City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Graduate Student Publications and Research CUNY Academic Works 2015 The Two Indexical Uses Theory of Proper Names and Frege's Puzzle Daniel S. Shabasson CUNY Graduate Center How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_studentpubs/18 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] THE TWO INDEXICAL USES THEORY OF PROPER NAMES AND FREGE’S PUZZLE Daniel Shabasson [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT: To solve Frege’s puzzle, I develop a novel theory of proper names, the “Two Indexical Uses Theory” of proper names (the “TIUT”), according to which proper names are used as indexicals. I distinguish two types of indexical uses: (1) ‘Millian’ uses on which a proper name merely refers (contributing its referent alone to the proposition expressed); and (2) ‘Conception-indicating’ uses on which a proper name both refers and conveys the speaker’s “conception of” or “way of taking” the referent at the moment s/he utters the name (contributing both referent and conception to the proposition expressed). Unlike Millianism, the TIUT is consistent with speaker intuitions about cognitive value vis-à-vis Frege’s puzzle about identity sentences and is consistent with speaker intuitions about truth-value vis-à-vis Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions. Unlike Descriptivism, the TIUT is not vulnerable to Kripke’s modal, epistemic, or semantic arguments because on the TIUT proper names are always used as rigid designators and lack descriptive meanings—instead possessing character (the sort of meaning borne by indexicals). Among theories of proper names, the TIUT is uniquely able to explain how co-referential name pairs such as ‘Clark Kent’/‘Superman’ can simultaneously have the following three properties: (a) rigidity, (b) lack of descriptive meaning, and (c) difference in semantic content. The TIUT explains the difference in cognitive value between identity sentences such as ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ by demonstrating that they may be used to semantically express different propositions with identical modal profiles (unlike Descriptivism, according to which they would have different modal profiles). The TIUT explains the difference in truth-value intuited by ordinary speakers between propositional attitude ascriptions such as ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies’ and ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman flies’ by demonstrating that they may be used to semantically express different propositions genuinely differing in truth-value, the former false and the latter true. The TIUT also solves Kripke’s puzzle by explaining how a rational and reflective agent might simultaneously believe P and ⌐P and why one may accurately and without inconsistency ascribe the belief both that P and that ⌐P to that agent. Hence, we may accurately and without inconsistency report Peter as both believing that Paderewski had musical talent and believing that he did not. KEYWORDS: Frege’s puzzle, proper names, indexicals, cognitive value, Millianism, Descriptivism, Kripke’s puzzle ©2015 DANIEL SHABASSON All Rights Reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………... ii 1 THE PUZZLES TO BE SOLVED 1.1 Frege’s Puzzle(s)……………………………………………….................………... 1 1.2 The Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief………………….…………………… 12 2 THE TWO INDEXICAL USES THEORY OF PROPER NAMES AND ITS SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLES 2.1 The Two Uses of Proper Names………………………………………………….... 16 2.2 Definitions: “Dossier Tokens,” “Dossier Types,” “Subjects” …………………...... 24 2.3 Names Used in a ‘Millian’ Way…………………………………………………… 32 2.4 Names Used in a ‘Conception-Indicating’ Way…………………………………… 33 2.5 Names are Rigid Designators on the TIUT……………………................................ 37 2.6 Solution to Frege’s Puzzle about Informative Identity Sentences…………………. 38 2.7 Solution to Frege’s Puzzle about Propositional Attitude Ascriptions……………... 41 2.7.1 Conception-Indicating Ascriptions…............................................................ 42 2.7.2 Millian Ascriptions………………………………………………………… 47 2.8 Solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief…………….…………...... 53 2.9 Informative Identities Without Substitution………………………………………... 57 2.10 Informative Identities: A Priori or A Posteriori Propositions?.................................. 62 2.11 Ascribing Belief to Non-Verbal Agents…………………………………………… 74 2.12 Solution to Kripke’s Puzzle……………………………………………................... 77 2.13 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………. 86 REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………......... 92 i INTRODUCTION The theory of proper names presented here, the Two Indexical Uses Theory of proper names or “TIUT,” is, to my knowledge, sui generis. The central claim is that proper names are used as indexicals. I distinguish two types of indexical uses: (1) ‘Millian’ uses on which a name merely refers (contributing its bearer/referent alone to the proposition expressed); and (2) ‘Conception-indicating’ uses on which a name both refers and conveys the speaker’s “conception of” or “way of taking” the bearer/referent at the moment s/he utters the name (contributing both referent and conception to the proposition expressed). The TIUT is designed specifically to solve Frege’s puzzle, as well as other semantic puzzles such as the puzzle I call the ‘Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief’ (see section 1.2, infra) and a related puzzle, Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle. I aim to show that the TIUT is the best theory of proper names because it offers the most comprehensive solution to this set of puzzles. It avoids the problems bedeviling other theories of proper names that pretend to solve the puzzles. On the one hand, we have Descriptivism, which was largely refuted by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity. Kripke famously argued that Descriptivism was defective because, inter alia, it held proper names to have descriptive meanings and to be non-rigid designators. The TIUT, in full agreement with Kripke and the current philosophical consensus, maintains that proper names are devoid of descriptive meaning (as indexicals, their meaning is their character) and are always rigid designators. On the other hand, we have Millianism, which makes numerous highly counterintuitive claims. For example, Millians dubiously maintain that the true sentence ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ semantically expresses the same proposition as the sentence ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman,’ and therefore, according to Millians, Lois Lane does in fact believe that Clark Kent is Superman. Millians ii also implausibly claim that the sentences ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ semantically express the same proposition—the trivial proposition that a particular individual is identical to himself. The TIUT avoids the absurd implications of Millianism, and, consistent with common sense, maintains that these sentences semantically express different propositions. The TIUT answers the central question posed by Frege’s puzzle: how can co-referential proper names such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ simultaneously be all of the following: (a) rigid, (b) lacking descriptive meaning, and (c) different in semantic content? Unlike some other anti-Millian theories of proper names, the TIUT recognizes that Millianism gets a lot right, even if it cannot be a fully correct theory of proper names because it cannot solve the puzzles. Most of the time proper names are used just as Millians say—just to refer to their bearers and nothing else. This is so in the case of names occurring in ordinary simple sentences, identity sentences, and within the ‘that’-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions. A good theory of proper names must take into account the plausibility of the Millian picture vis-à-vis the majority of uses of proper names. However, the failure of Millians to offer plausible solutions to Frege’s puzzle and other semantic puzzles militates in favor of the judgment that proper names must be used in non-Millian ways in some cases. The proper conclusion to draw is that names can be used in at least two ways—a Millian way, where a name just refers to its bearer, and a non-Millian way where the speaker uses a name to refer to its bearer and also to indicate a conception of or way of taking that bearer. In short, I am proposing that names are semantically ambiguous between these two kinds of uses: a ‘Millian’ use and a ‘Conception-indicating’ use. I am positing a semantic distinction and not a pragmatic one. Some philosophers will object that I am going too far in positing a semantic distinction—perhaps agreeing with my claim that proper names, as well as many classes of expressions, can be used in various ways, but objecting that not all iii differences in use mark a semantic distinction. However, I do really do want to posit a semantic distinction. For there is, as far as I can see, no pragmatic mechanism—neither implicature, descriptive enrichment, nor any other pragmatic mechanism—that could explain the fundamentally different ways in which proper names are regularly and consistently used. Unfortunately, there is a dogma in the current philosophy of language according to which the positing of a semantic distinction is viewed as something close to a mortal sin. Wherever possible, according to this dogma,