Notes and References Introduction 1. See Martin Kolinsky, Law, Order and Riots in Mandatory Palestine 1928-1935 (London: Macmillan, 1993) and David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (Manchester UP, 1990). 2. Martin Kolinsky, 'The Collapse and Restoration of Public Security', in Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky (eds), Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1992). 3. Memorandum by Secretary of State for the Colonies, 'Palestine. Arab Grievances', 10 January 1936, CP 3 (36), CAB 24/259, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew Gardens, London. 4. Michael J. Cohen, 'TIle Egypt-Palestine Nexus: 1935-1939', Bar-llan Studies in History 111, ed. by Michael J. Cohen (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Han University Press, 1992), pp. 67-79. 5. See file on Development of Haifa Port, 1942 in FO 921/11, PRO. 6. See Chapter 10. 7. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War vol. III: The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 373-9: the prime minister's disagreement with a paper by General Sir John Dill, dated 6 May 1941, which advocated abandon­ ing Egypt to reinforce the defences of the UK and of Singapore. 8. Quoted in John Connell, Wavell, Scholar and Soldier: To June 1941 (London: Collins, 1964), p. 232. Wavell noted that oil had to be shipped to its destina­ tion; that tankers, supply ships and convoys had to be protected by air and sea power; and that in turn the deployment of those forces depended on oil. 9. Peter R. Odell, Oil and World Power (Penguin, 1979), 5th ed, pp. 73-4. 10. Ibid., p. 83. 11. Ibid.; Fiona Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (London: 1986), pp. 92,95. Yusif A. Sayigh, The Arab Economy (Oxford UP, 1982), stated (p. 49) that in 1946 Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia together received a total revenue for their oil exports of only 20 million dollars. 12. 'Review of Military Policy in the Middle East', report by COS Cttee, 5 December 1939 W.P. (39) 148 (Also paper no. COS (39) 146), CAB 66/3, ff. 338-9. 13. 'Military Policy in the Middle East', 15 January 1940, W.M. 14 (40), CAB 65/5. The war cabinet approved the COS recommendations in principle. 14. Brock Millman, 'Toward War with Russia: British Naval and Air Planning for Conflict in the Near East, 1939-40', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 29 (1994), pp. 261-83. 15. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 339. 16. F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism (Penguin, 1962), pp. 41,109,183,203; Venn, Oil Diplomacy, p. 85. 17. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World atAnns (Cambridge UP, 1994), p. 199. 18. Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour: Winston S. Churchill 1939-1941 (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 358; Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (London: 220 Notes and References 221 Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), pp. 217-18. 19. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1970), p. 497. 20. Ambassador Schulenburg report to German Foreign Office, 26 November 1940, reproduced in J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, vol. II, 2nd edn revd and enlarged (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1979), p. 561; see also Weinberg, A World At Arms, pp. 199-205. 21. Documents on German Foreign Policy, (DGFP) Series D, vol. IX, doc. no. 523, 22 June 1940; see also doc. no. 479, which is a record of part of a conversation between Mussolini and Hitler on 18 June 1940. 22. In a conversation with Goering on 23 October 1942, he admitted that he had failed to raise the issue at the time. See Deakin, The Brutal Friendship, pp.81-2. 23. 'Axis Naval Policy and Operations in the Mediterranean, 1939-May 1943' by Vice Admiral Eberhard Weichold, pp. 4-5, ADM 199/2518. 24. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, Brassey's Naval Annual 1948, p. 134; ADM 199/2518, p.15. 25. Fuehrer Conferences, p. 142. The German Naval Staffs 'Evaluation of the Mediterranean Situation', dated 14 November 1940, stressed the importance of dominating the Eastern as well as the Western Mediterranean for the outcome of the war: Ibid" pp. 154-5. 26. Directive no. 18 of 12 November 1940, doc. no. 323, DGFP, series D, vol. XI; Directive no. 21 'Barbarossa' of 18 December 1940 made the decisive commit­ ment, but stated that: 'The main employment of the Navy remains, even during an Eastern campaign, clearly directed against England.' Fuehrer Conferences, p.159. In directives issued some eight months later, he indicated that it was only after the defeat of the Soviet Union that the shift in resources from the army to enhance the size of the navy could take place. 27. DGFP, vol. XI, p. 528. 28. Ibid., p. 530. 