Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 11-19-2019 2:30 PM Modes of Argumentation in Aristotle's Natural Science Adam W. Woodcox The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Henry, Devin The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Adam W. Woodcox 2019 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Woodcox, Adam W., "Modes of Argumentation in Aristotle's Natural Science" (2019). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 6769. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/6769 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract Through a detailed analysis of the various modes of argumentation employed by Aristotle throughout his natural scientific works, I aim to contribute to the growing scholarship on the relation between Aristotle’s theory of science and his actual scientific practice. I challenge the standard reading of Aristotle as a methodological empiricist and show that he permits a variety of non-empirical arguments to support controversial theses in properly scientific contexts. Specifically, I examine his use of logical (logikôs) argumentation in the discussion of mule sterility in Generation of Animals II 8, rational (kata ton logon) argumentation in his discussion of cardiocentrism throughout the biological works, and the method of division in Posterior Analytics II 13. Summary for Lay Audiences The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle relied on information gained through the senses to guide his scientific theorizing about many subjects, including the motions of the heavenly bodies and the behaviour of animals. Focusing on a few examples drawn from a variety of Aristotle's scientific works, I argue that he also relied on reason. We see perception and reason at play in Aristotle's investigations of reproduction, the role of the heart in animal life, and scientific definitions. Keywords Aristotle, natural philosophy, rationalism, empiricism, argumentation, cardiocentrism, scientific method, epistemology, scientific inquiry, Plato i For Mary ii Acknowledgements I would like to thank first and foremost my supervisor, Dr. Devin Henry, for his encouragement and guidance throughout this project. From our early meetings on the Posterior Analytics to more recent discussions of the Metaphysics, I have always been challenged to think for myself and develop my own views independently of the orthodoxy—so long as those views can be supported by the text. Thanks also to my supervisory committee, Dr. John Thorp and Dr. Lorne Falkenstein. A special thanks is due to Dr. Thorp, whose reading groups and “Greek Gang” meetings were foundational to the community of ancient scholarship during my time at Western. I am grateful to Dr. Mariska Leunissen, Dr. C. D. C. Reeve, and the Department of Philosophy at UNC–Chapel Hill for hosting me during the Winter of 2018. I received helpful comments on earlier drafts of this material from Dr. Leunissen, Dr. Reeve, Dr. Joseph Karbowski, and audiences at meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association, the Classical Association of Canada, and the Canadian Colloquium for Ancient Philosophy. Thanks also to my colleagues and friends for discussions of much of this material: Cecilia Li, Justin Bzovy, Matt Watton, Dan Coren, Mike Korngut, Jamie Shaw, and many others; to my mother Carolyn, my father Bill, and my brother Nathan for their unconditional support and encouragement throughout this process; and to the lovely Joshuelle Solomon for her joyful disposition and enduring optimism. This project was funded by a fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. iii Table of Contents Abstract i Dedication ii Acknowledgements iii 0 Introduction 0.0 Introduction 1 0.1 The Dual Knowledge Criterion in the Early Commentators 6 0.2 Outline 10 1 Two Kinds of Proof in Aristotle’s Natural Science 1.0 Introduction 12 1.1 The Many Senses of Source 16 1.2 Cardiocentrism in De Iuventute 18 1.2.1 Perceptual Arguments in De Iuv. 20 1.2.2 Rational Arguments in De Iuv. 23 1.3 Cardiocentrism in Parts of Animals III 4 31 1.4 Cardiocentrism in Generation of Animals II 4-5 40 1.5 Perceptual Argumentation 44 1.5.1 De Caelo II 14: The Sphericity of the Earth 48 1.6 Conclusion 51 2 Logikôs Argumentation in Aristotle’s Natural Science 2.0 Introduction 55 2.1.1 Introducing the Problêmata 60 2.1.2 Explaining Sterility Generally 63 2.2 Explaining Sterility in Mules 64 2.3 Aristotle’s Logikôs Demonstration 71 2.4 Aristotle’s Preferred Explanation 82 2.5 Positive Uses of Logikôs Reasoning 86 2.6 Conclusion 94 2.7 Appendix 95 3 The Hunt for Definitions: Posterior Analytics II 13 3.0 Introduction 98 3.1 APo II 5 and the Critique of Division 100 3.2 The Context of The Hunt 102 3.3 The Method for Hunting the Infima Species 103 