Copyright Trent Hone 2002 A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship International Journal of Naval History October 2002 Volume 1 Number 2 Building a Doctrine: U. S. Naval Tactics and Battle Plans in the Interwar Period Trent Hone Senior Associate, Rubicon Technologies General Introduction In the nineteen years between the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 and the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States Navy honed its skills in numerous Fleet Problems, and tactical exercises conducted both at sea and at the Naval War College. The most important product of these efforts was the introduction of a common doctrine allowing the Navy’s officers to operate as a cohesive unit. In the years immediately following the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, this doctrine did not exist, but the advantages of such a common doctrine were well recognized. Steps were taken throughout the interwar period to teach the Fleet to think as a single unit; to react to the changing circumstances of battle with one mind. The importance of this doctrinal development has largely been ignored, primarily because battleships formed its centerpiece. The destruction of the Navy’s battle line at Pearl Harbor and the ensuing dominance of the aircraft carrier in the decisive battles of the Pacific War have led investigators to focus on aircraft carriers when examining the prewar development of the Navy’s doctrine. This article seeks to address that oversight. Introduction 1 2/2/2012 Copyright Trent Hone 2002 At the end of World War One, the Navy was in the midst of producing the most powerful collection of capital ships the world had ever seen. The battleships of the South Dakota class and battle cruisers of the Lexington class were designed to secure naval supremacy in the coming decades. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 disrupted those plans. The treaty mandated that the Navy cease construction of its new ships and not engage in any new battleship construction for a decade. The Navy was forced to make do with its existing battle line; although it was one of the most powerful in the world, the diverse collection of ships had numerous weaknesses. These weaknesses were magnified by the lack of a common doctrine. The Navy’s initial efforts to rectify this deficiency focused on maneuver and aggressive offensive action to control the course of battle. Between the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930, the Navy’s doctrine developed to emphasize these two elements. Fluid maneuver would ensure that the Navy’s ships would operate as a cohesive unit in battle, and a determined offensive would keep the enemy off balance. After the First London Treaty of 1930, the Navy’s doctrine continued to evolve; as it became more sophisticated, it began to reflect the capabilities and limitations of existing ships. The increasingly complex tactical doctrine of the 1930s was refined during Fleet Problems and exercises at the Naval War College. As new elements were adopted they were published in the Navy’s Fleet Tactical Publications. Unpublished aspects of the doctrine can be found in lectures from the Naval War College and the annual reports of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. These sources illustrate that the U.S. Navy developed a sophisticated tactical doctrine during the last decade of the interwar period. This doctrine was based on controlling the pace of an engagement through seizure of the tactical initiative; it emphasized the coordination of all arms; and it stressed tactical flexibility. The adoption of this doctrine allowed the to Navy leverage one of its most important strengths, the ability and training of its officer corps. 2 2/2/2012 Copyright Trent Hone 2002 Formulating a Doctrine 1922-1930 For clues as to how to conduct a successful engagement the Navy looked to the failure of the Royal Navy to decisively defeat the German High Seas Fleet in the only major fleet action of World War One, the Battle of Jutland. On the afternoon of May 31, 1916, the two battle fleets fought a large but indecisive action off the coast of Denmark. In the eyes of the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy’s failure was due to three primary reasons: poor approach dispositions, inadequate coordination and communication among the British formations, and the Royal Navy’s inability to seize the offensive and control the pace of the battle.1 These observations formed the basis for several important lessons. The first of these, the necessity of fluid coordinated maneuver, could be addressed by the introduction of new tactical formations and cruising instructions. The others would prove more difficult. Aggressive offensive action was the key to success; it would allow the Navy to control the tempo of the engagement and impose its will on the enemy. But it would be impossible to coordinate the efforts of an entire fleet from a central location in the heat of battle; only the development of a common doctrine could guarantee that the Navy’s ship commanders would be able to coordinate their efforts effectively. The Introduction of Formations and Maneuvers In the initial portion of the interwar period, the Navy stressed the importance of coordinated maneuver. Specific formations for cruising, approach and battle were developed. These were supplemented by a fleet publication, Formations and Maneuvers of the Battle Line. This document specified the organization of the battle line and detailed the numerous maneuvers the battle line was expected to perform in battle. For tactical purposes the battle line is organized in three squadrons, and a separate flagship of the officer in tactical command of the battle line…. The squadrons are designated as the strong squadron, intermediate squadron, and the weak squadron.2 3 2/2/2012 Copyright Trent Hone 2002 Each squadron would be composed of one or more three-ship divisions depending on the number of ships available. The weak squadron was always positioned at the center, with the strong and intermediate squadron to either flank.3 It was essential that the Navy’s battle line maneuver as a cohesive unit; the division of ships into divisions and squadrons simplified this task. The maneuvers of the entire fleet were simplified by the introduction of new tactical formations. When the position of the enemy was unknown and the chances of contact were slight, the Navy would employ a cruising formation; these were designed to emphasize security. Concentric circles of light forces around the fleet guide would prevent a surprise contact with the enemy from immediately endangering the valuable ships at the center of the formation.4 Figure 1: Typical Cruising Formation5 4 2/2/2012 Copyright Trent Hone 2002 After the general location of the enemy had been determined, the fleet would shift into an approach formation. Approach formations featured greater concentration. They were designed to fix the location of the enemy and allow the fleet to deploy quickly into battle formation.6 Figure 2: Typical Approach Formation7 5 2/2/2012 Copyright Trent Hone 2002 When contact with the enemy battle line was made, the fleet would turn ninety degrees and transition into battle formation. Battle formations represented the maximum concentration of force, and were intended to allow all elements of the fleet to focus on the destruction of the enemy battle line.8 Light forces would concentrate at the head and rear of the formation. The exact ratio of this distribution would vary depending on the situation; placing two thirds of the light forces in the van and one third in the rear appears to have been the most common arrangement.9 6 2/2/2012 Copyright Trent Hone 2002 Figure 3: Typical Battle Formation10 Lack of a Doctrine 7 2/2/2012 Copyright Trent Hone 2002 The introduction of standard formations and maneuvers went a long way towards enabling the fleet to act as a coordinated unit in battle, but a coherent doctrine was still lacking. The Navy’s doctrine was based on very basic tactical principles, which amounted to little more than platitudes. “The fundamental tactical principle is that of superiority of force at the decisive point of contact.” This was the underlying basis of the War Instructions of 1923.11 It was hardly a doctrine. The limitations of this situation were well recognized. For some unaccountable reason the American Navy, and to a somewhat less degree the American Army, have never seriously endeavored to indoctrinate their officers, and thus to furnish as a basis for harmonious decisions during hostilities.12 Only a common doctrine would ensure that the Navy’s forces could coordinate their actions in the heat of battle. … no plan, however well it may be expressed, can possibly be co-ordinately executed by a large force of vessels of several types operating against a strong and efficient enemy, unless the squadron, division and ship commanders have the same conceptions of war as their commander-in-chief and are well indoctrinated.13 The War Instructions made a similar observation, noting that victory would be aided by: Indoctrination of the forces, so that there may be mutual understanding of the intentions and plans of the commander in chief and so that there may be coordination in the means and methods employed in carrying out the tasks assigned and of the necessary procedure when without orders. 14 However, the War Instructions provided little detail as to how such indoctrination was to be accomplished. Before it could begin, a doctrine had to be formulated; this became a major goal in the years following the Washington Treaty. The initial piece of the Navy’s doctrine would be based around aggressive offensive action.