Notes Chapter 1 An Introduction to Three Global Environmental Issues 1. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005. Web address: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/fra2005/site/en. 2. See chapter 6 for a list of these gases. 3. US Department of Energy, Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Voluntary Reporting. Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, US Department of Energy, Washington, DC, October 1997. 4. Research findings published in early 2006 indicate that ozone recovery detected in the 1990s may have been at least partially attributable to the intensity of the eleven-year solar cycle. However, although the solar cycle may complicate attempts to determine the effect of decreases in ozone-depleting chemicals, scientists predict that a sustainable ozone layer recovery should be detectable after the sun goes through its next period of minimum intensity in 2008, and may still recover by 2050, as per earlier UNEP predictions. David Adam, “Hole in ozone layer expected to increase,” Guardian, February 16, 2006, 13; also see Naila Moreira, “Ozone ‘Recovery’ May be Solar Trick,” ScienceNOW Daily News, February 13, 2006. Web address: http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/2006/ 213/1?eaf. 5. See, e.g., Steve Connor, “The Final Proof: Global Warming is a Man-Made Disaster,” Independent, February 19, 2005, 1; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Current Evidence of Climate Change.” Web address: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2904. php. 6. US official, personal communication, August 2001; British official, personal com- munication, May 2005. Chapter 2 A Different Approach to Understanding Environmental Regime Creation 1. My approach is based on the negotiation analysis approach of Sebenius (1991, 1992a, 1992b; Lax and Sebenius 1986) and others and Knight’s (1992) 212 ● Notes power-based theory of institution building in the context of conflicting interests. See also Krasner’s third definition of bargaining power as the ability to change the values within the game’s payoff matrix (1991, 340). 2. S. Touval and J. Rubin, “Multilateral Negotiation: An Analytic Approach,” Cambridge, MA: Working Paper Series, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, 1987, 1; quoted in Zartman 1994. The same observation can be made about “dilemmas of common aversions” that Stein models with coordination games (1983, 126); also see R. Hardin 1982. 3. The authors acknowledge that the bargaining process itself is a potential source of change in preferences but, justifiably enough, exclude it from the scope of their article. 4. Parties to an agreement include those states that have ratified it or undertaken an equivalent procedure, including acceptances, accessions, and approvals for those states requiring them; in many states this necessitates legislative approval of the executive’s signature on a treaty. 5. A shorter version of this argument appears in Davenport 2005. 6. W. M. Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); quoted in Zartman 1991, 68. 7. Snidal (1985b) is optimistic about the chances for successful and stable coopera- tion among a small group of smaller powers in the absence of a country with overwhelming power superiority. However, his analysis does not address a situa- tion in which a coalition of smaller countries would be required to cooperate in order to coerce cooperation by a dominant power that opposes agreement; the likelihood of this appears very small. 8. Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); cited in DeSombre 2000 Perceptions may also be affected by the framing effect identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1986; also see Berejekian 1997), or the phenomenon found in numerous studies that costs are generally felt more than benefits. Thus, even if everything else were equal, the costs of manipulating another state’s preferences through incentives might be felt more deeply by the manipulating state than would the benefit be felt by the target state. This might influence to some small extent which form of manipulation is chosen, but it appears that the feasibility of each type of manipulation in specific circumstances has much more to do with which one is chosen than a framing effect. 9. US official, personal communication, December 2001. 10. US official, personal communication, December 2001. 11. See Haas 1992a; also see, e.g., Benedick 1998. 12. Snidal (1985a) is incorrect in calling environmental services “public goods”; see Hardin 1992, 17, fn 4. 