UNDERSTANDING SMALL INFANTRY UNIT BEHAVIOUR AND COHESION: THE CASE OF THE SCOTS GUARDS AND THE ARGYLL AND SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS (PRINCESS LOUISE'S) IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1971-1972 Edward Burke A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2016 Full metadata for this item is available in Research@StAndrews:FullText at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/8507 This item is protected by original copyright This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Licence Understanding Small Infantry Unit Behaviour and Cohesion: The Case of The Scots Guards and The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise’s) in Northern Ireland, 1971-1972 Edward Burke This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews Date of Submission 30/6/15 1 2 Abstract This is the first such study of Operation Banner: taking three Battalions as case studies, drawing upon extensive interviews with former soldiers, primary archival sources including unpublished diaries, this thesis closely examines soldiers’ behaviour at the small infantry-unit level (Battalion downwards), including the leadership, cohesion, orientation and motivation that sustained, restrained and occasionally obstructed soldiers in Northern Ireland. It contends that there are aspects of wider scholarly literatures - from sociology, anthropology, criminology, and psychology - that can throw new light on our understanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland. The thesis will also contribute fresh insights and analysis of important events during the early years of Operation Banner, including the murders of two men in County Fermanagh, Michael Naan and Andrew Murray, and that of Warrenpoint hotel owner Edmund Woolsey in South Armagh in the autumn of 1972. The central argument of this thesis is that British Army small infantry units enjoyed considerable autonomy during the early years of Operation Banner and could behave in a vengeful, highly aggressive or benign and conciliatory way as their local commanders saw fit. The strain of civil-military relations at a senior level was replicated operationally – as soldiers came to resent the limitations of waging war in the UK. The unwillingness of the Army’s senior leadership to thoroughly investigate and punish serious transgressions of standard operating procedures in Northern Ireland created uncertainty among soldiers over expected behaviour and desired outcomes. Mid-ranking officers and NCOs often played important roles in restraining soldiers in Northern Ireland. The degree 3 of violence used in Northern was much less that that seen in the colonial wars fought since the end of World War II. But overly aggressive groups of soldiers could also be mistaken for high-functioning units – with negative consequences for the Army’s overall strategy in Northern Ireland. 4 Table of Contents Introduction Page 12 1. The Enduring Corporate Values and Experiences of the Scots Guards and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiments Prior to their Deployment to Northern Ireland 45 i. The British Army Before 1971 46 ii. The Regimental System in the British Army 52 iii. Training and Preparing for War Before Operation Banner 57 iv. The Scots Guards (1963 – 1970) 63 v. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (1963 – 1970) 67 vi. Conclusion 78 2. The Political and Operational Environment in Northern Ireland, 1969-1972 82 i. The Political and Operational Context 83 ii. The Social Environment: Interactions with the Local Population 119 iii. Conclusion 140 3. The Experiences of the Scots Guards and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiments from 1971 to 1972: Understanding Unit Culture, Combat and Cohesion 145 i. Who’s in Charge? Levels of Authority and Charisma in the Battalion 146 5 ii. Soldiers as Victims Page 174 iii. Discipline and Shifting Attitudes Towards the Local Population 184 iv. Retribution: ‘Giving Some back’ 201 v. Intelligence 221 vi. Combat 229 vii. Conclusion 251 4. Murder 260 i. The Killing of Michael Naan and Andrew Murray 264 ii. Fermanagh Goes to War: Internecine Suspicion and Atrocity in 1972 276 iii. Prelude to Murder: A Breakdown in Command and Intelligence 281 iv. Conclusion 287 5. Conclusion 295 Bibliography 305 Appendix 1 - Chronology of main events during the Scots Guards and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders tour of Northern Ireland (1971-1972) 339 Appendix 2 - Research Ethical Approval Form 363 Appendix 3 - Project Description to Interviewees 364 Appendix 4 - Interview Guidelines / Commitment to Interviewees 366 6 Abbreviations 1 Argylls - 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 1 GREN GDS - 1st Battalion, Grenadier Guards 1 Scots Guards/1 SG - 1st Battalion, Scots Guards 2 Light Infantry - 2nd Battalion, The Light Infantry 2 Scots