39/2010 Kauhajoki School Shooting on 23 September 2008 Report of the Investigation Commission REPORTS AND GUIDELINES 39/2010 Kauhajoki School Shooting on 23 September 2008 Report of the Investigation Commission Translation of the Finnish original report Multiprint Oy VANTAA, FINLAND 2010 17.2.2010 Name of Kauhajoki School Shooting on 23 September 2008 – Report of the Investigation the Publication Commission Author Investigation Commission of the Kauhajoki School Shooting Publication of the Reports and guidelines Serial number 39/2010 Ministry of Justice OSKARI number OM 11/021/2008 ISSN-L 1798-7059 ISSN (bound) 1798-7059 ISSN (PDF) 1759-7067 ISBN (bound) 978-952-466-514-8 ISBN (PDF) 978-952-466-515-5 Keywords school shooting, Kauhajoki, guns, security recommendations Abstract On 23 September 2008, a school shooting took place in Kauhajoki when a student in the local polytechnic entered his school, shot nine students in his study group, a teacher, and finally himself. The perpetrator carried fuel with him which he used to start several fires in the building. Of the students who were in the classroom when the incident took place, three survived, one of whom received a gunshot wound in the head. The psychosocial damage caused by the incident was considerable. An investigation commission was appointed to look into the incident and its back- ground, as well as the activities of the authorities, other operators involved in the inci- dent, and the media. The main results of the investigation are presented in the 28 conclusions and 9 recommendations included in the report. The purpose of the rec- ommendations and the entire investigation process was to enhance general security by learning from the incident. The fact that the perpetrator ended up committing this act was the result of a long process involving many factors. He had been suffering from mental health problems for approximately ten years and his condition had taken a turn for the worse. Several factors were involved during the course of the perpetrator’s life which contributed to his problems. With hindsight, it seems probable that the perpetrator would have bene- fited from being examined by a specialist in psychiatry. In the light of the information currently available, it is impossible to establish beyond any doubt why the young man’s mental health problems were channelled into an admiration for school shoot- ings and, eventually, led to him committing the deed, which was clearly modelled on earlier school shootings. The perpetrator used a self-loading or semi-automatic firearm, which was small-calibre but still capable of inflicting serious damage. The investigation commission recom- mends that firearms capable of firing multiple shots in a very short period of time be made illegal, and that only guns that do not allow the easy infliction of such carnage be available for hobby purposes. With respect to other types of firearms, the investiga- tion commission recommends that a stricter licensing policy be implemented. A dis- senting opinion on firearm recommendations has been recorded, however. To enhance the mental health care services available for young people, the committee also recommends that antidepressants not be prescribed for persons younger than 23 years of age without a thorough examination by a specialist doctor. Other recommen- dations presented in the report concern the enhancement of student health care, par- ticularly mental health care; the enhancement of interaction between generations in educational institutions; comprehensive security planning in educational institutions; shared command responsibility between authorities in operational situations; coopera- tion between authorities in preventive work; and the coordination of psychosocial sup- port. FOREWORD On 23 September 2008, a school shooting took place in Kauhajoki, with a student shooting 10 others and then himself in a school building. In this investigation report, the incident will be referred to by the everyday-language term ‘school shooting’ regardless of the definition of that phrase in criminal law. The crimes investigated by the police were 10 murders, 12 attempted murders, and an aggravated act of destruction. On the basis of the Act on the Investigation of Certain Fatal Incidents (662/2008), the Government appointed on 27 November 2008 an investigation commission to investi- gate the incident. The composition of the investigation commission was as follows: Chairman Pekka Sauri, chairman of the Finnish Central Association for Mental Health Members Pekka Aho, Inspector General of the Police, Ministry of the Interior, Se- curity Sector Supervision Unit (currently Chief Inspector for the Central Finland Police Department) Mirjam Kalland, Secretary General of the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare Esko Kaukonen, Special Research Officer of the Emergency Services College Ullamaija Kivikuru, Professor, University of Helsinki Pauli Niemelä, Professor, University of Kuopio (now the University of Eastern Finland) Leena Suurpää, Research Director at the Finnish Youth Research Society Kai Valonen, Chief Accident Investigator, Accident Investigation Board Secretary Sini Järvi, Assistant, Accident Investigation Board The expert for the investigation commission in structural fire safety and management of rescue activities was Rescue Director Jorma Westerholm of the Rescue Department of Northern Savonia. The psychiatry expert was Jari Sinkkonen, MD, Docent. On the basis of the police investigation, the investigation commission drew up this investi- gation report, wherein the approach is similar to that of an accident investigation. The in- vestigation report is divided into three main sections. The first, referred to as the factual section, recounts the events and their background. In the analysis section, the investigation commission analyses the facts that emerged in the investigation and discusses their signifi- cance. On the basis of the preceding analysis, the last section of the investigation report presents the conclusions and recommendations of the investigation commission. The investigation was aimed at the prevention of similar incidents and the improvement of safety, so no consideration was given to questions of guilt or compensation. The in- vestigation report was not written to be used in a court of law; therefore, its content and style do not correspond to legal practice. The draft investigation report was circulated for comments in the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Addi- tionally, interested parties and persons and organisations closely involved in the incident were invited to submit their comments on the report. The comments were taken into ac- count when the finishing touches were being put to the report. The investigation report is available for download on the Ministry of Justice Web site, www.om.fi. The investigation material is held by the Accident Investigation Board of Finland. INDEX 1. THE INCIDENT .................................................................................................................. 13 1.1. General description....................................................................................................... 13 1.2. The locale...................................................................................................................... 13 1.3. The course of events ..................................................................................................... 14 1.4. Police and rescue operations......................................................................................... 18 1.4.1. Alerts .................................................................................................................. 18 1.4.2. Police operations ................................................................................................ 21 1.4.3. Rescue operations............................................................................................... 23 1.4.4. Emergency Medical Services............................................................................. 24 1.4.5. Activities at medical institutions........................................................................ 27 1.4.6. Other immediate action taken by the authorities................................................ 28 1.4.7. Operational command involving multiple authorities........................................ 29 1.4.8. Communications................................................................................................. 30 1.4.9. Action taken by central administration authorities ............................................ 31 1.5. Identifying the victims and informing the families ...................................................... 34 1.6. Psychosocial support..................................................................................................... 37 1.6.1. Acute crisis relief ............................................................................................... 37 1.6.2. Psychosocial support in the following months and years .................................. 41 1.7. Damage ......................................................................................................................... 43 1.7.1. Personal injury.................................................................................................... 43 1.7.2. Damage to property...........................................................................................