A Report by a Study Team of the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION For the National Aeronautics and Space Administration October 2005 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR-LED MISSIONS IN SPACE SCIENCE Advisory Panel John G. Stewart, Chair Herbert N. Jasper Study Team William Lilly, Project Director Carole M. P. Neves, Senior Advisor Malcolm L. Peterson, Senior Advisor Officers of the Academy Valerie A. Lemmie, Chair of the Board G. Edward DeSeve, Vice Chair C. Morgan Kinghorn, President Jonathan D. Breul, Secretary Howard M. Messner, Treasurer Project Staff J. William Gadsby, Vice President, Academy Studies William Lilly, Project Director Carole M. P. Neves, Senior Advisor Malcolm L. Peterson, Senior Advisor The views expressed in this report are those of the Study Team. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Academy as an institution. National Academy of Public Administration 1100 New York Avenue, N.W. Suite 1090 East Washington, DC 20005 www.napawash.org First published October 2005 Printed in the United States of America ISBN 1-57744-119-2 Academy Project Number: 2035-100 ii FOREWORD Since its creation in 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has undertaken many space flight missions to carry out the mandate in its enabling legislation to increase “human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space.” These space missions have been planned, designed, developed, and operated using a variety of management approaches. More than a decade ago, NASA decided to undertake an experiment that would place the principal scientific investigator in a leadership position for the life cycle of a space science mission, beginning with the initial proposal and concluding with the final scientific data analysis and publication of results. The space science community was quick to embrace this new approach and responded to NASA’s solicitation of proposals with a large number of mission concepts. The solicitation included fixed schedule durations and limitations on the amount of government funding. Proposals selected for development would have to meet three tests. First and foremost, were they investigating scientifically compelling phenomena? Second, were the proposed technical and management approaches consistent with good engineering practices? Third, were they capable of being executed with a reasonable level of confidence within the cost and schedule caps established in NASA’s Announcement of Opportunity? In the ensuing decade, more than 400 proposals were subjected to those evaluation criteria. Out of this number, twenty missions were approved for development. As of this writing, twelve have been launched, with eleven having returned scientific data. NASA asked the National Research Council and the National Academy of Public Administration (Academy) to conduct an independent review of the principal investigator-led missions. The Academy’s study analyzes the causes for increased mission costs and makes recommendations to reduce the likelihood of cost growth in future missions. The study team’s fundamental conclusion is that changes in the competitive solicitation process can be made that will provide NASA with a better base of information on the probable costs and schedule. This, in turn, will allow NASA decision officials to assess the risks and provide an appropriate level of contingency in the funding requested for missions approved for development. The National Research Council’s study focused on the selection process and objectives for principal investigator-led missions; the roles and relationships among principal investigator team members; lessons learned from previous missions; and opportunities for knowledge transfer to new principal investigators. The Academy was pleased to undertake this study. I want to thank the Academy Fellows and the study team for their hard work and diligence in producing this important report. C. Morgan Kinghorn President iii iv TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD................................................................................................................................iii ACRONYMS............................................................................................................................... vii INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 SECTION I: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PI-LED MISSIONS............................................ 3 Embarking on an Experiment ..................................................................................................... 3 The Initial PI-Led Missions ........................................................................................................ 5 The Rationale for PI Leadership.................................................................................................7 The Experience with PI Leadership............................................................................................ 8 NASA’s Phased Project Planning and Execution Process........................................................ 12 Impact of the NASA Integrated Action Team Report .............................................................. 15 SECTION II: FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................. 17 The Proposal Process ................................................................................................................ 18 The Mission Development Process........................................................................................... 25 TABLES AND FIGURE Table 1. Number of PI-Led Mission Proposals Received; Selected for Concept Feasibility Studies; Selected for Development; and Launched, 1994-2003 ................. 11 Figure 1. Space Science Flight Program Management Process Flow ......................................... 13 Table 2. Cost Performance Measures for Discovery Projects, Expressed as a Percentage ......... 14 Table 3. Cost Estimates for a Medium Class Explorer Mission.................................................. 28 APPENDICES APPENDIX A: Individuals Interviewed or Contacted ............................................................... 31 APPENDIX B: References ......................................................................................................... 35 APPENDIX C: Advisory Panel and Staff................................................................................... 39 v vi ACRONYMS Academy National Academy of Public Administration AO Announcement of Opportunity APL Applied Physics Laboratory (a unit of the Johns Hopkins University) ARC Ames Research Center (NASA Center located in Sunnyvale, CA) CR Confirmation Review FY Fiscal Year JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory (operated for NASA by the California Institute of Technology) LMA Lockheed-Martin Astronautics (Denver, CO) LMMS Lockheed-Martin Missiles and Space (Sunnyvale, CA) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NIAT NASA Integrated Action Team NRC National Research Council PI Principal Investigator PM Project Manager SSB Space Studies Board (a component of the National Research Council) vii viii INTRODUCTION The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has, over the last decade, used principal scientific investigators in project leadership roles for an increasing number of Earth and Space Science flight missions. The principal investigators (PIs) lead missions throughout their lifecycles—from inception through definition, design, development, test, launch, mission operations, and data analysis. The conventional approach for NASA is to use its internal project managers (PMs) to lead the design and development of space flight projects. Under this approach, the principal scientific investigators have leadership responsibility for the science investigation and, commonly, for the design and development of a specific instrument. For their part, the NASA PMs are responsible for optimizing the spacecraft’s design and development. This optimization takes place within technical constraints that include: the launch vehicle that places payloads into orbit, the electrical power provided by the solar arrays, the telemetry downlink rate, the on-board computational capability, etc. There are also programmatic constraints, such as annual budget limitations, total cost for the mission, and schedule. The optimum arrangement of these highly interactive constraints is an extraordinary challenge. Compromises are often struck, and in the process, engineering, cost, and schedule feasibility often trumps optimum arrangements for the science investigations. NASA’s space science program managers commissioned this study to identify corrective actions to address the increase in the number and magnitude of cost overruns in PI-led space science flight missions. The associate administrator for space science asked the National Research Council’s (NRC) Space Studies Board (SSB) to take a broad look at PI-led projects, examining the overall successes and difficulties of PI-led space science missions, and to recommend ways to improve their overall performance. The National Academy of Public Administration (Academy) study team worked closely with the SSB’s Committee on PI-Led Missions in the Space Sciences. The interaction proved highly valuable, because the Committee’s membership consisted of experienced space scientists and program managers. In the course of this study, the NRC committee and the Academy study team interviewed PIs, industry and government program and project managers, and other members of