29. In May 1943, he told Grand Admiral Doenitz that 'we are not capable of an operation of this kind since it would require first class divisions. Occupation of Spain without the consent of the Spaniards is out of the question, since they ... would carry on guerrilla warfare in our rear.' Fuehrer Conferences, p. 329. 30. N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, vol. I: Rearmament Policy [History of the Second World War) (London: HMSO, 1976), p. 809; Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 314; Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: the dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972), pp. 114-16. See also R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1993). 31. Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940 (London: Methuen, 1955), p. 593. See also Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 4-5, 9. For an account of the influence of Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary of the Cabinet, on Chamberlain's policy towards Italy, see Lawrence R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 193~1939 (Cambridge UP, 1975), pp. 94-7; see also Christopher Seton-Watson, 'The Anglo-Italian Gentleman's Agreement of January 1937 and its Aftermath', in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (eds), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy ofAppeasement (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 276, who mentions that Sir Joseph Ball, a 222 Notes and References prominent member of the ConselVative Party headquarters, had links with Dino Grandi, the Italian Ambassador in London. 32. Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change, 1914-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 483. 33. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp. 620-1. 34. Robert Boothby wrote to Churchill on 9 May 1940, reporting on the situation in the House of Commons on that historic day. Churchill's active supporters were led by Amery and included Boothby, Winterton, Hore-Belisha, Hammersley, Law, Macmillan, Tree, Nicolson, King-Hall and six others. One of them, Clement Davies, a leading Liberal, kept in contact with the Labour leaders Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood. See Churchill private papers, CHAR 2/392B, f. 146, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge University. Printed in full in Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour, pp. 302-3. 35. Chatfield had previously selVed as Chief of Naval Staff from 1933 to November 1938. He was succeeded by Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse until his illness in March 1939, and then by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, who selVed until his death in October 1943. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, then became Chief of Naval Staff. 36. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. II: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell, 1949), p. 16. 37. See Eden diary entries for 19 June 1941 and 6 February 1942, AP 20/1/21 and AP 20/1/22, respectively, Avon Papers, University of Birmingham; see also The War Diaries of Oliver Har.ey 1941-1945, ed. John HalVey (London: Collins, 1978), p. 15. 38. He worked through Major-General H. L. Ismay, who as Churchill's represen­ tative, became a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in May 1940. Ismay was also Deputy-Secretary (Military) to the war cabinet. See The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York: Viking Press, 1960). 39. Eden's memorandum, The Case Against Partiton', 15 September 1944, P(M) (44) 11, CAB 95/14. 40. See Michael J. Cohen, Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate (London: Paul Elek, 1978), pp. 46-9. 41. See Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle (London: Futura, 1980), p. 68. 42. See Chapter 10 for a discussion of his telegram of 9 November 1942 to the Colonial Secretary and minister of state, Cairo, FO 921110. See also J. C. Hurewitz, The Stmggle for Palestine (New York, Greenwood, 1968; originally published 1950), pp. 141-2. 43. See Cohen, Retreat, pp. 174-5; Bethell, Palestine Triangle, pp. 162-3. 44. Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (Bloomington/London: Indiana UP, 1973; originally published 1965), p. 258. 45. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. III, pp. 311-14; and Churchill, extract from Hansard, 9 July 1941, CAB 95/8. See also Gilbert, Finest Hour, pp. 110 1-2, 1125-7 regarding Churchill's reaction to Harriman's telegram of 3 July 1941 on shortcomings in salvaging tanks and overhauling American aircraft engines, and so on. General Sir Robert Haining, who had been GOC Palestine 1938-9, and Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1940-1, was sent to the Middle East as 'Intendant-General' at the beginning of June to coordinate the three selVices and the representatives of the relevant Whitehall departments in the Middle East such as Ministry of War Transport, as well as with Egyptian Government.