A PRE-PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTION: NAPOLEON’S MARSHALATE AND THE DEFEAT OF 1813 Eric C. Smith, B.S. Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS August 2014 APPROVED: Michael V. Leggiere, Major Professor Richard G. Lowe, Committee Member Richard B. McCaslin, Committee Member and Chair of the Department of History Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Smith, Eric C. A Pre-Professional Institution: Napoleon’s Marshalate and the Defeat of 1813. Master of Arts (History), August 2014, 195 pp., 13 tables, 8 figures, bibliography, 155 titles. Napoleon’s defeat in 1813 generates a number of explanations from historians regarding why he lost this epic campaign which ultimately resulted in France losing control over the German states. Scholars discussing the French marshalate of the Napoleonic era frequently assert that these generals could not win battles without the emperor present. Accustomed to assuming a subordinate role under Bonaparte’s direct supervision, these commanders faltered when deprived of the strong hand of the master. This thesis contributes to this historiographical argument by positing that the pre-professional nature of Napoleon’s marshalate precluded them from adapting to the evolving nature of warfare during the First French Empire. Emerging from non-military backgrounds and deriving their capabilities solely from practical experience, the marshals failed to succeed at endeavors outside of their capacity. An examination of the military administration of the Old Regime, the effects of the French Revolution on the French generalate, and the circumstances under which Bonaparte labored when creating the imperial marshalate demonstrates that issues systemic to the French high command contributed to French defeat in 1813. This thesis also provides evidence that Napoleon understood this problem and attempted to better prepare his marshals for independent command by instructing them in his way of war during the 1813 campaign. Copyright 2014 by Eric C. Smith ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my adviser Dr. Michael Leggiere for his patience and guidance in writing this thesis. Despite being a soldier en-route to teach at the Military Academy, he took me in and treated me as one of his circle of graduate students. I also owe a debt to my committee members, Drs. Richard Lowe and Richard McCaslin, whose mentorship made me a better student. Dr. Guy Chet also provided a significant amount of support to my endeavors at the University of North Texas, and I would be remiss to not mention him in this acknowledgement. I also would like to thank my circle of fellow scholars at North Texas: Jordan Hayworth, Nate Jarrett, Chad Tomaselli, Jonathan Abel, Kyle Hatzinger, and Casey Baker. I frequently relied on them for their advice and experience to help me through this process. Despite their busy schedules, they took me in and treated me as one of their own. The Department of History at the University of North Texas proved very helpful and treated myself and my other Military Academy colleagues very well, and I cannot forget to thank the Department for its support. Last, but definitely not least, I need to thank my wife Becky for her support during these last two years. After watching me deploy overseas for the first year of our marriage, she demonstrated an incredible amount of patience and love when she found out I would be spending our first years together as a couple with a man dead for almost two hundred years. Without her encouragement, I could not have done this. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1 2. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MILITARY THEORY AND ADMINISTRATION .........9 3. THE REVOLUTION AND THE CREATION OF A NEW FRENCH GENERALATE .....................................................................................................37 4. NAPOLEON AND THE SELECTION OF THE IMPERIAL MARSHALATE ..........64 5. THE 1813 CAMPAIGN: A CASE STUDY IN NAPOLEON’S PEDAGOGY ...........89 6. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................128 Appendices APPENDIX A: PROMOTION TIMELINES OF 1794 ARMY COMMANDERS VERSUS 1799 ARMY COMMANDERS ..........................................................136 APPENDIX B: FRENCH ARMY COMMANDERS, 1792-1802 ..................................138 APPENDIX C: CAREERS OF THE 1804 MARSHALATE, 1792-1804 ......................142 APPENDIX D: CAREERS OF THE LATER MARSHALATE .....................................146 APPENDIX E: CAREERS OF THE 1799 SAMPLE, 1792-1804 ..................................149 APPENDIX F: CAREERS AND ARMY COMMANDS OF THE MARSHALATE, 1804-1812 ............................................................................................................152 APPENDIX G: THE 32ND MILITARY DIVISION ........................................................155 APPENDIX H: HAVELBERG.......................................................................................157 APPENDIX I: POSITIONS FORWARD OF MAGDEBURG .......................................159 APPENDIX J: PURSUIT AFTER LÜTZEN AND THE ARMISTICE .........................161 iv APPENDIX K: THE BATTLEFIELD OF BAUTZEN...................................................163 APPENDIX L: CENTRAL EUROPE, 1812 ...................................................................165 APPENDIX M: THE END OF THE ARMISTICE .........................................................167 APPENDIX N: OUDINOT’S AXES OF ADVANCE AND THE BATTLE OF GROß BEEREN ..............................................................................................................169 APPENDIX O: DRESDEN .............................................................................................171 APPENDIX P: THE AREA SOUTH OF DRESDEN .....................................................173 APPENDIX Q: SITUATION, LATE AUGUST 1813 ....................................................175 APPENDIX R: THE BATTLE OF THE KATZBACH ..................................................177 APPENDIX S: THE BATTLE OF DENNEWITZ ..........................................................179 APPENDIX T: SITUATION, SEPTEMBER TO OCTOBER 1813 ...............................181 APPENDIX U: THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG, 16 OCTOBER1813 ................................183 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................185 v LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 3.1: Days Between Promotion to General of Brigade and General of Division, 1804 Marshals .............................................................................................................................77 Figure 3.2: Days Between Promotion to General of Brigade and General of Division, Later Marshals .............................................................................................................................78 Figure 3.3: Days Between Promotion to General of Brigade and General of Division, 1799 Sample................................................................................................................................78 Figure 3.4: Number of Army Commands Greater than a Single Division, 1792-1805, Future Marshals .............................................................................................................................79 Figure 3.5: Number of Corps Commands, 1805-1812, All Marshals ............................................80 Figure 3.6: Number of Army Commands, 1792-1805, Future Marshals.......................................81 Figure 3.7: Number of Army Commands, 1805-1812, All Marshals ............................................81 Figure 3.8: Army Commands, 1799 Sample, 1792-1804 ..............................................................82 vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Historians attribute the unending tide of French victories between 1805 and 1809 to the military brilliance of Napoleon. His genius on the battlefield struck fear into Europe for almost a decade. Unfortunately, this strength also proved to be his foremost weakness. Without him, the system of warfare dependent on his personal presence collapsed. The incapacity of many of Napoleon’s marshals at independent command evidences this point. Napoleon employed these men as his tools, most famously appointing them to command French corps on campaign. As the empire expanded in size, they stepped outside of the emperor’s oversight and commanded armies of their own. With a few key exceptions, many of these men failed at this particular endeavor. France’s marshals could not replicate Napoleon’s success without his intellect to guide them. The failures of the imperial marshalate highlight the role that Napoleon’s genius played in the triumphs of the First French Empire. The inability of the marshalate to command without the emperor’s supervision contributed to French defeat in the 1813 campaign.1 In August 1813, Napoleon spread his forces between North Germany, Silesia, and Bohemia. He entrusted Marshal Nicolas Charles Oudinot with the task of seizing Berlin, which he hoped would remove Prussia from the war and shatter the alliance opposing him. Though he did not initially intend