13. National interests are not monolithic, of course. Nevertheless, the unitary actor approach may be used in considering policy-makers’ calculations of net costs and benefits of agreement in overall terms. As Snidal points out, “domestic factors shape the preferences that guide states in their interactions. But if the executive has maintained its policy (or implemented coherent policy change) then the unitary actor assumption is sustained” (Snidal 1990, 340–342). Notes ● 213 14. Oye and Maxwell contrast “Stiglerian” situations with “Olsonian” ones in which the converse is true (terms based, respectively, on George Stigler, “The Economic Theory of Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics 2 (1971): 3–21, and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 15. Australian NGO representative, personal communication, August 2001. 16. See, e.g., Sebenius 1992b, 335. 17. Taken from Nicole T. Carter, CRS Report for Congress. “New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection,” Congressional Research Service Report RS 22238, September 6, 2005. Also see Will Bunch, “Did New Orleans Catastrophe Have to Happen? ‘Times-Picayune’ Had Repeatedly Raised Federal Spending Issues,”Philadelphia Daily News, August 31, 2005. Web address: http://www.editorandpublisher.com. 18. Delegate to International Tropical Timber Council meeting, personal communi- cation, May 1994. Chapter 3 Ozone Politics 1. Stratospheric ozone is distinguished from ground-level ozone that is itself anthropogenic in origin and is one of the chemicals that contribute to smog. 2. Richard Benedick was the chief US negotiator for the ozone treaties from 1985 till the mid-1990s. 3. Cited in Thomas 1992, 201. 4. See Appendix 4.1 for a detailed list of commitments on ODSs, with targets and timelines. 5. For CFCs as well as for all other chemical groups listed, some exception is made for essential uses. 6. Except where otherwise noted, article numbers refer to articles in the Montreal Protocol. 7. According to Benedick, because many early compliance problems, particularly for developing countries, were due to the great technical complexities in assembling national data on production and trade that was the foundation for monitoring compliance, there was a good rationale for providing an option for “friendly” assistance rather than stigmatization through cautions (1998, 272). 8. Trade sanctions were originally intended to encourage countries to join the Protocol by helping to ensure that markets for CFCs would dry up for non-parties as more and more countries acceded. 9. R. E. Train, EPA, speech to NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, December 3, 1976; cited in Parson 2003, 45, fn 102. Even as early as May 1975 the United States and Canada asked the OECD, which had the authority to negotiate agreements among its member states, to take action on CFCs, but after publishing a staff report examining an aerosol ban in 1980, OECD activity ground to a halt (Parson 2003, 45). 10. Benedick 1998, 41. As of 1990, the United States supplied about 30% of world demand for CFCs, second to the ECs 40% (Jachtenfuchs 1990, 261). 214 ● Notes 11. G. W. Wirth, P. W. Brunner, and F. S. Bishop, “Regulatory Action,” Stratospheric Ozone and Man 2(1981); quoted in Morrisette 1989, 806. 12. Adele R. Palmer et al., Economic Implications of Regulating Chlorofluorocarbon Emissions from Nonaerosol Applications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1980); cited in Brown and Lyon 1992, 128. Also see Rowlands 1995, 102. 13. DeSombre (2000, 27–28) is correct that US industry later had an incentive to push for international regulation regarding CFCs in non-aerosol uses, but not until 1986. 14. Reported in Parson 2003, 115. 15. Mostafa Tolba was Executive Director of UNEP from 1976 to 1992. 16. Parson in fact calls the period between 1975 and 1985 a “decade of deadlock” (2003, 245). I argue that the deadlock persisted until negotiations leading to the Montreal Protocol began to produce convergence in positions in 1987. 17. Nigel Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy and Britain, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1989), 266; quoted in Benedick 1998, 25. 18. Parson 1993, 32; Grundmann 1998, 206; see also Brown and Lyon 1992, 125; DeSombre 2000, 145. 19. US Environmental Protection Agency, “Stratospheric Ozone Protection Plan.” Fed. Reg. 51 (1985) 1257; cited in Benedick 1998, 49, fn 22. 20. Dudek and Oppenheimer (1986) summarize the findings of a number of these studies. 21. Congressional Record, S7712, June 5, 1987. 22. Testimony of Eileen Claussen (Director, EPA Office of Program Development); and Lee Thomas (EPA Administrator) in Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances and on Environmental Protection of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 100th