ 3.4 billion Mediterranean, given the ease with which they can travel to the initiative. Transposed to the Mediterranean, this between the two sides, especially in the North-South rivalry seems to manifest with Russia’s diplomatic, sense.7 This situation should place the hybrid threat at strategic and geo-economic return: Will we see a strategic the center of the MD, since the terrorist networks use rebalancing, even as NATO and the Western powers have unconventional means to achieve their goals by taking strategic monopoly in the Mediterranean? It is still early advantage of the structural limits of the States and NATO to make a comprehensive and thorough assessment, as itself. This is one more reason to guide the fight against long as the speed of events fails to enable a clear forecast terrorism towards the strengthening of border control of what configuration will emerge from this dynamic. capacities, cyber defense, and management of terrorist However, preliminary indications highlight Russia's threats, through the transfer of technology solutions to desire to position itself as a regulator and referee of the partners. Mediterranean game, as demonstrated by its role in the Syrian crisis. Lastly, the demographic issue provides a challenge to the Mediterranean and globally because of its strategic « If one pools the security efforts of this consequences in terms of conflict and security. If the dialogue with the economic commitment demographic transition seems underway in the Maghreb of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, an with a fertility rate of 2.3 for Morocco and Tunisia, and 2.7 for Algeria, in the Sahel-Saharan region and in West overall vision and effective management Africa the situation is more complex, if not dramatic, and of the problem could therefore be it will be increasingly so based on UNICEF’s demographic implemented.» projections8: the fertility rate is 7.6 in Niger, about 6.5 in Mali, 6 in Chad, 4.7 in Mauritania, 4.3 in Sudan, and Furthermore, the Southern Mediterranean does not 5.3 in Nigeria. So, according to these forecasts, Niger's yet have a collective mode of governance to guarantee population will increase from 19 million in 2015 to 69 solidarity and a comprehensive treatment of new million in 2050, in 2050 Nigeria will be the third largest asymmetric factors that may cause a crisis. The Libyan globally with 433 million inhabitants, while Egypt could and Malian crises give way to an instability that affects reach a population of 180 million.

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