chapter 7 German Cameroon 1 Introduction After the unification of Germany in 1871, a decade passed before Germany’s im- perial ambitions and its quest for territorial expansion became a matter of public debate. In the 1880s, the call for colonial activities became stronger as German private trading companies applied to their government for an official mandate to acquire and rule African territory. Despite his initial reluctance to become in- volved in colonial affairs, Chancellor Bismarck yielded to the twin temptation of expanding Germany’s international power and creating an overseas empire. The Germans acquired their first territories in the tropical and rivery part of Sub- Saharan Africa. The colonial protectorate of Deutsches Kamerun was established on the basis of bilateral treaties between Germany and African native rulers. The central issue of this chapter is the German acquisition of Africa in par- ticular Cameroonian, territory by way of treaties in the late nineteenth century. The aim will be to establish the historical context in which these treaties were negotiated and concluded and to analyse the treaty texts. The textual analysis will address property and sovereignty arrangements in the treaties transfer- ring territorial sovereignty from the Cameroonian rulers to Germany. Once the treaty-making context has been outlined, the next question to be addressed is how existing sovereignty and property rights fared after the treaties had been signed. Specifically, the chapter will first discuss the historical context of the German colonial venture in Africa, more specifically Cameroon (§2). Second, protectorate treaties concluded between Germany and Cameroonian polities will be analysed to find out whether and how sovereign and property rights were mentioned (§3). Third, the chapter will examine how Germany established its control over the territory by means of legislation after the treaties had been concluded (§4). Fourth, the interpretation and execution of the treaties will be explored by discussing German conduct and the reactions of native inhabit- ants (§5). The chapter will conclude by making some observations anticipating the question whether Germany’s acquisition of Cameroon was legal (§6). 2 Historical Background Bismarck dominated the internal and foreign policies of the new German Em- pire from its foundation in 1871 to the early 1890s. He intended to transform Mieke van der Linden - 9789004321199 © Mieke van der Linden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/9789004321199_008Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 12:17:16PM This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. via free access German Cameroon 175 Germany into one of the greatest military powers on the European continent. In terms of imperial expansion, however, Germany was often considered to lag behind. In the early 1870s, Germany was neither prepared nor able to acquire overseas territories. It was fully occupied with internal affairs and was there- fore not in a position to match the colonial aspirations of other European pow- ers.1 The unification of Germany, however, not only redrew the geographical map of Europe, it also betrayed a strong nationalistic mindset, which was a key driver of Germany’s imperial expansion in the 1880s.2 Initially, Bismarck had no need for colonies and even labelled colonial adventures as irrational activi- ties.3 In the 1870s, Bismarck’s diplomacy4 was trained on a calculated strategy 1 For an extensive overview of the pressing internal affairs occupying German politics in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, see H.-U. Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1994). See also W.J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867–1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State (London: Arnold, 1997). 2 For an extensive overview of the general motives of the German colonization mission, see A. Bernard, ‘Germany’s Colonial Aims,’ Journal of the Royal African Society, 16 (1917), 306–313; T. Büttner, Geschichte Afrikas. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, vol. ii (Berlin: Akademie, 1976); F.R. Cana, ‘German Aims in Africa,’ Journal of the Royal African Society, 14 (1915), 355– 365; Förster, Mommsen and Robinson, Bismarck, Europe and Africa; K. Hausen, Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika. Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in Kamerun vor 1914 (Zurich, Freiburg: Atlantis, 1970); P. Heine and U. van der Heyden (eds.), Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Peter Sebald. