OBJECTIVE ·· RELEVANT ·· RIGOROUS || JUNE/JULYNOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2018 · VOLUME 2020 11, · ISSUEVOLUME 6 13, ISSUE 11 FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEWFEATURE FROM COMMENTARYTHE CT FOXHOLE TheThe Jihadi Taliban Threat and Biosecurity in the the Struggle for LTC(R)Wake of Bryan COVID-19: Price to Indonesia The Urgent Action Afghanistan FormerNeeded Director, KirstenSeth G.E. JonesSchulze HamishCombating de TerrorismBretton-Gordon Center FEATURE ARTICLE Editor in Chief 1 Afghanistan's Future Emirate? The Taliban and the Struggle for Afghanistan Seth G. Jones Paul Cruickshank Managing Editor FEATURE COMMENTARY Kristina Hummel 11 Biosecurity in the Wake of COVID-19: The Urgent Action Needed Hamish de Bretton-Gordon EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. ANALYSIS Department Head Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) 18 Outlasting the Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State Threat in Africa Jason Warner, Ryan O'Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, and Ryan Cummings Brian Dodwell Director, CTC Don Rassler In this month’s feature article, Seth Jones examines the evolving threat Director of Strategic Initiatives, CTC posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. “The Taliban is in many ways a differ- ent organization from the one that governed Afghanistan in the 1990s. Yet CONTACT most of their leaders are nevertheless committed to an extreme interpretation of Islam that is not shared by many Afghans, an autocratic political system that eschews democracy, and the persistence Combating Terrorism Center of relations with terrorist groups like al-Qa`ida. These realities cast serious doubt about the possibil- U.S. Military Academy ity of a lasting peace agreement with the Afghan government in the near future,” he writes, adding 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall that “without a peace deal, the further withdrawal of U.S. forces—as highlighted in the November 17, 2020, announcement to cut U.S. forces from 4,500 to 2,500 troops—will likely shift the balance of West Point, NY 10996 power in favor of the Taliban. With continuing support from Pakistan, Russia, Iran, and terrorist Phone: (845) 938-8495 groups like al-Qa`ida, it is the view of the author that the Taliban would eventually overthrow the Email: [email protected] Afghan government in Kabul.” Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ In a feature commentary, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon outlines the urgent action needed on biose- curity in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. He writes: “For years, the United States and many oth- er countries have neglected biosecurity because policymakers have underestimated both the potential SUBMISSIONS impact and likelihood of biological threats. COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on the planet and The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions. could be followed by outbreaks of even more dangerous viral diseases. Meanwhile, advances in syn- thetic biology are transforming the potential threat posed by engineered pathogens, creating growing Contact us at [email protected]. concern over biological attacks and bioterror. Given the scale of the threat, biosecurity needs to be a top priority moving forward. Not only do efforts need to be stepped up to try to prevent the next pan- The views expressed in this report are demic (natural or engineered), but resilience needs to be built by developing early warning systems, the capacity to track outbreaks, and medical countermeasures, including ‘next generation’ vaccines.” those of the authors and not of the U.S. He stresses that “winning public acceptance for public health measures will be imperative to tackling Military Academy, the Department of the biological emergencies in the future.” Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, and Ryan Cummings assess the evolution of the Is- Government. lamic State threat across Africa. They write that “the annus horribilis Islamic State Central suffered in 2019, during which the group lost the last stretch of its ‘territorial caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed, does not appear to have had a discernible impact on the Cover: Afghan Taliban fighters and villagers overall operational trajectory of the Islamic State threat in Africa” underscoring “that while connec- attend a gathering in Laghman Province, tions were built up between Islamic State Central and its African affiliates—with the former provid- Alingar district, Afghanistan, on March 2, ing, at times, some degree of strategic direction, coordination, and material assistance—the latter have historically evolved under their own steam and acted with a significant degree of autonomy.” 