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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that ad- dress the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for re- search quality and objectivity. Modeling, Simulation, and Operations Analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq Operational Vignettes, Lessons Learned, and a Survey of Selected Efforts Ben Connable, Walter L. Perry, Abby Doll, Natasha Lander, Dan Madden C O R P O R A T I O N NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Modeling, Simulation, and Operations Analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq Operational Vignettes, Lessons Learned, and a Survey of Selected Efforts Ben Connable, Walter L. Perry, Abby Doll, Natasha Lander, Dan Madden Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Approved for public release; distribution unlimited This research was sponsored by OSD-CAPE and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: 978-0-8330-8211-4 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND—make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute.html R® is a registered trademark. Photo by Cpl. Ruben D. Maestre © Copyright 2014 RAND Corporation This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see the RAND permissions page (www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html). RAND OFFICES SANTA MONICA, CA • WASHINGTON, DC PITTSBURGH, PA • NEW ORLEANS, LA • JACKSON, MS • BOSTON, MA DOHA, QA • CAMBRIDGE, UK • BRUSSELS, BE www.rand.org Preface The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD-CAPE) asked RAND to conduct a lessons learned examination of analysis, modeling, and simulation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND) to help improve resource alloca- tions in these activities. This effort will identify decisions at all levels of counterin- surgency and, more broadly, irregular warfare that could benefit from more extensive and rigorous modeling and simulation. It also identifies ways in which analysts have attempted to address these decisions, describes many of the models and tools they employed, provides insight into the challenges they faced, and suggests ways in which the application of modeling, simulation, and analysis might be improved for current and future operations. Interviews and review of analytic activities focused on the expe- rience of analysts and their consumers in U.S. forces in OEF, OIF, and OND from late 2001 through early 2012. This research was sponsored by OSD-CAPE and conducted within the Interna- tional Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the Director (contact information is provided on webpage). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................................... iii Figures and Tables ..................................................................................ix Summary .............................................................................................xi Acknowledgments ............................................................................... xvii Abbreviations ...................................................................................... xix CHaptER ONE Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 Clarifying Terminology .............................................................................. 3 Use of the Term Model in This Report ........................................................... 3 Use of the Term Simulation in This Report ...................................................... 4 Defining and Differentiating Between “Analysis” and “Assessment” ......................... 5 Differences Between Campaign Assessment and Intelligence Analysis ...................... 8 Systems Analysis .................................................................................... 8 Why Are COIN and IW So Difficult to Analyze and Assess? .................................. 9 Research Objectives and Limits ....................................................................10 Focus on Operations for the Army and Marine Corps ........................................11 Methodology .........................................................................................11 About This Report .................................................................................. 12 CHaptER TWO Decision Issues and Analysis in COIN and IW Literature ................................ 13 Two Highly Relevant Publications ................................................................ 13 TRAC Irregular Warfare Working Group Report .............................................14 CAA Deployed Analyst History for OIF .......................................................16 Decision Issues Identified in Literature ............................................................19 M&S and Analytical Methods Identified in Literature .........................................21 Demonstrated IW Decision Support Identified in Literature ..................................21 Courses of Action Associated with Families of Analysis ..................................... 22 Kinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Physics-Based Analysis ........................... 23 Kinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Social Science Analysis .......................... 25 v vi Modeling, Simulation, and Operations Analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq Nonkinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Physics-Based Analysis ...................... 27 Nonkinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Social Science Analysis ...................... 28 Pattern and Trend Analysis and Assessment ................................................... 30 Literature Identifies Factors That Hindered Analytic Support to Commanders .......... 33 Operations Researchers Have Their Say About IW Assessment: MORS Workshops .... 35 Summary of Decision and Analytic Issues in the Literature ................................... 39 Analysts should be vested in the problem. ..................................................... 40 Know how and where to find data, and compare data. ...................................... 40 Analysts must answer the question asked. ..................................................... 40 Help commanders understand complexity. .................................................... 41 Build credibility as an analyst. .................................................................. 41 Know the players, use all available tools—both art and science. ...........................