Seventy-five years on, the Battle of Cable Street stifl holds a . proud place in anti-fascist memory, considered a decisive victory against the far right. In fact, far from striking a fatal blow, the event boosted domestic fascism and anti- semitism and made life far more unpleasant for its ' Jewish victims, explains Daniel Tilles. THE MYTH OF CABLE STREET n October 4th, 1936, following days of Anti-fascist protestors arrested, at least 73 police officers injured - but most frantic, last-minute organisation, a crowd behind a barricade in Cable importantly, the Fascists did not pass. of over 100,000 protesters congregated in Street as police attempt to The demonstration has come to be seen, particu- break it down to allow the OLondon's East End. Their single aim was to BUF through, October 4th, larly on the political left, as the moment London's prevent the passage of 5,000 black-shirted supporters 1936. working class united en masse to reject fascism's of Sir Oswald Mosley, the leader of the British Union hateful ideology once and for all: 'The spectacle of the of Eascists {BUF), who a week earlier had announced workers in action gave the Fascists reason to pause', plans to march through the area to mark the fourth claimed Ted Grant, a participant in the demonstration anniversary of his party's formation. Despite the best and later an influential socialist thinker. 'It induced efforts of the police to clear a path for the procession, widespread despondency and demoralisation in their the protestors stood resolutely firm. Left with little ranks ... [and] the East End Fascist movement other choice Mosley conceded defeat and disbanded declined.' Cable Street is still invoked in today's fight his followers. Around 80 anti-fascists had been against the extreme right, with the Unite Against www.historytoday.com October 2011 | History Today 41 Battle of Cable Street Fascism pressure group describing it as a 'turning point in the struggle against Fascism in Britain'. The battle also holds a proud place in the collective memory of the Anglo-Jewish community', described by one historian as 'the most remembered day in 20th- century British Jewish history'. Like Mussolini's Fascist Party, upon which it was modelled, the BUF had initially paid little attention to what it described as the 'irrelevant' Jewish question. Although the movement contained individuals who favoured an antisemitic policy, Mosley's aim was to create an outwardly reputable political party. As such, he permitted violence only when it was 'defensive' and eschewed racial prejudice. His approach reaped some success, with party membership reaching 50,000 within two years. This all changed over the summer of 1934 when a wave of organised anti-fascist disruption struck BUF events around Britain, prompting a violent response. Disorder at a mass meeting in June at London's Olympia Hall, where Mosley's stewards brutally Mosley in 1934 at BUF headquarters in King's Road, Chelsea, with the new edition of his book The Greater Britain, first published In 1932. ejected hecklers, was especially damaging to the Blackshirts' reputation. With its façade of respectability stripped away and Britain's gradual recovery from the Great Depression rendering Mosley's sophisticated economic programme increas- Under a Star of David flag, Jewish protestors and sympathisers rally against mounting anti- ingly obsolete the BUF collapsed, its membership semitism in Nazi Germany, Hyde Park, London, April 2nd, 1933. The following year, in a bid to increase its appeal, the BUF adopted an antisemitic policy, a move that proved especially falling to around a tenth of its peak. The party was left successful with voters in the East End. in desperate need of a new ideological impetus. Following discussion with his senior lieutenants Mosley resolved to incorporate antisemitism into official policy, announcing the decision in late September. This proved particularly popular in the East End, a district with a long history of tension between Jews and gentiles. It had been the principal point of first settlement for the 150,000 or so Eastern European Jews who had arrived in Britain since the 1880s, increasing competition for housing and jobs in this deprived part of London. By the 1930s, with Britain's largest concentration of Jews still to be found in the area, it proved fertile territory for the BUF's racial incitement and between 1935 and 1937 the party committed the majority of its resources to campaigning there. In addition to the offensive and inflammatory language employed by his street-corner orators Mosley's followers were also responsible for a growing number of physical attacks on Jews. Unsurprisingly local Jews felt compelled to retal- iate. They came to play a central role in Britain's anti- fascist movement through growing participation in existing organisations opposed to the BUF, such as trade unions and the (ximmunist Party, and via