2020, as they celebrate the peace deal signed between the United States and Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief Taliban. (Wali Sabawoon/NurPhoto via Getty Images) NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2020 CTC SENTINEL 1 Afghanistan’s Future Emirate? The Taliban and the Struggle for Afghanistan By Seth G. Jones the possibility that Afghanistan will once again become a sanctu- With the onset of inter-Afghan peace talks, it is important ary for international terrorism would be a welcome development. to take a close look at the Taliban—including their main It would end several decades of war that has killed over 157,000 objectives, ideological underpinnings, organizational people (including 43,000 civilians) in Afghanistan, created mas- 6 structure, military strategies and tactics, and relationship sive suffering among its population, and decimated its economy. It with state and non-state actors. The Taliban is in many would also allow the United States and other countries to withdraw ways a different organization from the one that governed their military forces and reduce their military and other foreign assistance. After all, the United States has deployed combat forces Afghanistan in the 1990s. Yet most of their leaders are to Afghanistan for nearly two decades (including a peak of over nevertheless committed to an extreme interpretation of 100,000 U.S. troops), spent over $800 billion in military expen- Islam that is not shared by many Afghans, an autocratic ditures and development assistance between 2001 and 2019, and political system that eschews democracy, and the suffered over 2,300 soldiers killed.7 Around the globe and at home, persistence of relations with terrorist groups like al- there are more pressing problems, from countering and recovering Qa`ida. These realities cast serious doubt about the from COVID-19 to competing with major powers like China and possibility of a lasting peace agreement with the Afghan Russia. government in the near future. As this article argues, however, a close look at the Taliban to- day suggests that their leaders remain committed to an extreme religious ideology, an authoritarian political system, and the con- n September 15, 2020, representatives from the Tal- tinuation of relations with militant groups that will not likely be iban and Afghan government gathered in Doha, Qa- acceptable to the current Afghan government, many Afghans, tar, to begin face-to-face peace negotiations. Foreign and many foreign governments. In addition, the United States leaders attending in person and by video conference announced on November 17, 2020, that it would reduce its force lauded the start of peace talks as a historic moment.1 posture in Afghanistan from 4,500 to 2,500 troops.8 These reali- But the Taliban’s reaction was more subdued. The Taliban’s senior ties make a lasting peace agreement with the Afghan government O negotiator, Mawlawi Abdul Hakim Haqqani, sat hunched in his unlikely in the near future. In this author’s view, a precipitous U.S. chair in the grand ballroom, hardly looking at the video screen and withdrawal without a peace agreement between the Taliban and refusing to put on a translation headset even though the speeches Afghan government would be highly destabilizing and would ulti- were in English (a language he does not speak).2 Perhaps the Tali- mately undermine U.S. national security interests. ban had a point. The history of intrastate wars is littered with failed To examine the Taliban today, the rest of this article is divided peace attempts.3 Since World War II, nearly three-quarters of insur- into several sections. The first outlines the Taliban’s ideology and gencies have ended because of a military victory by the government objectives, including in historical context. The second section exam- or insurgent side on the battlefield, and only a quarter have ended ines the Taliban’s organizational structure. The third analyzes the because of political negotiations or other factors.4 Afghanistan itself Taliban’s military strategy and tactics. The fourth section explores is a graveyard of failed peace talks.5 the Taliban’s relationship with other militant groups, including These challenges raise important questions. Among the most al-Qa`ida. The fifth assesses the Taliban’s links with the govern- important—and the focus of this article—are the following: Who ments of other countries, such as Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. Finally, are the Taliban today? What are their main objectives, ideological the sixth section outlines implications of this analysis for peace talks underpinnings, organizational structure, military strategies and and the future of Afghanistan. tactics, and relationships with state and non-state actors? Based on answers to these questions, what are the implications for peace Ideology and Objectives negotiations? The Taliban’s ideology is deeply rooted in Hanafi school of Islamic An agreement with the Taliban that ends the war and decreases jurisprudence.9 While the ideology of the Taliban has been evolv- ing since the movement’s establishment in the 1990s, Taliban lead- ers today generally support the establishment of a government Seth G. Jones is the Harold Brown Chair and Director of Transna- by sharia (‘Islamic’ law) and the creation of an “Islamic Emirate” tional Threats at the Center for Strategic and International Stud- in Afghanistan.10 The Taliban elevate the role of Islamic scholars ies (CSIS), as well as the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: (ulema) that issue legal rulings (fatwas) on all aspects of daily life.