June 7, 1972 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 20121 Baird, Dale L. Dowell, Frederick L. Howard, Sylvester Mouton, Joseph INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND; INTERNA­ Barinea.u, Richard L. Dunbar, George H. Hunnicutt, Thomas Newman, Billy R . TIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEVEL­ Barron, Bonie P. Eckman, George M. Hurst, Charles E. Palmquist, Charles J. OPMENT; INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT Baseley, Jacque A. Egbert, Carroll F., Jr. Jackson, Albert P. Parrish, John W. BANK; AND AsiAN DEVELOPMENT BANK Belville, Arthur J., Jr. Eldredge, Frederick Jenkins, Robert Payne, Walter A., Sr. George P. Shultz, of Illinois, for appoint- Bergeron, Joseph W., R., Jr. Jiminez, Francis Scraggy, Gene A. ment to the ofllces indicated: Sr. Estey, Howard E. Johnson, John W. Seagroves, Ronald G. U.S. Governor of the International Mone­ Birren, James M. Faircloth, Jeris L. Johnson, Robert B. Sellers, Walter S. tary Fund for a term of 5 years and U.S. Bolles, Elmer S. Farr, Roland C. Jordan, Robert T. Sherry, Guy R. Governor of the International Bank for Re­ Brakowiecki, LaurenceFitzgerald, Joseph T., Justis, Forest W. Smiley, Perry construction and Development for a term of 5 years. R. J~ Kldd, Arthur J. Snodgrass, Nathan iel A Governor of the Inter-American Devel­ Brewington, Robert E.Flowers, Percy Kiker, Meek C. L. opment Bank for a term Of 5 years; and Broughton, Frankie D.Ford, Billy J. Kingry, Thomas E. Spangler, Tommy L. U.S. Governor of the Asian Development Bryant, Edward L. Geer, Robert W. Kistler, Ernest J. Surles, Charles T. Bank. Carr, JayS., II Giger, John R . Kolek, David L. Thompson, Leon R. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Ledford, William H. Vaughn, James Carr, William W. Griflln, Charles L. Carroll G. Brunthaver, of Ohio, to be an Carter, Wallace M. Gwinn, Robert P. Liebl, Luitpold J. Vessey, Arnold F. Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, vice Clar­ Cheely, Benjamin L. Halburnt, James C. Lile, Brian K. Webster, Lawrence E. ence D. Palmby, resigned. Collins, Melvin Haley, Dale A. Loy, Lloyd L. Whipple, William L. Carroll G. Brunthaver, of Ohio, to be a Condrey, Jimmy W. Hallbick, Larry J. Luchansky, George J. White, Llewellyn S. Member of the Board of Directors of the Corbett , Edward F. Harkless, James J. Lundberg, Frank c. Whitehead, Otis J. Commodity Credit Corporation, vice Clarence Critzer, Roger A. Harpe, Charles W. Lynch, John F. Widenhouse, Robert D. Palmby, resigned. Cuddy, Raymond S., Hashagen, Donald J. Ma.chado, Louis E. w. BOARD OF PAROLE Mannix, James W. Jr. Hastings, Sidney T. Williams, Robert G. Maurice H. Sigler, of Nebraska, to be Mem­ Curry, Carl R. Heatley, George Mattox, Chester C. Wilson, Eugene S. ber of the Board of Parole for the term ex­ Day, Lawrence M. Hicks, Robert McDuflle, Don C. Witham, Merton T. piring September 30, 1978. Mr. Sigler is now Dolphin, John J. Hinchliffe, Herbert C. Meagher, Gregory F., Wolf, Donald E. serving in this position under an appoint­ Donelow, Robert L. Hinman, Rex L. Jr. Young, Paul M., Jr. ment which expires September 30, 1972. EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY Then in 1957 the United States intro­ currently lacks a worldwide marit ime capa­ duced the A3D aircraft on our aircraft bility. HON. MIKE GRAVEL carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean. I ask unanimous consent that the Since these planes could reach Russia's study be printed in the RECORD. OF ALASKA industrial areas the Russians felt they There being no objection, the study IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES had to counter our carriers in the Med­ was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, Wednesday, June 7, 1972 iterranean for defensive purposes. When as follows: we later put Polaris submarines in the Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I should SOVIET NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS Mediterranean this gave them another (By Michael MccGwire) like to place in the RECORD a study on reason to be there. Mr. MccGwire illus­ the Russian NaVY by Michael MccGwire, trates this by saying: Most qualified opinion is in fact agreed a former commander in the British NaVY The greatly increased range of sea-borne on the essentially defensive requirements and naval attache in Moscow. The title strategic weapons has meant that the eastern which caused the Soviet Union to develop its of this study is "Soviet Naval Capabilities basin of the Mediterranean is now in many present naval capability, although there is a ways of greater defensive concern to the wider range of opinion as to where this may and Intentions." lead them in the future. All are also agreed I would like to summarize some of the SOviet Union than her northern seas. Mos­ that, irrespective of its genesis, growing So­ main points of this report. First, Mr. cow is equidistant between the two, but viet naval strength presents a potential MccGwire says the West has given the whereas population and industry thin out threat to Western interests, which