RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL FOR THE CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND Frank Kakungu Working Paper No. 13 December 2013 © Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research 2013 i Abstract Detailed information on the location of those with the greatest need for publicly provided social services may be the most valuable information policy makers could use to allocate resources, plan and budget. More often than not, the emphasis has been on evaluating the distribution of poverty, as defined by income insufficiency, to inform resource allocation. Theoretically, measures of household wealth can be reflected by income, consumption or expenditure information. However, the collection of accurate income and consumption data requires extensive resources for household surveys. As regards, it may be more appropriate to focus on relative material and social deprivation than narrowly defined poverty. More importantly when one wants to evaluate the distribution of relative disadvantaged status between quite small geographic areas (e.g. Constituency), it is best to use data derived from the census, given that it is the most inclusive and representative of all household surveys. More overall, income from surveys are measures more reflective of short-run household’s wealth or living standard, inadequate for estimating long-run poverty accurately whereas other socio-economic and demographic census variables are regarded as much more reliable to estimate long-run deprivation. The research reported on in this paper has calculated a composite index of deprivation using 2010 Census data, drawing on the experience of similar initiatives in other countries and using internationally accepted statistical techniques. This index shows that the socio-demographic variables that have the greatest influence on deprivation in the Zambian Constituencies are: lack of access to piped water and toilets, traditional dwelling whose material for walls, roofs and floor are not solid, lack of access to electricity, solar power, gas or bio fuel, living in a female headed household, being a child under the age of 5 years, being illiterate, and being unemployed youth. The deprivation index was calculated at the constituency level. The highest levels of deprivation are experienced in the Sinkongo, Luapula, Lukulu-West, Sinjembela and Zambezi-West constituencies. To equalize development across the country there is need for policy intervention to re-allocate more resources in these need areas. The analysis shows that deprivation is skewed to rural dominated constituencies. i Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. (i) Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................. (ii) 1.0. Background ............................................................................................................................................. 1 2.0. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 2 3.0. Key Concepts and Literature .................................................................................................................. 3 3.1. Measures of Needs – How is Deprivation Measured? ........................................................................... 3 3.2. Literature Review .................................................................................................................................... 5 4.0. Methodology ........................................................................................................................................... 5 4.1. Initial Identification of Variables for possible inclusion in the PCA ................................................... 5 4.2. Finalising the variables for inclusion in the PCA .................................................................................. 7 4.3. Identifying the Principal Component or main Factor .......................................................................... 8 4.4. Calculating the Composite Index .......................................................................................................... 9 5.0. Results-Factors predicting Deprivation .................................................................................................. 9 6.0. Classification of Constituencies into Quintiles ................................................................................... 10 7.0. Deprivation and Resource Allocation .................................................................................................. 11 8.0. CDF Allocation Formula ...................................................................................................................... 11 9.0. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 12 References ........................................................................................................................................ 13 Appendices.................................................................................................................................. 14-18 ii 1. Background The Constituency Development Fund, CDF, was established in Zambia in 1995. Under this arrangement, Government allocates funds on an annual basis to all constituencies through the Member of Parliament. The purpose of the fund is to empower local communities by providing a fund for health, education and other initiatives. The CDF is not unique to Zambia. It was probably pioneered by the Federal Government of India in 1993. In the Indian example, each MP, is given an equal amount of money from the Central Government to spend on eligible projects in Constituencies of their choice. This includes all MPs, both elected and nominated. A list of eligible and ineligible projects is given on which the MP may authorize expenditure to any part of the constituency or district of their choice. The MP may however, as case maybe, also authorize utilization of part of the fund elsewhere, outside the constituency, if necessary. To date at least 23 countries have adopted or are considering adopting CDFs: In Africa CDFs are implemented in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Liberia, Rwanda and Zambia, among others. It has been argued that CDFs can address a number of development and governance challenges that many countries face. They purportedly: Ensure project delivery in the face of ineffective and corrupt local government structures; Bypass central bureaucracies and channel funding directly to community level, enable the participation of the local population in the choice of which local infrastructure is delivered; Empower the legislature by allowing them to allocate and spend money independently of the executive; and Allow MPs to respond directly to concrete demands from their constituents, something that they may not be powerful enough to make the executive do. These arguments in favour of CDF are appealing, yet there are many critics of CDFs, as well. Though CDFs have made the headlines largely because of corruption and political manipulation associated with them, there are three more fundamental deficiencies built into the design of these schemes. CDFs may breach the key democratic principle of the separation of power by conferring the executive function of budget execution on the legislature. As a result of this breach, CDFs may compromise the ability of legislatures to represent the electorate and to oversee the work of the executive. By skewing resource allocation and project selection and oversight, CDFs also may have a negative impact on governments’ capacity to contribute to service delivery and development, especially at the local government level. CDFs are increasingly significant tools for politicized and decentralised resource allocation. Their popularity may stem from their performance of a function not otherwise supplied by the existing administrative-political system. As in the case of earmarks in the US, CDFs could fill the holes for things that fall between the cracks. But, the enormous potential for abuse in the operations of CDFs creates a significant challenge for policy makers and scholars to devise norms, rules and procedures for the effective operation of these increasingly important policy tools. 1 2. Introduction CDFs are distinguished from other decentralization initiatives or community-based development programmes by virtue of being raised by national government and disbursed at local level through the constituency and provides MPs some degree of control over the spending and earmarking of funds to development projects which reflect local needs and preferences. However, other factors have a direct bearing on the performance of the CDF scheme. The disbursement of an equal quantum of funding per constituency has equity concerns because constituencies are not equal. This favours smaller, least populated constituencies against greatly populated and or the poorest – where needs are greatest. The blanket allocation of CDFs across the country, without recourse to policy targets underscores national failure to address pertinent policy concerns. This is unfortunately the case now. According to a study commissioned by the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ), the CDF was described as a ‘one-size-fits-all’