3.4 Division and Order: 96b26-97a6 105 3.5 Three Rules for Dividing: 97a23-b6 107 3.6 The Problem of Homonymy: 97b6-25 109 3.7 Conclusion 110 4 Conclusion 112 iv 0.0 INTRODUCTION There has been a longstanding debate about the relation between Aristotle’s theory of science and his actual scientific practice. This debate usually centers on the question of how Aristotle’s views on the nature of scientific knowledge, as presented in the Posterior Analytics, line up with the his natural-scientific works. For instance, scholars raise many issues surrounding the role of demonstration, which is front and centre in Book One of APo. but almost absent elsewhere in the corpus. Similar questions are raised about Aristotle’s theory of definition, which is presented in Book Two of APo. and seems to guide much of his enquiry into nature. I aim to contribute to the debate surrounding the relation between Aristotle’s theory and practice, but I take a less comparative approach than most. On the comparative approach, we take the theory presented in the Posterior Analytics to represent Aristotle’s theory of science, and then see how it applies (or fails to apply) to other parts of the corpus, namely the natural-scientific works wherein we find Aristotle practicing science. Although the comparative approach can be very valuable, it is not the only way to address the question of the relation between Aristotle’s theory and practice of science. We often find Aristotle declaring his commitment to certain theoretical standards or ideals in his natural-scientific works, or indeed employing a certain standard without ever explicitly defending it—as we find, for instance, in his use of rational and perceptual argumentation in his defence of cardiocentrism and elsewhere. Through a detailed analysis of the various modes of argumentation employed by Aristotle throughout his natural scientific works, I aim to contribute to the scholarship on the relation between Aristotle’s theory of science and his actual scientific practice. 1 Specifically, I consider what kinds of argumentation are permissible in scientific contexts, focusing especially on his use of, rational (kata ton logon) argumentation in his discussion of cardiocentrism throughout the biological works, logical (logikôs) argumentation in the discussion of mule sterility in Generation of Animals II 8, and the method of division in Posterior Analytics II 13. I challenge the standard reading of Aristotle as a thoroughgoing methodological empiricist and show that he permits a variety of non-empirical arguments to support controversial theses in properly scientific domains. Throughout his natural-scientific works, Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes that we should give pride of place to empirical evidence when we are constructing scientific theories. He admonishes the Platonists for relying on arguments in the absence of observation and argues that theories ought to conform to the facts. This attitude is apparent in a number of texts. For instance, Aristotle begins his investigation in De Motu Animalium by invoking the principle that movement requires something at rest. The necessity of something being at rest for movement on a cosmic scale has already been established in the discussion of eternal motion in Physics VIII with reference to the Prime Mover. But Aristotle now aims to establish that this principle holds too in the case of animal motion, where the role of the unmoved mover is filled by the joint, so that as the limb moves the joint remains at rest. [T1] “And we must grasp this not only generally in theory, but also by reference to individuals in the world of sense; for with these in view we seek general theories, and with these we believe that general theories ought to harmonize.” (De Motu 1, 698a11-14)1 δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, δι’ ἅπερ καὶ τοὺς καθόλου ζητοῦμεν λόγους, καὶ ἐφ’ ὧν ἐφαρμόττειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς. 1 Trans. A. S. L. Farquharson (1984). 2 The discussion of the Prime Mover in Physics VIII allowed us to grasp the principle in question ‘by reason’ (τῷ λόγῳ). Presumably, Aristotle would identify the argument offered in support of this conclusion as an instance of rational argumentation. Since the investigation in De Motu turns to the common cause of all kinds of animal motion (whether flying, swimming, or walking), the same principle is now shown to hold of animal motion via perceptual argumentation (the nature of which will be discussed in Chapter 1). Importantly, Aristotle here claims that we should seek general theories that are in harmony with the perceptual phenomena; we should not allow our antecedent theories to bias our observations, but rather should let the facts lead us to our theories.