must be Russians propaganda advantages by to the north of the capital, to its south and countered. But starting from these points east lies the greater pa~t of Russia's indus­ overstating the threat in the Mediter­ of agreement, opinion then divides into two trial strength. It seems probable that the broad groups. There are those who see the ranean. The author speculates that this 1963 announcement that Polaris submarines great est danger to the West, in a democ­ may have been done to create myths were taking up station in the Mediterranean, racy's reluctance to provide adequate re­ similar to the bomber and missile gaps caused the Soviet Navy to advance its plans sources to long-term defence in peacetime, for the purpose of expediting funds to project a naval presence in the area. and who therefore tend to formulate the through Congress. Mr. MccGwire states This is a classical case of the spiraling threat in extreme terms, both of m111tary that- arms race. capability and aggressive intentions, in or­ By ignoring the "most likely course of der to frighten the politicians into releas­ Concerning the value of our huge car­ ing adequate funds to naval defence. And enemy action," and by concentrating our riers, Mr. MccGwire says: attention solely on some hypothetical "worst there are others who consider that more cer­ case," based on a rather flattering estimate As sufllcient nuclear submarines armed tain damage to Western interests has been, of Soviet naval capabilities and an implied with horizon-range missiles become avail­ and will be caused by alarmist assessments absence of Western reaction, we undermine able for the task, it seems likely that West­ (however worthy their motives) which ex­ ern strike carriers will be marked wherever aggerate Russian maritime capabilities and our own maritime credibility while encour­ they may be. ignore the considerable constraints which aging the Soviet Union to develop a taste for limit the flexible employment of Soviet na­ sea power, and to fulfill our most gloomy It is the belief of many naval experts val forces. prophesies. that the aircraft carrier is now obsolete I hold unreservedly to this latter opinion, The basic strategy of the Soviet Naval due to the cruise missile. The new Rus­ and it is not because I under-rate the very forces is the "Young School" concept sian C class cruise missile system would real threat to Western interests which 1s adopted in the early thirties of only de­ be very dangerous against carriers, be­ implicit in Soviet naval strength nor be­ cause I am persuaded of their friendly in­ fending their maritime frontiers and not cause of its submerged launch, super­ tentions. My reasons are twofold. Firstly, ex­ ruling the waves. The first two tasks of sonic speed, and surface-skimming tra­ perience as a long-range planner has shown the Soviet Navy are: jectory. me the dangers of 'fiddling the factors' in 1. Countering the Polaris submarine. But once out of the Russian frontier order to produce some predetermined con­ 2. To neutralize the strike attack aircraft area, Mr. MccGwire feels Soviet capa­ clusion, and how in the long run it always carriers prior to aircraft launch. rebounds to one's disadvantage; in formu­ bilities fall off: lating a threat which wm persuade the pol­ The main defense areas are the Baltic The Soviet Navy does not have the capa­ iticians, we run the risk of obscuring our and Black Seas. It was from these areas city to sustain general naval operations in own perception of the real danger to West­ that the Western Powers intervened by a hostile maritime environment at a dis­ ern maritime interests, and at the same time sea in an attempt to crush the revolution. tance from Russia's shores. The Soviet Union we are likely to distort our wider foreign CXVlli--1268-Part 16 20122 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS June 7, 1972 policy assessments. And secondly, I have both her capability and her readiness to use were adapted to build the Moskva Class anti­ watched the way in which alarmist. and fre­ force. There is a perverse community of in­ submarine cruiser. These were mainly interim quently ill-informed Western comment has terest between Russia's desire to obscure measures, a.nd the final answer had to await brought Russia political benefits, which the her naval inadequacies and the West's con­ the third generation of nuclear submarines, Soviet Navy could never have achieved on cern to guard against overcomplacency. Nat­ which were projected at this time and due its own. urally enough, the Soviet Union welcomes for delivery in 1968. These would include a Over the last three years, there has teen the Western amplifier which is now plugged nuclear missile system with a self-contained a marked and substantial shift in the Soviet into her naval propaganda machine, whose horizon-range missile system for use against Union's political exploitation of her navy's authoritative voice helps to compensate for the carrier and a much improved Polaris enforced forward deployment; this stems the sometimes glaring shortfall between her style SSBN.