BOEING 737 MAX Patrick KY Executive Director EP TRAN Committee Meeting 29 October 2020 Your safety is our mission. EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent An Agency of the European Union Agenda 01 EASA conditions for Return to Service 02 EASA activities 03 Outcomes 04 Next Steps EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 2 Return to Service - EASA conditions As set from the very first days after the grounding: Accidents of JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood Design changes proposed by Boeing to address the issues highlighted by the accidents are EASA approved and their embodiment is mandated Additional independent design review has been completed by EASA BOEING 737 MAX flight crews have been adequately trained EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 3 Return to Service - EASA design review Objective To ensure that no similar weaknesses in the design are present in the other (safety critical) areas of the BOEING 737 MAX design Scope Flight Control System and all associated functions/systems including (but not limited to): the displays, the crew alerting system, the sensors and the autopilot. Targeted assessment of the aircraft Critical review of credit taken for crew Comprehensive re-analysis of the handling qualities: stability, recognition of, and reaction to, failures multiple effects of sensor failures maneuverability, stall identification. (including Human Factor assessment) EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 4 EASA activities - Overview Effort Reviews Flight Control Team Computer Safety Analysis > 15.000 working hours System audits at Boeing 20 multi-disciplinary Simulator data x4 over 19 months experts, including test Flight test data x4 Software audits at Collins pilots and engineers Crew procedures Training requirements Simulator sessions Human Factor EASA Flight tests Joint Operational Evaluation Participation to x2 Engineering Sim Line crew evaluation with 4 different airline flight crews x2 EU airline captains x2 Full flight Sim x2 EASA observers EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 5 EASA activities – Flight tests Simulator Aircraft Used to evaluate many failures, Used to check aircraft behaviour including combinations of failures, with MCAS on & off (simulator not in a controlled environment. accurate at high angle of attack) Well-suited to pilot behaviour Perfectly representative for observation (human factors) stability & control Adequately-representative for [Also enabled to check simulator most cases representativeness] EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 6 Additional activities Review of the Safety Recommendations made available through the accident reports, the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) report, the US Department of Transport (DoT) Special Committee report Review of whistleblower reports and similar reports, received directly by the Agency or indirectly (e.g. hearings performed by the US congress) Classification into two categories: → Inclusion in the scope of the additional independent design review if relevant to the BOEING 737 MAX safety → Inclusion in the wider scope of Lessons Learned project EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 7 Outcome – comparison before/after BEFORE Upon failure of one single Angle-of-Attack (AoA) sensor: The MCAS activates: repeated nose down orders The stick shaker activates on the pilot control columns Multiple alerts are simultaneously displayed in the cockpit However - there is no alert that highlights the AoA failure, which is the root cause The crew procedures are not well adapted to this scenario The pilots do not know about the MCAS, there is no training addressing this problem If the crew does not react appropriately, forces needed to recover manually may be too high EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 8 Outcome – comparison before/after AFTER Upon failure of one single Angle-of-Attack (AoA) sensor: The MCAS does not activate The stick shaker activates on the pilot control columns, but it can be inhibited by the crew The alert pointing to the AoA failure is displayed, the crew procedure covers this scenario This scenario, and others involving the MCAS, are trained at the simulator The system and its wiring are modified to prevent further erroneous nose down orders The system will automatically stop any rapid nose down order before the forces needed to recover manually are too high EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 9 Outcome - Summary Design safety Human Factor Design deficiencies have been fixed Crew procedures improved. Design review beyond MCAS led to additional Crew training program revised and design improvements complemented with Full Flight Simulator. Aircraft is stable even without MCAS. One-off return to service training on top of initial/recurrent training. EASA confidence Follow-up EASA confident that the corrections in the design, Further safety improvements (“3rd synthetic AoA) the improvement of the crew procedures and the planned to be developed within the next 2 years, extension of the crew training program will ensure and retrofitted on in service airplanes. a safe return to service of the aircraft. Enhanced continued operational safety monitoring. EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 10 International cooperation EASA design review was independent but coordinated with the US, Canada and Brazil. Good level of cooperation and support (e.g. organisation of the EASA flight tests in Vancouver) Information sharing and mutual respect Willingness to reach common conditions for return to service as far as possible Conditions for return to service: Design change: identical for all 4 authorities Crew procedures: EASA and Transport Canada allow the crew to inhibit an erroneous stick shaker. EASA impose additional (temporary) operational limitations due to lack of AoA integrity Crew training: identical for all 4 authorities EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 11 Next steps Operations may resume worldwide end of this year / beginning of next year, also depending on the COVID context Airworthiness & Safety Directives to be released for pubic consultation Coordination with EASA MS Joint Operational Evaluation for lift of airspace restrictions & for crew training assessment Webinar with National Authorities on crew training implementation Final review of Boeing justifications Flight tests on a BOEING 737 MAX in Vancouver EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 12 … and after Return to Service ALL NEW AIRCRAFT NEXT BOEING MODELS BOEING 737 MAX Cooperation Enhanced with FAA monitoring of “3rd synthetic AoA” operations design enhancement Increased scrutiny & training on critical areas (Flight controls, Certification Crew Alerting System) Regulation, Procedures & Working methods EASA PROPRIETARY – Do not disclose without EASA consent 13 Thank you for your attention easa.europa.eu/connect Your safety is our mission. An Agency of the European Union.