Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons History Theses & Dissertations History Winter 1992 U.S.S. New Ironsides: The eS agoing Ironclad in the Union Navy William Howard Roberts Old Dominion University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds Part of the Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Roberts, William H.. "U.S.S. New Ironsides: The eS agoing Ironclad in the Union Navy" (1992). Master of Arts (MA), thesis, History, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/mv9c-hp68 https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds/31 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. U.S.S. NEW IRONSIDES: IHE SEAGOING IRONCLAD IN THE UNION NAVY by William Howard Roberts B.S. March 1973, Massachusetts Institute of Technology A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS HISTORY OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY December 20, 1992 Approvi L. Wilson (Director) Willard C. Frank. Jr. Patrick J.N«ollinsr^Roi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT U.S.S. NEW IRONSIDES: THE SEAGOING IRONCLAD IN THE UNION NAV7 William Howard Roberts Old Dominion University, 1992 Director: Dr. Harold L. Wilson Of the ironclads completed by the Union during the Civil War, only the U.S.S. New Ironsides was a seagoing, high-freeboard design. Her seagoing qualities and heavy battery made her uniquely valuable to the Union in combat. Although New Ironsides was highly successful and her high- freeboard design squarely in the European mainstream, she represented the last of her direct line in the U.S. Navy. The lessons learned from her construction and wartime ser­ vice, which should have provided invaluable instruction for U.S. designers, were not followed up. By failing to develop the seagoing ironclad the United States forfeited the advan­ tages it might have gained over European navies from its extensive combat experience. The Navy was unable to con­ vince Congress that money for ironclads would be well spent, and the U.S. Navy's best opportunity to build a seagoing ironclad fleet was lost for a generation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright * by William Howard Roberts 1992 All Rights Reserved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To Peg Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To Bill Jurens, for clear and forceful reworking of the original drawings and plans. To Barry Zerby, of the National Archives Military Re­ cords Branch, for hours of patient assistance with the Navy Department records. To Kris Weaver, for cogent and forceful criticism of innumerable drafts. To Dr. Charlie Peery, for his help in providing photo­ graphs and images of New Ironsides. To Coomie Lee and Dan Stedham, Pearl and Bob Sherman, and Sara and John Wepplo, for gracious hospitality to an itinerant researcher. ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE LIST OF TABLES ....................................... iv LIST OF FIGURES ..................................... ... Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION: THE NEGLECTED IRONCLAD ............... 1 2. GENESIS: IMPETUS AND DESIGN ...................... 3 3. CONSTRUCTION HISTORY AND DESIGN EVOLUTION ......... 36 4. TEETHING TROUBLES: A "HOT-HOUSE” SHIP ........... 58 5. EARLY EXPERIENCE: CLEARING FOR ACTION ............. 77 6. BATTLE EXPERIENCE: "A CAPITAL SCARECROW"? ......... 93 7. COMBAT VETERAN: MATURE REFLECTION ............... 128 8. FINAL CAMPAIGNS: FORT FISHER AND JAMES RIVER . 165 9. CONTEMPORARIES AND COMPETITORS ................ 193 10. SEAGOING IRONCLADS: FAILURE OF WILL ..............208 11. CONCLUSION ...................................... 225 EPILOGUE............................................239 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY .............................. 242 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................. 250 APPENDICES A. SPECIFICATION OF WEIGHTS AND DISPLACEMENT . 269 B. SALVAGE AND FINAL DISPOSITION ............... 271 iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 1. Comparison of New Ironsides. Gloire, and Warrior . 16 iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 1. U.S.S. New Ironsides outboard profile ............. 17 2. French ironclad Gloire outboard profile ........... 18 3. U.S.S. New Ironsides Spar and Gun Deck Plans ........ 20 4. U.S.S. New Ironsides Berth Deck and Hold Plans .... 21 5. U.S.S. New Ironsides Deck Plans (Key) ............. 22 6. Tongued and Grooved Armor (Side V i e w ) .............. 24 7. U.S.S. New Ironsides Midship Section and sectional drawing of armor arrangement ...................... 26 8. Main Boiler of U.S.S. New Ironsides ................ 30 9. U.S.S. New Ironsides Screw and Rudder P l a n .......... 63 10. Iron Carriage and Slide for New Ironsides' Xl-inch Dahlgren gu n s ............................. 65 11. U.S.S. New Ironsides with masts and rigging ........ 76 12. U.S.S. New Ironsides under bare poles ............. 80 13. Outline chart of Charleston Harbor .............. 92 14. Typical Confederate barrel torpedo ............... 97 15. DuPont's plan of attack at Charleston............. 102 16. Body and Sheer Plan of U.S.S. New Ironsides .... 108 17. Damage to New Ironsides' armor from Confederate fire at Charleston .............................. 113 18. Confederate spar torpedo boat C.S.S. David .... 149 19. Fort Fisher and Vicinity ........................ 170 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20. Plan of first attack on Fort Fisher ........ 174 21. Plan of second attack on Fort F i s h e r ............. 180 22. Map of the James R i v e r .......................... 187 vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION: THE NEGLECTED IRONCLAD I have never yet seen a vessel that came up to my ideas of what is required for offensive operations as much as the Ironsides.1 Admiral David Porter's words elicit little modern rec­ ognition. To most, "ironclad" is synonymous with "monitor," and scholars give New Ironsides but a few lines.2 Yet this seagoing broadside ironclad presented one of the earliest instances in which the U.S. Navy's tacticians and strate­ gists were forced to adapt to technological change. The new technology of iron and steam, pressed into service with neither precedent, wartime experience, nor sound theory to guide the designers, yielded both unanticipated strengths and unforeseen weaknesses. New Ironsides participated in more engagements and fired more shots than any other Civil War ironclad. Her strategic importance to the blockade of Charleston and her :Rear Admiral David D. Porter to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, January 15, 1865, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion 28 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1894-1922) (hereafter ORN), 11: 602. All references are to Series One unless otherwise noted. 2James Phinney Baxter III, The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933; reprinted Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968), 268-69. This, his most extensive discussion of the ship, is 23 lines. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contributions to the bombardments of Charleston and Fort Fisher were unmatched. New Ironsides was in the mainstream of ironclad development; while the low freeboard monitors were an evolutionary dead end, New Ironsides was of the high freeboard line that led to the dreadnought battleship. Despite her highly successful career, New Ironsides herself had no direct descendant in the U.S. Navy. Her bright promise was neglected in the post-War reaction, and by the time the U.S. Navy again turned to seagoing iron­ clads, she had been forgotten. This is her story. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER TWO GENESIS: IMPETUS AND DESIGN By mid-1861, it was evident that the Union needed iron­ clad warships.1 The impetus was clear: a Confederate iron­ clad program was already underway. The Confederate Navy could not hope to challenge the U.S. Navy with conventional wooden ships, so Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory placed his faith not in numbers but in technolo­ gy. As he phrased the idea, "Inequality of numbers may be compensated by invulnerability."2 Although there were several Confederate projects un­ derway, the Federals worried most about the conversion of the partially destroyed frigate U.S.S. Merrimack into the ironclad C.S.S. Virginia.3 Virginia, being rebuilt at the Navy Yard at Portsmouth, Virginia, might threaten the Union JFor a discussion of the plans submitted before Welles reported to Congress, Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 238-45. 2Mallory to C. M. Conrad, Chairman