Maestría en Análisis, Derecho y Gestión Electoral Tesis: “Representación política y dinámica partidaria. Un análisis de los municipios del conurbano bonaerense (1983-2013)” Autor: Gabriela Porta Correo electrónico: [email protected] Director: Dr. Miguel De Luca Lugar y Fecha: Buenos Aires, 2017 Resumen La provincia de Buenos Aires es una de las principales arenas electorales de Argentina, en tanto es la más extensa, poblada y de mayor peso en la política nacional. Sin embargo, el espacio más densamente poblado está concentrado en un fragmento relativamente menor de su territorio: el Conurbano. Esta tesis estudia las relaciones entre representación política y dinámica partidaria en esa área, desde tres perspectivas: en primer lugar, analizando el impacto del sistema electoral municipal en los 24 distritos que conforman el Conurbano de la Provincia de Buenos Aires entre 1983 y 2013. Este trabajo plantea que el análisis municipal - tanto en términos político-electorales como de los liderazgos que allí surgen- resulta indispensable para comprender la vida política, no solo al interior de la Provincia sino también en relación con otras instancias de decisión (nacional y subnacional). Para ello, la investigación se estructura en torno al estudio interrelacionado de: la magnitud del distrito o circunscripción electoral, la concurrencia entre la elección de cargos ejecutivos y legislativos; la fórmula electoral y la estructura de la boleta. En segundo lugar, reconstruyendo cómo impactan las reglas electorales sobre los principales actores políticos que compiten en cada elección y en la conformación de los Concejos Deliberantes. En tercer lugar, abordando la dinámica política a nivel municipal; atendiendo al rol que ejercen los intendentes y la construcción de sus liderazgos, y colocando el énfasis en la configuración del poder de éstos y de su capacidad para ser reelegidos, al tiempo que se caracteriza cómo interactúan en las distintas arenas políticas-nacional, provincial y municipal. i SUMARIO: 1. INTRODUCCIÓN ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Provincia y Gran Buenos Aires: aproximación al territorio ......................................................... 1 1.2. Representación política y dinámica partidaria ............................................................................. 8 1.3. Encuadre metodológico .............................................................................................................. 11 2. ESTADO DE LA CUESTIÓN Y MARCO TEÓRICO ................................................................ 13 2.1. Antecedentes históricos del debate ............................................................................................. 13 2.2. La Provincia de Buenos Aires como protagonista del análisis ................................................... 20 3. LAS REGLAS DEL SISTEMA NACIONAL Y DEL SUBSISTEMA PROVINCIAL ............. 27 3.1. Reglas nacionales ....................................................................................................................... 27 3.2. El sistema electoral de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. La fórmula “Hare a la Bonaerense” ...... 31 4. LOS ACTORES ............................................................................................................................... 44 4.1. Gobernadores Bonaerenses ........................................................................................................ 44 4.2. ¿Barones, Caudillos o Intendentes? Construyendo un perfil del líder Municipal ...................... 48 4.3. Barones del Conurbano; ¿mito o fenómeno de la política argentina? ........................................ 57 4.3.1. Mito I: “Los barones del conurbano permanecen eternamente en el poder” ...................... 59 4.3.2. Mito II: “Los barones del conurbano son todos peronistas” ............................................... 64 4.3.3. Mito III “Los intendentes del conurbano permanecen fieles a sus partidos” ...................... 70 4.3.4. Mito IV: “Los intendentes del Conurbano ganan por amplios márgenes de victoria” ....... 84 4.3.5. Mito V: “Los barones del conurbano son invencibles” ...................................................... 91 4.3.6. Mito VI: El comportamiento electoral de los intendentes del Conurbano es homogéneo .. 96 4.4. Desempeño electoral de los partidos políticos en el Conurbano Bonaerense ¿Cambios o continuidades? ................................................................................................................................... 99 4.5. Concejos Deliberantes: Análisis de la distribución de las preferencias electorales legislativas………………………………………………………………………………...……….137 5. ANÁLISIS DE CASOS: LOS MUNICIPIOS DE LANÚS Y QUILMES ................................. 143 5.1. Manuel Quindimil: Crónica de una reelección anunciada ........................................................ 143 5.2. Quilmes, el “caso atípico” del Conurbano ............................................................................... 151 5.3. Consideraciones finales ............................................................................................................ 158 6. CONCLUSIONES ......................................................................................................................... 160 7. BIBLIOGRAFÍA ........................................................................................................................... 175 8. 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