TOP SECRET rnaJuvmrnaJl1 ~csCBrnwvu~ aJmcsrn~~ Lrl!JGJV ~151!JW~15 ~'1 W15Ulfill5 17 WUJW~CkU!Wfil WINTERBOTHAM' S "THE ULTRA SECRET": // / i A PERSONAL COMMENT. •••.••.•.•••....• Brigadier John H. TiltrnaJ"l •• 1 WEAPON THAT HELPED DEFEAT NAZIS •.•.• P. W. Filby •.••• ~ ••.••• • t... 3 MUM'S STILL THE WORD! .............. ·1 . I........ 5 LINEAR RECURSIVE SEQUENCES............. f••••••••••••••• 6 CUMULATIVE INDEX, 1974-1975 ........................................ 9 GREAT S~IET SHIPBUILDING MYSTERY ..... lnavid H Williams ; •. 21 WHAT ARE WE ABOUT?..................... I· .. 23 LINGUISTS FROM THE MELTING roT........ .. 25 CLA ESSAY CONTEST; CAA NEWS .....••....•••••••.•.••.........•.••.• 27 '1'1118 99CJl-:JMBN'f CJ9N'l'AINS CJ9BEW9RB MA'fERIAI:. ~· ·•eli 11, l>IRflliil l/~N~iiliil (fllil l/~iilal &aa a~ llH••• •·· G98, Re ll&&a, ~.ee,.,.11 TOP SECRET Bee....,, 8,_ Notilcatiuu bJ the 81 iJhiabH Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on -10--1 -1-.20'1.2 pursuant to E.O. '135.26. vl DR Case # 54 778 DOCID: 4009727 fOP SECRE'f Published Monthly by Pl, Techniques and Standards, for the Personnel of Operations VOL. II, NO. 12 DECEMBER 1975 PUBLISHER WILLIAM LUTWINIAK BOARD OF EDITORS Editor in Chief ............ Arthur J. Salemme (5642s) Cryptanalysis .............. ._I _____..... ltsozs:sr --------- "P . L . 86-36 Language ............ .. •.... Emery W. Tetrault (5236s) Machine Support ............ 1 kii~ls) Special Research ........... Vera R. Filby (7119s) Traffic Analysis ........... Frederic O. Mason, Jr. (4142s) For individual subscriptions send name and organizational designator to: CRYPTOLOG, Pl 'f OP S"ECKjijT ...._ - . , .:ii_.... lu>-"~ - DOCID: 4009727 813CRECf ( The fo7,7,CMing three articles deal in various ways with the publicity given in the British and Ameriaan press and on television to F. W. Wi nterbothcun's book "The Ultra Searet." The first artiale, by Brigadier John H. TiZtman, deals with the aacu:t'aay of the statements in the book and the degree of ha:f'7TI done by them. The aeaond article, by P. W. Filby, is a review of the book as asse.ssed by a member o~ the t~am of syeaialists who worked the Ger;nan ~~~lo.. ~ ... .... mti.a problem. The thi.rd arti.ale, by lM542:; gi.<Je8 a word: P. L . 86- 3 6 of adviae to those who might now be tempted to tell every hing they know. A PERSONAL COMMENT By Brigadier John H. Tiltman, Pl When Winterbotham's book was first published Another and J?erhaps a decisive factor mak~ng late in 1974 in England, some members of NSA prosecution unlikely to succeed was the publi­ who had served at Bletchley Park during World cation in France in 1973 of Bertrand's book War II, on reading early reviews, assumed that Enigrfkl, ou La Plus Gr>ande Enigtne de la Guerre it was officially authorised. This was defi­ 1939-1945. This revealed for the first time nitely not the case. Its publication was stren­ the fact of an analytic success against the uously opposed by British responsible authori­ Enigma and was decisive in the discussions ties, who took legal advice on the probable between Deputy Director NSA and Director GCHQ consequences of prosecuting the author under on the matter of whether to attempt to restrain the British Official Secrets Act. They were Winterbotham and his publisher. advised that prosecution could not be effective I am not alone in believing that an early without the case going to court and evidence official public description (perhaps a joint produced that British national security had been US-UK statement) of the basic facts of the war­ damaged by the book's publication with conse­ time exploitation of the intelligence derived quent public disclosure of more current intelli­ from the solution of the Eni gma keys might have gence activities. They therefore decided that le­ mitigated the damage done to security. Perhaps gal action would probably do more harm than good. this could have been strengthened by a further .December 75 * CRYPTOLOG * Page 1 SECRET IW41'te o'IA ee~HIC't' ettAICHEM 6HLY DOCID: 4009727 SECRE'f statement that the revelation of technical de­ cial liaison units) for the dissemination of tails of the methods of solution would be resisted ULTRA to commanders in the field. I have no indefinitely. I realise however that there reason to doubt that he records this faithfully. must be other valid arguments which persuaded He gives rise to feelings of iiscomfort, however, the responsible authorities not to take such when he describes his relations with the more action. high-ranking recipients of his wares. It ap­ I myself took no part in the solution of pears that Montgomery must have treated him with Enigma keys in Huts 6 and 8, nor in its exploi­ less courtesy than others and consequently he tation in Hut 3, but I am, I