Guards/2 SG - 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards 3 Brigade - 3rd Infantry Brigade 8 Brigade - 8th Infantry Brigade 16/5 Lancers - 16th/5th The Queen’s Royal Lancers 22 SAS - 22nd Special Air Service Regiment 39 Brigade - 39th Infantry Brigade ASH - The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders ASU - IRA Active Service Unit ATO - Ammunition Technical Officer AVRE - Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers BAOR - British Army On the Rhine CO - Commanding Officer CSM - Company Sergeant Major DAC - Divisional Action Committees DPP - Director of Public Prosecutions CLFNI - Commander Land Forces Northern Ireland COPFS - Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service - Scotland CPA - Conservative Party Archives, Oxford University 7 CRD - Conservative Research Department CSM - Company Sergeant Major DEFE - Ministry of Defence File Series, National Archives Gdsmn - Guardsman GOC - General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland GPMG - General Purpose Machine Gun GSW - Gun-Shot Wound HET - Historical Enquiries Team HQNI - Headquarters Northern Ireland HV - High Velocity (Shot) IED - Improvised Explosive Device INTSUM - Intelligence Summary IRA - Provisional Irish Republican Army LF - Left Flank LMG - Light Machine gun MACP - Military Aid to the Civil Power MAI - Military Archives of Ireland, Cathal Brugha Barracks MC - Military Cross MI5 - Security Service MI6 - Secret Intelligence Service MoD - Ministry of Defence MRF - Military Reaction Force NAI - National Archives of Ireland NAS - National Archives of Scotland 8 NICRA - Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association NCO - Non-Commissioned Officer NIO - Northern Ireland Officer NITAT - Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Teams OBE - Order of the British Empire OC - Officer Commanding OIRA - Official Irish Republican Army OP - Observation Post PHC1 - Prisoner Holding Centre 1 (Holywood Barracks) PRONI - Public Record Office of Northern Ireland PSNI - Police Service of Northern Ireland QRF - Quick Reaction Force RF - Right Flank RMAS - Royal Military Academy Sandhurst RMASH - Regimental Museum of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders RMP - Royal Military Police RSDG - Royal Scots Dragoon Guards RSM - Regimental Sergeant Major RVH - Royal Victoria Hospital RUC - Royal Ulster Constabulary SAS - Special Air Service SBS - Special Boat Squadron 9 SIB - Special Investigation Branch SDLP - Social Democratic and Labour Party Sitrep - Situation Report SMG - Submachine gun SSNI - Secretary of State for Northern Ireland TAC HQ - Tactical Headquarters TNA - The National Archives, Kew UDA - Ulster Defence Association UDR - Ulster Defence Regiment USC - Ulster Special Constabulary UUC - Ulster Unionist Council UUP - Ulster Unionist Party UVF - Ulster Volunteer Force UWC - Ulster Workers Council VBIED - Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device WO - War Office 10 Acknowledgements I am indebted to my Supervisor, Professor Richard English, for the excellent guidance and encouragement he has given me over three years. I am also grateful to my Second Supervisor, Dr. Sibylle Scheipers, for her very valuable insights and advice. Dr. Tim Wilson has also provided a wealth of information and advice. A number of people at the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) and the wider School of International Relations, including Julie Middleton and Gillian Duncan, have been rocks of professionalism and sound advice. My fellow PhD candidates, Nick Brooke, Tone Danielsen, Dr. Kieran McConaghy, Dr. Connal Parr, Roger Warren and Shane Drennan have also offered companionship and illuminating feedback on various drafts of this thesis. I have also received a lot of guidance from outside the University of St. Andrews including from, among others, Professor Sönke Neitzel, Professor Simon Wessely, Dr. Jan Honig, Dr. Huw Bennett, Professor Peter Jackson, Professor Anthony King and Professor Graham Walker. At PRONI Lynsey Gillespie and her colleagues were always polite and helpful. The Military Archives of Ireland at Cathal Brugha Barracks in Dublin diligently helped me sift through the Archives of the Irish Defence Forces and the Department of Defence. I am very grateful to the staff of the libraries of the University of St. Andrews and Queen’s University Belfast for their constant support during my research. The Scots Guards Association, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Association, the Regimental Museum of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, the Regimental Headquarters of the Scots Guards at Wellington Barracks in London and Bishop Edward Daly have all been exceptionally helpful to my research. I am especially grateful to all those who made themselves available for interview – I enjoyed the company of these soldiers immensely.