newly formed Jewish defence bodies, most prominent of which was the Jewish People's Council ( JPC), founded in mid-1936. Mosley's announcement of the October procession, which was to include many Jewish neigh- bourhoods on its route, caused particular outrage. With the Communist Party's leadership initially reluc- tant to support a proposed counter-demonstration for fear of association with the inevitable disorder- only relenting at the very last minute - much of the responsibility for its coordination fell on the JPC and other Jewish organisations. HistoryTix/ii.i' I October 2011 www.historytoday.com Battle of Cable Street Mosley leads his Black- shirts away from the East End on October 4th, 1936. He is wearing a military- style uniform, which the BUF introduced earlier in the year. Memoirs of the period attest to the pride felt has been steadily gaining ground in many parts of east among Jews at their participation in the occasion, a London'. Its sources suggested an influx of over 2,000 sense that they, standing side by side with their non- new recruits in the capital, a considerable boost given lewish neighbours, had driven the Fascists out of east that party membership in London had stood at less London: 'The sound-hearted British working-class than 3,000 earlier in the year. had given ... a clear message,' Morris Beckman, at the In the week after Cable Street the BUF 'conducted time a teenager living in Hackney, later recounted; the most successful series of meetings since the begin- Jews had shown 'they were sick and ashamed of ning of the movement', attracting crowds of thou- keeping their heads down'. Like Ted Grant, he remem- sands and little opposition. Mosley made an 'enthusi- bered that day as 'the high water mark of the British astically received' address to an audience of 12,000 at Union of Fascists' hubris and arrogance, the very Victoria Park Square, which was followed by a moment that... the tide began to recede'. Bill Fishman, peaceful march to nearby Limehouse. By contrast the then a 15-year-old witness to the protests and subse- Communists' efforts to consolidate their victory had quently a prominent historian of East End Jewish life, 'met with a very poor response'. 'A definite pro-Fascist recalled that 'Oswald Mosiey's popularity began to feeling has manifested itself, the Special Branch report wane after his setback in Cable Street.' concluded: 'The alleged Fascist defeat is in reality a Fascist advance.' An immense impetus The reason the BUF was able to profit so hand- Yet such perceptions bear little relation to the actual somely from what had initially appeared a setback was repercussions of the event. Contemporary records, in that, at this stage, it thrived off the publicity that contrast to the romanticised recollections of those on violent opposition produced. The national media, the anti-fascist side, tell a diflerent story. Far from under pressure from the government, largely avoided signalling the demise of fascism in the East End, or reporting on Fascist activity other than when disorder bringing respite to its Jewish victims. Cable Street had occurred. A leading Mosleyite lamented the 'total quite the opposite effect. Over the following months silence' in the press when BUF events passed without the BUF was able to convert defeat on the day into incident, complaining that only after disruption by Ftom the Archive longer-term success and to justify a further radicalisa- opponents did newspapers show any interest. \ Oswald Mosley as tion of its anti-Jewish campaign. When such incidents took place the party was able / Entrepreneur J When money for Within days the party's newspaper, Blackshirt, was with some success to portray itself as a victim. It Oswald Mosiey's British boasting that the incident had given Fascism 'an claimed that its eftbrts to exercise free speech legally, Union of Fascists began to immense impetus'. The BUF regularly exaggerated the through organised meetings and police-approved dry up in the iate 1930s, he turned to novel schemes for strength of its support, but this particular claim was processions, were being systematically suppressed by fund-raising. James and more than spurious bravado. In its monthly report on left-wing extremists. Whatever the truth of such alle- Patience Barnes explain. extremist political activity Special Branch observed in gations - and it was certainly the case that anti-fascists www.historytoday.com/archive October 'abundant evidence that the Fascist movement were responsible for the majority of disorder, albeit www.historytoday.com October 2011 ] HistoryToday 43 Battle of Cable Street financed the anti-fascist movement and used their wealth and influence to turn the media and government often in the face of Fascist provocation - the Black- Police dismantle a makeshift against the BUF. It had also become clear, Mosley alleged, shirts elicited a degree of sympathy in certain quarters.