believe, the only feels sure he himself could have fought Mont­ person around who was on the directorate level gomery's battles far more efficiently! at Bletchley Park during the war and had a hand In view of its general inaccuracy, especially in many of the policy decisions made regarding when touching on technical matters, I believe the production and use of the intelligence the book, taken by itself, does no harm. This derived. cannot be said for the side effects it touched The book is poorly written and very inaccu­ off. The first review I read was in the rate in some areas where I know the facts. The Washington Post by Al Friendly, who himself references to the early history of Enigma solu­ served in Hut 3. He headlines his review "Con­ tion and to the activities of the staff of Hut 6 fessions of a Codebreaker." He gives the im­ (who performed the cryptanalytic part of the pression that for a great part of the war every enterprise) are hopelessly wrong. It is diffi­ telegraphic order issued by Hitler was currently cult to understand how the author who had con­ on the desk of the Prime Minister and concerned siderable responsibilities for the organisation Allied commanders. This is simply not true. and distribution of Enigma intelligence could Such a picture takes no account of the many dif­ have been so completely ignorant of the techni­ ficulties of the operation, the decisions to be cal side of the operation. He doesn't know the taken on insufficient evidence as to priorities difference between the Enigma (a rotor machine), of attack on some keys to the exclusion of other German ciphers, the Japanese high-grade others, the many failures and delays, the early diplomatic machine (the "Purple," a totally misunderstanding as to the real meaning of mes­ different kind of machine). and the Japanese sages, etc. The general success of the project Fleet general cipher (a codebook and additive was as much a triumph of organisation of the hand system). His remarks about the "Rronze large-scale attack as of the ingenuity and Goddess" appear to be a complete invention. persistence of the cryptanalysts, especially the mathematicians. Some people gather the impression when they read the book that the author greatly magnifies Perhaps the most objectionable of the reviews his own part in the winning of the war. I give was a long article in one of the London Sunday an example from my own experience. To quote newspapers by Peter Calvocoressi. He was an some passages, "It was at this point that Men­ important figure in Hut 3, presumably recruit­ zies told me he had decided to hand over my ed by Winterbotham. He is now, I believe, shadow OKW in Hut 3 to the General Administra­ managing director of Penguin Books and was the tion at Bletchley. One never knew where one joint author of a distinguished history of stood with Menzies. He softened the pill by World War II. His article is an extremely confirming me as his deputy, ••. " (p. 87). well-written description of life in Hut 3, but "Despite the loss of my personal control of Hut he has gone further than anyone else in includ­ 3 and the shadow OKW, I still had direct access ing a photograph of the German Service Enigma to it when required. I was never told by Men­ and in mentioning the Bombe. I believe this zies the real reasons for the takeover, • • . " was the first time a picture of the service (p. 92). The facts are that I reported to Enigma appeared in public print. Not even Bert­ the Director of Military Intelligence at the rand in his book Enigma gives a photograph of War Office, that Curtis, the War Office repre­ the machine. I am quite unable to understand sentative in Hut 3, in conjunction with Humphries, Calvocoressi's arrogant assumption that he can the corresponding Air Force representative, had say what he likes in public now that Winter­ on two separate occasions gone behind my back botham' s book has appeared. I hold the view to recommend reorganisation of Hut 3 under their that everyone who worked in Bletchley Park is own more direct control. In consequence, a still under a moral obligation not to disclose SIGINT Board meeting was called with General secrets not previously published without offi­ Menzies in the chair and consisting of thethree cial permission and, I would have thought, is Service Directors of Intelligence and Director aware of this obligation. GCHQ. At this meeting it was decided to with- draw Humphries, Curtis, and the naval represen- Many of us were nervous of what David Kahn tative. would have to say when his turn came to review I knew Winterbotham slightly and flew with the book. When his review did appear in the him to Paris on the occasion of one of my offi- New YoPk Review of Books, it was surprisingly cial visits to France in 1940.