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afri- ka (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1995); G. Knopp, Das Weltreich der Deutschen. Von kolonialen Träumen, Kriegen und Abenteuern (München: Pendo, 2010); Mommsen, Imperial Germany; H. Schnee, Kolonialmacht Deutschland (Berlin: Hillger, 1940); H. Sippel, ‘Aspects of Colonial Land Law in German East Africa: German East Africa Company, Crown Land Ordinance, Eu- ropean Plantations and Reserved Areas for Africans,’ in: R. Debusmann and S. Arnold (eds.), Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa. Case Studies from Colonial and Contemporary Cam- eroon and Tanzania (Bayreuth: Bayreuth African Studies, 1996), 3–38; H. Stoecker (ed.), Ger- man Imperialism in Africa. From the Beginnings until the Second World War (London: Hurst, 1977); H. Zache, Das Deutsche Kolonialbuch (Berlin, Leipzig: Andermann, 1926) and H. Zache, Imperialismus und Kolonialpolitik (Berlin: Kolonialdruckerei, 1927). 3 Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers, 137. Bismarck put forward four different reasons why colonies would be an absurd liability for the Reich, which are formulated by Pakenham in the form of four questions: ‘First, would new colonies pay their own way? … Second, was public opinion ready for them? … Third, how could the German navy defend such colonies? … Fourth, what about the damage to his own diplomacy?’ Pakenham, Scramble for Africa, 203–204. 4 On the developments in the diplomatic field and the role of Germany, see A. Green, Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge University Press, 2001); H. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 103–200; G. Knopp, Das Weltreich der Deutschen. Von kolonialen Träumen, Kriegen und Aben- teuern (München: Pendo, 2010); Mommsen, Imperial Germany; W. Mulligan, ‘Restrained Mieke van der Linden - 9789004321199 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 12:17:16PM via free access <UN> 176 chapter 7 of diverting the attention and energies of the major European powers away from the European continent to overseas territories.5 Directing his attentions to sustaining the European balance of power and to strengthening Germany’s position within Europe, Bismarck did not see colonization as the way forward. First, Germany had no military infrastructure and means to acquire and protect foreign territory, and Bismarck was loath to make the necessary investments. Second, Germany had no trading companies that were capable of exploiting the colonies on a large scale and Bismarck did not desire to facilitate them. Germany was not in need of resources. In fact, overproduction was already causing many problems on the European mainland. Third, the financial bur- den of acquiring and especially ruling colonies curbed public enthusiasm for a colonial venture in Africa. Or, in the words of Bismarck: ‘Wir sind noch nicht reich genug, um uns den Luxus von Kolonien leisten zu können.’6 Bismarck’s perspective on looking after German national interests in Germany’s relations with other European States was continental; Bismarck’s ‘map of Africa was in Europe.’7 However, in the years 1884–1885 Bismarck changed his mind,8 as he came under pressure of the nationalist movements within parliament,9 the trading companies lobby and internal social problems. An accumulation of political, economic and social considerations were the incentive for Bismarck to par- ticipate in the quest for African territory. Mary Townsend eloquently describes this mixture of motives, which convinced German politicians, and Bismarck in particular, of the need for territorial expansion: ‘[A]n enhanced national consciousness expressed by Germans both at home and abroad; a swollen purse requiring objects for expenditure, and then a depleted purse in need of large dividends regardless of risk; and abnormally inflated production demanding outlet markets; mushroom industries clamouring for raw materials; an Competition: International Relations,’ in: S. Berger (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe, 1789–1914 (Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell, 2006), 401–422; J.L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy. The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Wehler, Deutsche Kaiserreich. 5 W.J. Mommsen, ‘Bismarck, the Concert of Europe, and the Future of West Africa, 1883–1885,’ in: S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen and R. Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe and Africa (Oxford University Press, 1988), 153. 6 L. Gall, Bismarck: Der weiße Revolutionair (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1980), 617. 7 This remark was made by Bismarck to a German traveller in Africa on 5 December 1888, as quoted in Gall, Bismarck, 623. 8 See Wesseling, Verdeel en Heers, 142–144. 9 See P. Grupp, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Kolonien (Tübingen: Mohr, 1980), 47–85 and 86–211. Mieke van der Linden - 9789004321199 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 12:17:16PM via free access <UN> German Cameroon 177 overstocked labor market using emigration as a safety-value; and finally, an ever growing navy promising protection to overseas ventures and investments.’10